Philosophy as scientia scientiarum : and, A history of classifications of the sciences

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PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIAEUM

AND

A HISTORY OF CLASSIFICATIONS
OF THE SCIENCES

PHILOSOPHY AS SOIENTIA SOIENTIARUM

AND

A HISTOKY OF CLASSIFICATIONS
OF THE SCIENCES

BY

ROBERT FLINT

D.D., LL.D., F.R.8.S.
ooBBnPOVDnro kxhbbb of thb uwtitot b or nuvcs ;

HOTOBABY MEMBER OF TBS ROYAL SOC1KTT OF PALERMO J AKD
PBOFBWOB (EMXEITUS), BCIVBUBGH UVnPBBBITY

i * •

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS

EDINBURGH AND LONDON

MCMIV

All Righto reserved

121092

PREFATORY NOTE.

Very little requires to be referred to here. The Table
of Contents should render unnecessary any Index of
Names. The author's connection with the subject of
his book has been a lengthened one. When a mere
youth in Glasgow University he joined a number of
young men, among whom were representative Cana-
dians, Englishmen, Welshmen, and others, in forming
a Literary and Philosophical Society. As a member
and vice-president his contributions to it were two
essays, one on " Cartesianism " and the other on " The
Relations of the Sciences." The former cost him a
study of two hundred old books in Latin and French,
but it soon got lost and never returned to him. The
latter he still possesses, and deems on the whole fairly
accurate so far as it goes. His dealing with such a
subject at all he attributes to the inspiration of the
greatest of his teachers, the Professor William Thom-
son of the time, the Lord Kelvin of to-day and of all
time. My study on the " Relations of the Sciences "
did not deal at all with the history of the subject, but

VI PREFATORY NOTE.

kept entirely to what was implied in the title. During
some years I was entirely engrossed with pastoral
duties. In 1864-65, my first session as Professor of
Moral Philosophy and Political Economy at St An-
drews, I gave some lectures on the connection of those
two sciences to other sciences. In 1867 I had begun
to think of constructing an elaborate work on the
Relations of the Sciences to one another, to Philosophy,
Religion, and Morality, and such a work was adver-
tised for a considerable number of years. The delay
and revocation must have been hard on the publishers,
but I suppose publishers get accustomed to such things.
For myself I deem it fortunate and even providential
to have had to change my intended course and follow
others where more urgent demands were made and
more obvious interests were at stake. A considerable
portion of the History of Classifications of the Scieiices
appeared in America long prior to any portion of it in
Britain. The portion referred to will be found in the
July number of the Presbyterian Review for 1885.
Dr Briggs and Dr Patton were the chief editors of the
Review. Dr Calderwood, Dr Blaikie, Dr Croskery,
and I were associate editors for Great Britain. Never
can I forget the kindness and worthiness of them all.
Alas 1 few of them now remain here below. May those
of us who are still here walk worthy of those who
have gone before.

R. FLINT.

1 Mountjoy Terrace, Musselburgh, N.B.,
24th September 1904.

CONTENTS.

PAon

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM 1-63

I. Philosophy should supplement the sciences . 3-7

It should trace aright their boundaries and relationships 7-12

Should aid them effectively to co-operate. Examples . 12-16

Needed to counteract excessive specialism. Examples . 16-18

Bemarks on a passage of Wordsworth 19-21

Philosophy should be a guide to education . . 21-23

Truths between as important as truths within the sciences 24-28

II. How philosophy should help to estimate aright the sciences 28-32

Philosophy as Critical ..... 32-33

as Metaphysical ..... 33-36

as Practical ...... 37-38

how different from ordinary knowledge or positive

science ....... 38-41

III. The various species of knowledge. Animal Mind 41-51

Ordinary human knowledge . 51-52

Scientific knowledge ..... 52-54

Philosophic knowledge ..... 54-56

Restatement of its stages or species 57-62

Divine knowledge. Omniscience .... 62-63

A HISTORY OF CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES 67-340

First problem of ecientia ecientiarum — £&, positive

philosophy ...... 67-68

I. From Plato to the Renaissance . . 68-97

The Platonic attempt at a distribution of knowledge.

Erroneous views of it Its merits and defects 68-77

Vlll

CONTENTS.

The Aristotelian scheme of classification so far an
advance on the Platonic distribution of knowledge.

Its encyclopaedic character .... 77-81

Has three great defects . . 81-84

Modified Aristotelian classification . . 84-86

Stoic and Epicurean distribution of sciences . 86-88

From Capella and Cassiodorus to Bonaventura and Dante 88-97

II. From the Renaissance to Kant . . . 97-131

In that interval were the classifications of Poliziano

and Nizolio ...... 97-99

OfCampanella . . .99-103

OfDesCartes 103-104

And of Bacon. For the Baconian distribution of

science see ..... . 104-111

For criticism of it . . . 111-113
Albted's Encyclopaedias and the pansophic systems of

Comenius and Weigel . . . . . 113-118
Hobbes' classification of the sciences is in some respects

superior to Bacon's . . . . .118-122

Locke's division of them is much inferior to both

Bacon's and Hobbes' ..... 122-124
Leibniz showed it to be radically defective. His own

was so likewise ..... 124-126

Vico largely anticipated Comte .... 127-129

Wolffianism essentially encyclopaedic 129-131

III. From Kant to De Tract .... 132-161

Kant's scheme of the sciences .... 132-134

Objections to it ...... 134-135

In Germany Sulzer, Gesner, Krug, and many others
attempted to exhibit encyclopaedic surveys of the

sciences ...... 135-141

The English Cyclopaedia and the French EncyclopeaHe . 141-142

IVAlembert's classification, and indication of its defects 142-147

Rise of the Doctrine of Science. Fichte and Schelling . 147-153

German distributions of the sciences from 1806 to 1816 153-154

Hegel and his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences 1 54- 1 60

De Tracy and his Cows <$ Ideologic . 160-161

IV. From Bentham to Gioberti .... 162-197

Bent ham's classification formed by successive bifurca-
tions like a Bamean tree .... 162-164

CONTENTS.

IX

Coleridge's classification ..... 165-166

Jannelli's general distribution .... 166-167

Komagnosi, Longo, and Ventura . . . 167-170

Ferrarese and De Pamphilis .... 170-173

Neil Arnott'8 fourfold distribution and four funda-
mental sciences ..... 173-175

Comte's classification stated and criticised . 175-185

Also Amperes ...... 185-191

Proudhon's substitution of a ternary for Ampere's

quaternary distribution .... 191-193

Duval-Jouve's classification in his Traite* de Logique

manifestly insufficient . . . 193
Views of Bosmini and Gioberti on classification of the
Sciences . . . 193-197

V. From Whkwell to Zkller .... 197-239

Whewell'8 classification elaborate but not always ration-
ally connected ...... 197-202

Views of Lubbock, Lindsay, and Ramsay . 202-203
Schopenhauer's scheme of distribution of the sciences

a very ingenious curiosity .... 203-204

Dove's classification of the sciences well presented 204-208

Objections to it ...... 208-213

Cournot'8 co-ordination of the departments of human

knowledge ...... 213-215

Wilson's reproduction of the Aristotelian classification 215-216
Hamilton's classification in Lectures on Metaphysics

(LectVII.) 217-221

Renouvier's scheme and its defects 221-224
Peccenini's Nuovo Albero Enciclopedico and Di Gio-
vanni's Principii di Filosofia Prima 224-226
Spencer's classification stated and criticised 227-238
Zeller and Harms ..... 239

VI. From Bain to Wundt ..... 239-272

Bain's classification an improvement on Comte's and

superior to Spencer's ..... 239-244

Cantoni'8 Corso> Valdarnini's Ptincipio, &c., and Pey-

retti's Istituzioni, &c. . . . . . 244-247

Labanca'8 three classes of sciences. See his Dialettica

(vol. ii. lib. iv. c. i.) 247-249

Conti's 11 Vero nelV Ordine (2 vols. c. xi.) . 249-250

B. Erdmann's " Gliederung der Wissenschaf ten " 250-253

X CONTENTS.

Corleo's Sophology in his Sistema ddla FUosqfia Univer-
sale ...... 253-254

Bourdeau's single linear series of fundamental sciences 254-255

Prof. Shield's Order of the Sciences . . . 255-259
H. M. Stanley's Classification of the Sciences, in Mind\

No. XXXIV 259-261

D. G. Thompson's scheme in his System of Psychology

(vol. i. pp. 76, 77) 262-263

DeRoberty's/ourgrrowp* .... 263-267
Wundtfs conclusions as to the classification of the

sciences ...... 267-272

VII. From Masartk to Karl Pearson 272-301

Masaryk's Versuch einer Concreten Logik 272-283
Adrien Naville's classification of the sciences . . 283-289
De la Grasserie's De la classification objective et sub-
jective des sciences, &c. 289-292
Karl Pearson's classification of the sciences in his

Grammar of Science ..... 292-301

Criticisms of .... . 293, 295, 299, 300

VIII. From Paul Janet to Present Time . . . 301-340

How Janet has dealt with classification of the sciences 301-306

Goblot'8 "system of the sciences" . . . 307-315

Stadler's contribution to organisation of the sciences . 315-320

Trivero's Classifications delle Scienze . . . 320-324
Durand's study of Taxinomy — *'.«., of classification

itself 324-326

History of classification of the sciences will not be

arrested ...... 326-327

Influence of Anthropology, Ethnology, and Sociology

on organisation of the sciences . 328-338

Of Anthropology ..... 328-334

Of Ethnology ...... 335

Of Sociology ...... 335-338

Concluding Words ..... 338-340

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIAEUM

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM.

I.

rpHE sciences are parts of a great whole, the
members of a magnificent system. Each of
them has manifold relations to every other. But
the great whole, the magnificent system, to which
they belong is itself an object of knowledge.
Unless the intellectual universe be no real uni-
verse, but essentially a chaos, science must be
general as well as special ; or, in other words, there
must be a science of the sciences — a science which
determines the principles and conditions, the limits
and relations, of the sciences. This science is
philosophy ; and what the author has to say in the
present chapter is meant to be a plea for philosophy
as the legitimate but often disavowed and insulted
queen of the sciences. "Time was," says Kant,
"when metaphysics was the queen of all the
sciences. But now it is the fashion to heap con-

4 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM.

tempt and scorn upon her, and the matron mourns,
forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba." The sciences,
however, cannot do without a queen. There may
be a republic of letters, but the sciences cannot
constitute a republic; they must be so connected
as to form a unity; and the science which refers
them to unity and shows that knowledge as a
whole is a cosmos is the supreme science, the queen
of the sciences. The want of practical recognition
of this truth is one main cause of the intellectual
anarchy of our times.

Philosophy as scientia scientiarum may have
more functions than one, but it has at least one.
It has to show how science is related to science,
where one science is in contact with another, in
what way each fits into each, so that all may
compose the symmetrical and glorious edifice of
human knowledge, which has been built up by the
labours of all past generations, and which all future
generations must contribute to perfect and adorn.
With whatever province of science a thoughtful
man occupies himself, he soon becomes aware that
it has intimate and manifold connections with other
provinces, and if he try to trace these connec-
tions out, he will ere long perceive that the sciences
are not isolated things, but so bound together as
to constitute a unity which is a reflection of the
unity of nature and of the unity of that Supreme

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIEXTIABUM. 5

Reason which pervades all nature and originates all
intelligence. Philosophy aims to raise the mind
gradually and legitimately to a point from which
this unity may be visible, while the distinctions of
the special sciences are not only not effaced, but
lie clearly and truthfully before it. If I seek to
vindicate and magnify this aim it is not because I
suppose its reasonableness is likely to be directly
and explicitly denied, but because its importance
can scarcely in the present day be too often or
strongly insisted on. There is many a truth which
is not contested, which receives a ready acqui-
escence of a sort, and yet which is very far from
being apprehended or generally acted on, because
the evidence for it is not so definitely and ade-
quately before the mind as to counteract influences
which tend to obscure it and make it practically
neglected. And that aspiration after insight into
the system of science as a whole should not be lost
in the study of details is pre-eminently such a truth.

Now, the first consideration which here suggests
itself is that philosophy, viewed as scientia scienti-
arum, is simply science which has attained to a
knowledge of the unity, self-consistency, and har-
mony of the teachings of the separate sciences.
Philosophy seeks to do for the sciences just what
each science does for the doctrines it comprehends.

6 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SGIENTIARUM.

In the latter case separate truths are brought into
unity, and in the former separate sciences. The
one unity constitutes a science, the other a science
of the sciences, and shows that absolutely there is
but one science, although it has various depart-
ments, whereby the incommensurableness of nature
is brought down to our capacities. The second and
higher unity is as natural, as legitimate, as im-
portant as the first and lower unities. It would
little avail, indeed, that these existed — that there
was unity enough in things to permit of the forma-
tion of special sciences — if there were no still more
comprehensive unity, if the point of view of each
science was in itself final, if each science was utterly
isolated from all others. If such were the case
there would be in science something essentially dis-
appointing to the human mind, for it would be of
its very nature calculated not to satisfy but to
thwart that love of unity which is the source and
life of all scientific research. If such were the case
truth would not form a fair and harmonious body,
but it would resemble the mangled and scattered
limbs of Osiris, while the human mind in its pursuit
would be engaged in a task more mournful than
that of Isis, because hopeless. It is not so, how-
ever, but

" The One through all in cycles goes,
And all to One returning flows."

PHILOSOPHY A8 SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM. 7

Science is not sectioned into entirely unconnected
sciences. In all the sciences there is a certain
common nature, and among them there are many
ties of affinity and points of contact. There are
precedence and subordination, order and harmony,
among them; so that, many and diverse as they
are, they form a whole, a system in which each of
them has its appropriate place, and, so far from
being sacrificed to any other, has a new dignity
imparted to it by being referred to the final unity
of reason, the common centre of knowledge.

Secondly, philosophy, as a comprehensive survey
of the sciences and a deeply grounded knowledge
of their principal relations to one another, is a
condition indispensable to a correct conception of
the special province of any science. The bound-
aries of most sciences are very ill-traced, their
definitions most irreconcilable. The first question
which the student of any science naturally asks,
What is it? What is it about? is one to which
he can often get no satisfactory answer— one on
which he finds that all the doctors disagree. Take
logic. One logician will tell you its proper object
is thought as thought ; another, that it is the forms
as contradistinguished from the contents or matter
of thought ; another, that it is only the necessary
as distinct from the contingent forms of thought;

8 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIBNTIA SOIENTIARUM.

another, that it is only a kind of thought, mediate
or discursive thought ; another, that it is only a
kind of mediate or discursive thought — inference ;
and still another, that it is not thought as thought,
nor any elements or kinds of thought, but qualities
of thought — truth and error so far as involved in
the application of thought. And, it must be re-
marked, this opposition is in no way one between
old and new views, between transcended and effete
conceptions and those which actually prevail, but
one which exists between the most deliberately
formed convictions of the most eminent modern
logicians. Certainly it is a somewhat perplexing
puzzle to lie at the very entrance of a science.
The ingenuous youth who makes his first acquaint-
ance with logic by getting that nut thrust into his
mouth is not likely, if his teeth be sharp enough to
crack it, to find any subsequent problem too hard
for him. It is not much otherwise with psychol-
ogy, with rhetoric, with ethics, with politics, with
political economy. And as to metaphysics, it fares
far worse; the discordance and embroilment there
baffle description, for, as Professor Ferrier so happily
said, " All the captains are sailing on different tacks,
under different orders, and under different winds ;
and each is railing at the others because they will
not keep the same course with himself. One man
is playing at chess, his adversary is playing against

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM. 9

him at billiards ; and whenever a victory is achieved
or a defeat sustained, it is always such a victory as
a billiard-player might be supposed to gain over a
chess-player, or such a defeat as a billiard-player
might be supposed to sustain at the hands of a
chess-player."

Now, how is such a state of things to be
remedied ? How are we to decide between the dis-
putants ? How make a choice for ourselves between
conflicting definitions ? It is obvious neither tradi-
tion nor authority can here help us, for not only are
they in themselves discordant and undecided, but
they have no right to overrule reason, which ought
to submit to evidence alone, and is unworthy of
itself when it listens to any other voice than that of
truth. Nor will it suffice to found our definitions
on the etymology and inherent significance of
names. That may wholly mislead. Words often
come to signify what is altogether different from
their intrinsic meaning, sometimes what is the
reverse of it. A manufacture, for instance, is not
what is made by the hand, but what is made
by machinery with little or no aid from the
hand. Words may be stretched or contracted, where
needful, to conform to realities, but realities are
not to be twisted in any way to conform to words ;
and it is not with words but realities that science
has to deal. It may be said, a science cannot be

10 PHILOSOPHY AS SCI EN TI A SCIENTIARUM.

defined until after the study of its appropriate facts,
and when the study is sufficiently advanced the
definition comes of itself. And that is so far true.
Although first in the order of exposition, the defini-
tion of a science is late in the order of discovery
and presupposes a certain acquaintance with an
appropriate order of facts, expressing, as it does,
some essential characteristic which they all possess.
But the question is, the difficulty is, to determine
what is the appropriate order of facts, why the one
chosen and not another, why an order of a given
extent instead of one larger or smaller. All the
views of logic, for instance, to which I have referred
assign to it a natural order of facts, a sphere of real
knowledge worth acquiring, a sphere with distinct
enough boundaries ; and yet the natural orders
are not coincident, the boundaries are altogether
different, some going all round those of others,
and others intersecting one another in the most
perplexing ways.

Now, in such a case, it is obvious there is but
one mode of deciding who is right and who is
wrong, who has selected the proper group of facts
and who groups larger or smaller, who has traced
the boundaries of his science well and who ill. It is
by examining whose views give to their science a
place that fits in rightly into the scheme of science.
The question is one of adjustment. The logician

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIABUM. 11

simply as logician cannot define logic, for that is an
affair of the settlement of boundaries between the
sort of knowledge he cultivates and contiguous
divisions of knowledge, such as metaphysics,
psychology, and rhetoric; one, accordingly, which
can only be decided by a higher and more general
sort of considerations than belongs to any special
science — by considerations as to the relations of the
sciences. And this holds universally. It is as
impossible to fix the position of a science without
reference to neighbouring sciences, and even to the
general system of the sciences, as to fix the position
of a nation without reference to surrounding nations,
and even to the general geography of the earth. In
this respect a general scheme of science is exactly
like a general map or like a terrestrial globe ; and
like such map or globe it supplies a want which can
no otherwise be provided for. An atlas with a
separate map of every state in the world cannot
dispense with, cannot supply the place of, a map
which will show them in relation; nay, the more
complete an atlas is in special maps the more need
is there of a general one, because the more certainly
and the more deeply will the student without such
assistance be lost in details. And so with respect
to science. The more it becomes divided and sub-
divided, the more urgent, the more imperative
becomes a knowledge of its greater general outlines

12 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA 8CIENTIARUM.

in order that each man may recognise how the
department he is specially conversant with is related
to others. The greater the multiplication of sciences
the more chaotic must be the effect they produce
unless the mind can locate them aright, can refer
them to their place in a system, and see how they
stand to one another and the whole.

What has now been said leads to a third
consideration in favour of philosophy as viewed
from our present standpoint. By a true co-ordina-
tion of the sciences and a comprehensive insight
into their natures, it must help us to see how
and when they can assist each other. There are
problems which require a combination of sciences
for their solution ; there are certain combinations
of the sciences possible, while others are absurd ;
and it is only through a clear apprehension of the
respective natures and relations of any two or
more sciences that we can perceive if one can be
made to operate with another to the attainment
of a given end. Some of the most important
advances which have occurred in the history of
science have been due to the associated action of
two or more sciences. A signal instance is
Descartes' application of the algebraic analysis to
define the nature and investigate the properties of
curve lines. It was only by the clearest conception

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SG1ENTIARUM. 13

of the relations of the two sciences, algebra and
geometry, that he could have brought the symbols
and calculations of the one to bear on the problems
of the other, and thus start a new epoch in mathe-
matical science. A more modern instance of the
same kind is the union of chemistry and optics in
spectral analysis, by which the most singularly
interesting results as to the physical constitution
of the heavenly bodies have been attained. It will
be in the future as it has been in the past. Some
of the most difficult and important of the problems
which are at present attracting the curiosity and
trying the ingenuity of men can only, it is apparent,
find their solution from a happy combination of
chemistry and physiology; others still more vital
only from the combination of physiology and psy-
chology ; and not a few are so complex that it is vain
to hope that they will be mastered otherwise than
by the conjoint and concentrated efforts of many
sciences. It is most erroneous to suppose, as some
persons do, that the true way to advance any study
is to devote the whole mind exclusively to it so as
to have no thought or interest beyond it.

The sciences advance by solving problems which
are often presented to them from without, and by
accepting hints and helps from all sides. Mathe-
matics itself, although it has in the character of
its fundamental conceptions an enormous advantage

14 PHILOSOPHY AS 8CIBNTIA SCI EN TI A RUM.

over all other knowledge as abstract science, has
found its chief stimulus in the requirements of the
natural philosopher, in the problems of astronomy,
mechanics, optics, heat, and electricity. " The
combinations arising out of external phenomena,"
said Principal J. D. Forbes of St Andrews, "are
more suggestive of the possible relations of number
and quantity than is the most unlimited stretch of
fancy and imagination." And if even mathematics,
which is based on such singularly simple, precise,
definable, workable conceptions as number and
quantity, thus needs light from without, and only
prospers because readily responsive to external
suggestions, what can be expected from, say, logic,
psychology, or ethics, which have vastly vaguer
conceptions to start from, attempting to proceed
entirely from within, and ignoring the combinations
of human nature which are presented to us in
history, in literature, and in language; what but
that which we not unfrequently see — men working
their way laboriously and painfully into a world of
mere formulae, of words and nothing but words,
although doubtless big and brave words — a region
of absolute emptiness, into which we may as well
not follow them, however much we may admire
the strength of constitution which enables such
privileged natures to sustain life in a vacuum?
Whatever may be fancied to the contrary, the

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA 8CIENTIARUM. 15

truth is that the researches and studies of the mere
specialist are never very productive. Special in-
vestigations only enrich science to any considerable
extent when they are directed and guided by
enlarged views; they are only truly successful
when not exclusively special ; when, on the contrary,
the part or section of existence examined is looked
at by a reason illumined by a worthy and ample
idea of science ; a reason which sees the part in the
light of the whole and the whole as related to the
part. I do not deny that now and then, by a
lucky chance, a mere specialist may come across
something valuable ; that an entomologist who has
no interest in anything but beetles may detect
something in the eye or on the wing of some of
these creatures which wiser men than himself can
turn to good account ; or that the most unintelligent
local antiquarian may not find in some old document
or mound or ruin a fact which decides the fate of a
brilliant historical hypothesis : but I do affirm that
discoveries thus made are extremely rare. Have
not the most minute researches of recent botanists,
zoologists, physiologists, &c, had reference to the
vast generalisations and bold conjectures of a Spencer
and a Darwin ? What special historical researches
have ended in the adequate solution of a complicated
and difficult problem, except those conducted by
men whose insight into the general providential

16 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIKNTIA SCIBNTIARUM.

plan of history, or at least of a large portion
of history, was clearer and more profound than
that of other men ? I know of none. Now, what
does all that amount to, but just that a study, a
science, is progressive and flourishing only in so far
as it is impelled and guided, penetrated and per-
vaded, by the spirit of philosophy ; that all scientific
discoveries whatever lie in the path along which
philosophy leads science — along which science tends
towards philosophy ?

Philosophy, understood as has been explained, is,
I remark fourthly, fitted and needed to counteract
the evil intellectual and moral influences of special-
ism. We are all narrow by nature, and we require
to have our narrowness guarded against and cor-
rected, not confirmed and intensified. Different
minds have different natural aptitudes. These
different aptitudes find their appropriate spheres
of exercise in special studies and special depart-
ments of practical life. A man with a genius for
languages may have no turn for mathematics. The
born poet may be the reverse of specially qualified
for success either in science or business. The
shrewdness and decision of mind which go so far
to ensure success in the commercial world are
useful gifts anywhere, but will certainly count
for less in the world of learning than of traffic.

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIBNTIA SCIENTIARUM. 17

Many a man who is great, and justly great,
among the merchant princes of the earth, could
never have been educated into a great scholar or
great speculative thinker, and that not from want
of mind but from constitutional peculiarities of
mind. Now, all such variety is wise and good.
It makes human nature so much the fuller revela-
tion of the divine nature ; human life so much the
broader; human history so much the richer. But
the same facts which show most distinctly how wide
are the thoughts of God are those which also show
most distinctly how narrow are the thoughts of men.
Individuals will have it that their excellences
are the only excellences — the pursuits which they
prefer those which all men ought to prefer.
The poet looks down on the man of business as a
creature of low and grovelling habits, and the latter
in turn casts a sarcastic glance upwards to his
aerial friend, with the suspicion that he must find
his castles in the air, even by moonlight, very
poor places to live in. The distinguished classical
scholar need not be ashamed that he cannot stand
high in mathematics, yet he ought humbly to feel
that his failure is owing to the limitations of his
own individual intellect : but how apt is he instead
to attribute to mathematics the restrictions which
are in himself; to despise them, instead of learning
the true lesson to be drawn from every failure

B

18 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SOIENTIARUM.

where we have earnestly striven to succeed — a due
sense of one's own littleness. So the mathemati-
cian, making his own individuality the measure of
the whole universe of truth and culture, is prone
to contemn many of the inquiries of the philologist
as instances of learned trifling beneath the notice
of serious men. Physicists and psychologists have
never been noted for a candid appreciation of each
other's labours. Any unfortunate science which
happens to be not quite so strong as could be
wished, metaphysics for instance, is almost sure to
be fiercely set on by all the others, just as a poor,
lame, unpopular swan is occasionally assailed by
the whole flock of its companions. Now, there is
only one judgment, I think, to be formed of all
aversion of this sort, be it directed against what
object it may. All such aversion is evil. It is a
narrow and bad feeling which we ought to beware
of cherishing. Sectarianism in science, like sec-
tarianism in religion, is unlovely in itself and
baneful in its consequences. Just as nothing is
morally so ruinous as cultivating a habit of detect-
ing only the faults and failings of our fellow-men,
so nothing is intellectually more ruinous than
cherishing a habit of depreciation of any kind of
knowledge whatever. As in the moral life, al-
though we cannot attain to all good, we ought
carefully to cherish the love of all good, so in the

PHILOSOPHY AS 8CIENTIA 8CIBNTIARUM. 19

intellectual life, although we cannot attain to all
truth, we ought carefully to cherish the love of all
truth. But this, I need hardly say, is very difficult
to do in the present state of society, when the
division of scientific as well as of industrial func-
tions is extreme.

A great and thoughtful poet, struck with the
obvious and terrible dangers which, in consequence,
threaten the spiritual life, has said :

" .... Go demand
Of mighty nature if 'twas ever meant
That we should pry far off and be unraised,
That we should pore, and dwindle as we pore,

Viewing all objects unremittingly
In disconnection dead and spiritless ;
And still dividing, and dividing still,
Break down all grandeur, still unsatisfied
With the perverse attempt, while littleness
May yet become more little : waging thus
An impious warfare 'gainst the very life
Of our own souls."

Now truth and error are mingled there and must
be separated. It was meant by mighty nature that
we should go on, as we have been doing, "still
dividing, and dividing still"; it was meant that
we should break down all grandeur into its consti-
tuents ; that the life which we cannot create we
should yet in order to understand dissolve into its
elements and view them unremittingly, " dead and

20 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM.

spiritless " although they be ; that we should be
unsatisfied " while littleness may yet become more
little," while division has not reached its utmost
limits, while analysis has anything more to do.
Division, analysis, is a necessary and inevitable
condition of progress both in life and science.
Every stage of progress must be consequent on a
stage of division, spontaneous or reflective, indus-
trial or scientific. We can well forgive a poet
being slow to believe in the existence of such a
law ; but the law exists, and it will not avail us to
ignore it, still less to resist it. This law, however,
like every other, requires to be watched and its
incidental evils guarded against. It is not more
true that it is one of the conditions on which the
progress of science and the advancement of society
depend, than that if left to itself, if not balanced
and counteracted by other agencies, it will arrest
science and destroy society. But nature has pro-
vided forces with which it has only to be rightly
adjusted in order that its action may be purely
beneficial. If in one respect the subdivision of in-
dustrial labour has a narrowing and anti-social influ-
ence, it has in the other respect, that it condenses
population within narrow circuits, associates intel-
ligences and forces, and multiplies the objects of
common interest, as well as the occasions for sym-
pathy and the facilities for education, an influence

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIKNTIA 8CIENTTARUM. 21

altogether contrary, which has only to be made the
most of and secured to the side of truth and good-
ness in order that all the evils incident to the
specialisation of functions in modern industry may
be scarcely recognisable when laid by the side of its
benefits. In a general doctrine of science, the ex-
pression of that pure love of truth in its entirety
which is identical with the spirit of philosophy, there
is no less obviously a natural remedy for the evils
incident to the specialisation of the sciences. Such
a doctrine would enable the specialist to transcend
the bounds of his own department, to realise his
relation to science as a whole, and his own relation
to all his fellow-labourers in science. Limited as his
own particular study might be, it would no longer
be a something " dead and disconnected," but united
to the ultimate principles which are the root of all
science, and through that union filled with the life
which the root alone supplies.

This leads me to remark that philosophy, thus
viewed, would afford the most important guidance in
education. It must be, indeed, the very basis of
rational education in science. It must be what best
determines the course to be pursued. We cannot
commence the study of science at any point nor
prosecute it in any order we please. Nature has
determined both where we ought to begin and what
path we ought to follow. It is very far from a

22 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM.

matter of indifference which of the mathematical
sciences we commence with. If we plunge into
natural philosophy without any mathematics to buoy
us up we are likely soon to repent of our fool-
hardiness, and are certain not to swim very far. We
shall make a similar mistake if we enter on moral
philosophy without having made ourselves acquainted
with the leading truths of psychology. Now, a phil-
osophy of science worthy of what it should be would
inform us at once what science was the natural ante-
cedent of any other science, the condition of its intel-
ligibility. It would, in fixing the order of the
sciences, fix likewise the order of their rational study.
It would thus lay what is the very corner-stone of
the science of education — that without which no
such thing as a science of education can exist. And
it would confer on education another advantage only
inferior to that. It would show what science was
most fitted to correct the mental vices generated by
any other science, as well as what science was needed
to render it intelligible. No one science does more
than cultivate the mind in a partial and one-sided
manner; and if we would have fully developed,
well-balanced minds, we must not only not confine
ourselves exclusively to one, but counteract that
which is exclusive and hurtful in our special pursuit
by the kind of knowledge most unlike it in char-
acter and tendencies ; that which it requires the most

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIBNTIA SCIENTOARUM. 23

directly opposite procedure of mind to appropriate ;
that which exercises with most intensity the faculties
which the other leaves most dormant.

Those who cultivate a science which is entirely
inductive, which is only in process of formation,
still unsettled in its foundations, still vague and
dubious in the majority of its conclusions, while they
can need no mathematics merely to render it intel-
ligible, are precisely those who will need most the
peculiar discipline of mathematics ; and without it
their power of deduction will remain unexercised;
without it the very notion of what complete proof is
will never find a place in their minds. On the same
principle, the study of physics and psychology should
be conjoined in one culture. The one is required to
balance the other. All physicists should seek a
general acquaintance with psychology, and all psy-
chologists a general acquaintance with physics. This
would remove the unbecoming antagonism which
has so long and widely prevailed between those two
classes of students — an antagonism which has its
origin in ignorance, and is a signal proof of the
narrowness of intellectual conception and illiber-
ally of feeling which are produced by specialism
when left to operate without check or counter-
poise. This, then, is also to be said on behalf of
a science of the sciences, that it would at once
and authoritatively tell where the knowledge

24 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SOIENTIARUM.

requisite to condition or the knowledge requisite
to supplement or balance any other knowledge
was to be found.

I now come to a consideration at least as weighty
as any of those which have already been mentioned
— namely, the interest and importance of the truths
with which a science of the sciences must be con-
versant. The truths which lie between the sciences
are as real and have equal claims to attention as the
truths within the sciences. If the relations between
facts are as important as the facts themselves, — and
every science acknowledges and proceeds on this
assumption, — how should the relations between the
sciences not be of extreme interest and value?
When these relations are known, all the facts any
given special sciences deal with, and all the laws
which have been derived from these facts, have a
new light shed on them by being connected, con-
trasted, and compared from an elevation which per-
mits of a truthful survey. That the relations of
the sciences to one another are in themselves most
worthy of examination, any one may convince him-
self by considering for a moment what they are,
what great problems they present, what grave in-
terests they involve. How are the mathematical
sciences related to one another and to physics ? Do
they originate in experience, or are they offshoots
of a transcendental or metaphysical condition ? Are

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM. 25

there any limits in nature to their application, and,
if so, what are those limits ? These are questions
which mathematics suggests, although it does not
solve, — hard and abstruse but real and not fanciful,
weighty and not trivial questions, — and on which
not philosophers only, but men whose distinctions
have been gained chiefly in mathematics, such as
Courtot, Sir Wm. R. Hamilton of Dublin, Boole,
De Morgan, Bartholmai, Duhamel, have written
either books or elaborate essays. How are the
physical sciences related? Which are simple and
fundamental, which complex and applicate ? What
must each take from others, and what may each be
made to contribute to others? These, again, are
questions which all physicists, not dwarfed by ex-
clusive specialism of pursuit into incapacity of large
views of any kind, are keenly alive to ; for they see
that on clear and correct views regarding them the
future progress of physical science is greatly depend-
ent, and a right settlement of the practical problem,
What is a wise and well-conducted education in
physical science ? entirely dependent. What is the
relation of the physical to the mental sciences, or
even merely, What is the relation of physiology to
psychology ? No man can be so intellectually blind
as to fail to perceive what a most momentous ques-
tion this is. Every thinking man must answer it in
some form or way ; yet if you answer it in one way

26 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA 8CIENTIARUM.

you must be a materialist, if in another a pure ideal-
ist, and it is to be hoped that it can be answered
also in a third way which will make you neither —
which will not compel you, as a rational being, to
deny the existence either of matter or spirit, either
of your bodies or souls.

Then, as to the mental sciences, psychology, ethics,
aesthetics, politics, paideutics, philology, philosophy
of history, &c, nothing is more certain than that a
very large proportion of the evils which infest them,
and which have given such abundant occasion to
their adversaries to misrepresent and depreciate
them, are due precisely to the want of definite and
correct views in their cultivators as to their bound-
aries and relations ; so that inquiries proper to one
have been inextricably mixed up with inquiries
proper only to another, and not unfrequently even
this has been aggravated and confusion itself still
further confounded by the introduction of the still
more extraneous elements of physics, and meta-
physics, and religion.

There is not less involved in the question, How is
metaphysics related to physical and mental science ?
There are those who suppress metaphysics entirely,
who regard it as only an erroneous phase of thought,
gradually drawing near to the death which is its
doom, — who maintain that there is no science save
realistic or positive science. There are others who,

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA 8CIBNTIARUM. 27

instead of thus absorbing metaphysics in positive
science, have sought to absorb all positive science
in metaphysics, pretended to " re- think the great
thought of creation," and hesitated not to deny
the law of gravitation, to blame the very stars,
to pronounce the most ancient heavens wrong,
when these things did not appear to conform
to their deductions. And between these two ex-
tremes, the Comtist and the Hegelian, there are
innumerable other erroneous positions, into any
of which it is easy to fall ; while to get sure
footing on the one right spot no man can, unless
by working out for himself a correct and adequate
apprehension of the relation of metaphysics to
experience.

Quite as important as the question just referred
to is this other question, How are piety and
knowledge, religion and philosophy, theology and
the physical and mental sciences, to be shown in
their true relationship? Even in this age of
many wants there are few, if any, more to be
desired than a right answer to that question. The
false and mischievous attitudes so often assumed
by scientific men towards religion and by religious
men towards science may unquestionably be largely
traced to such erroneous conceptions of the relation-
ship between religion and science as can only be
dispelled by a thorough and unprejudiced philo-

28 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM.

sophical investigation. And it can hardly be in
the power of man to render better service to
either religion or science than to exhibit them in
their true natures and relationships, seeing that
both of them, and society as well, are so grievously
suffering from the want of clear and just views
on the subject.

II.

In seeking to attain self-consistency and com-
pleteness philosophy must strive to solve four
very comprehensive and complex problems.

In the first place, it has a duty towards the
special sciences.

It is bound to form a right estimate of them
and to take up a right attitude towards them.
It is science, yet not merely a special science, but
the science which has the processes and results
of all the special sciences for its data — the general
or universal science which has so risen above the
special and particular in science as to be able to
contemplate the sciences as parts of a system
which reflects and elucidates a world of which
the variety is not more wonderful than the unity.
Philosophy should neither attempt to do the work
nor to dispense with the aid of any special science,
but must seek so to understand the methods, to

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM. 29

appreciate the findings, and to trace the relation-
ships of all the special sciences as to be able to
combine them into a harmonious cosmos or well-
proportioned corpus. When engaged in this task
it may appropriately and usefully, perhaps, be
called positive philosophy, and nearly corresponds
to what has been so designated by Comte.

Comte's view of philosophy, however, as merely*
a generalisation of the results of the sciences,
would have been an inadequate one even if he had
duly recognised the existence and claims of the
psychological and theological sciences. It is
necessary to hold to the truth which is in Kant's
view, and to the truth which is in Ferrier's or
Hegel's view, of the nature of philosophy, quite
as firmly as to the truth which is in Comte's view.
Given a complete knowledge of the relations of the
sciences — given, consequently, a correct picture on
the mind's eye of the whole intelligible world drawn
from the highest and best established results of all
the sciences — and the work of reason, which is the
comprehension of itself and of its objects so far as
knowable, is still far from accomplished; yea, its
highest and perhaps hardest labours have not yet
begun. Scientific thought is not necessarily self-
criticising thought ; on the contrary, mere scientific
thought, however rigid and methodical, is essentially
dogmatic thought in that it rests on untested and

30 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIKNTIA SCIBNTIARUM.

uncriticised assumptions. It is reasoned, yet un-
reflective. It builds up what is currently admitted
to be knowledge, but it does not inquire what so-
called knowledge is or is essentially worth. The
philosophy which wholly depends on such assumed
thought or knowledge has all their essential defects.
It is merely an advance on special science, as special
science itself is on ordinary knowledge, and ordinary
knowledge on crude sensation. Along the whole
line the mind never changes its attitude towards
its objects. At the end its nature is just what it
was at the beginning. Throughout what it brings
with it is borrowed ordinary knowledge or positive
science. The scientist often fancies that he is a
man who takes nothing on trust when in reality he
takes everything on trust, because he accepts
without question or reservation thought itself as
naturally truthful and its laws as valid. What-
ever superficial scientists may suppose to the con-
trary, the fact is that the entire procedure of
science and of philosophy, in so far as it is simply
a generalisation of science, is assumptive and dog-
matic. Although often contrasted and opposed
to faith it really rests on faith, and in the view
of a serious and consistent scepticism must rest on
blind faith.

Thought may assume, however, and is bound to
assume, a very different attitude towards itself and

PHIL080PHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM. 31

towards its objects. It may pass and ought to
pass from a believing to an inquiring, from a
dogmatic to a critical stage. It may turn its
attention and force from a study of the relations
of the known to an examination of the conditions
and guarantees of knowledge.

In the second place, then, philosophy is bound
to institute an investigation into the nature of
knowledge itself

All the special sciences aim merely at the exten-
sion and acquisition of knowledge. They assume
that there are things and truths to be known, but
make no attempt to verify the assumption or even
to understand what it implies. What are things
apart from knowledge and in relation to knowledge ?
Are things just what they appear to be, or not at
all what they appear to be, or partly what they
appear to be and partly not ? May all things not
ultimately be thoughts or feelings, or even imagin-
ations and illusions? If more or else than states
or acts of mind, what more, what else? If they
are affirmed to be existences, or substances, or
realities, and the like, what precisely do such affirm-
ations mean? What is truth? Is the assump-
tion that we can' attain it well founded or a mere
blind belief? If attainable, on what conditions and
within what limits is it to be attained? What is
knowledge? Is it possible? How is it possible?

32 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM.

How can we separate between the knowable and
the unknowable? What are we to think of such
assertions as that knowledge is confined to experi-
ence, or that spiritual things may be objects of
faith but not of knowledge, or that metaphysical
problems are incapable of solution?

These are questions with which no special science
deals, and which even philosophy as positive does not
discuss. Positive philosophy is merely an advance
on special science, as special science itself is on
ordinary knowledge, and ordinary knowledge on
crude and confused sensation. It accepts the
sciences and endeavours by their combination and
co-ordination to organise knowledge, but it leaves
untouched the same questions as the special
sciences, and consequently remains as assumptive
and dogmatic as they are. For the special sciences
and for a consistent positive philosophy, philo-
sophical criticism and philosophical scepticism must
be as if they were not. But they undoubtedly
exist, and neither can nor ought to be ignored.
Philosophy is bound not only to organise but to
criticise whatever professes to be knowledge. It
must not only survey knowledge as a whole and
trace the relations of its parts, but it must satisfy
itself as to its grounds and guarantees, and nearly
corresponds to what has been designated by Kant
critical philosophy.

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM. 33

What may be called positive philosophy naturally
prepares the way for critical philosophy. Kant
will always be honoured as the man who first ade-
quately realised the necessity under which philos-
ophy lay to exercise its critical functions, and who
gave the first general yet profound exposition of
philosophy as a criticism of knowledge. He erred
seriously, however, even in his conception of its
problems, and still more seriously in his attempted
solutions. Hence the cry of * Back to Kant ' which
for a time resounded widely throughout Germany,
and to a considerable extent, although compara-
tively feebly, in Britain and America, cannot be
justly regarded as having been wholly the voice of
wisdom. 1 No one, however, has done so much for
critical philosophy as Kant. Even his errors have
in a wonderful measure proved more valuable than
other men's truths.

In the third place, philosophy requires to elabo-
rate a theory of being and becoming in accordance
with its views of the sciences and its criticism of
knowledge.

Philosophy as critical examines all the assump-
tions on which philosophy as positive and the special
sciences proceed. It is only through critical philo-

1 See the criticism of Kant's criticism in Hegel's History of Philos-
ophy, vol. iii. pp. 423-478 (E.T.) ; and the author's in Agnosticism,
pp. 140-190.

C

34 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIBNTIA SCIBNTIARUM.

sophy that thought can assure itself that what are
called science and knowledge have anything to cor-
respond to them, — that their supposition of real
objects or objective realities is not a baseless illu-
sion, — that sense and reason are not essentially
antagonistic, and experience not inherently self-
contradictory. This assurance it may conceivably
fail to attain. It may, on the contrary, be forced
either to the conclusion that nothing real exists, or
that if anything real exists it cannot be known.
In other words, its criticism of knowledge may lead
to philosophical nihilism or to agnosticism. But it
may also issue in the refutation of these hypotheses
and the vindication of the beliefs which under-
lie the special sciences, ordinary knowledge, and
common life. It may warrant the conviction that
objective reality is the necessary antecedent and
universal correlative of the subjective activity in
knowledge, and that, so far from being absolutely
unknowable, it is continuously self-revealing even
to our very limited minds. If this result, however,
be reached, philosophy is manifestly bound to en-
deavour to exhibit the nature of the ultimate reality
or realities which the special sciences presuppose
and in some measure reveal, but with which they
cannot directly deal, first because they are special,
and secondly because they are kinds of know-
ledge, and logically anterior to the criticism of

PHILOSOPHY AS SCI EN TI A SCIENTIARUM. 35

knowledge. Philosophy in this phase — philosophy
as the theory of being and becoming — is what
has for very long been known as metaphysical
philosophy.

As such it cannot be satisfied with mere objec-
tive appearances or subjective impressions. It must
seek to penetrate farther, must seek after the un-
seen and eternal, and strive if possible to attain
some apprehension of ultimate reality, of absolute
being, in Nature, Mind, or Deity. Metaphysics
has sometimes been identified with Philosophy;
but that is to make either the one term or the
other useless. Obviously the latter term is the
one best entitled to the wider signification. The
former, even if considerably restricted, will still
be found sufficiently comprehensive for any good
purpose. It will appropriately include Ontology,
the doctrine of being or reality as distinct from
phenomenon, appearance, or illusion; Psychology,
but only so far as regards the primary intuitions
of reason and their corresponding immutable ob-
jects; and Theology, but not further tJian as
occupied with Godhead as the one absolute
existence. To a large extent Psychology and
Theology are independent of Metaphysics.

The difficulty of defining Metaphysics is well
known. I prefer to regard it not as a science
but as a function of philosophy, although I do

36 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIAEUM.

not see any serious objection to such a definition
of it as, say, Trendelenburg's, — "the science
which considers what is universal in the objects
of all the sciences" ; and still less to that of
Prof. Fraser, — "the knowledge of being in its
universal principles." Either knowledge or phil-
osophy seems to me a better generic term for
Metaphysics than science. The jocular definition
even given of it by De Morgan is decidedly
suggestive, — "The science to which ignorance goes
to learn its knowledge, and knowledge to learn
its ignorance. On which all men agree that it is
the key, but no two upon how it is to be put
into the lock."

The metaphysical function of philosophy is a
most important one. Although it may not be
exact science, such science has owed a great deal
to it. It has engrossed the attention and
energies of many of the world's greatest thinkers.
Socrates by his questionings, Plato by his dialogues
and dialectic, and Aristotle by the work called
(not by himself, however) 'Metaphysics/ were
among the first clearly to show what it meant
and should aim at accomplishing. The most re-
nowned oriental, medieval, and modern philosophers
have been eminent metaphysicians, and their repu-
tations as philosophers have been largely owing to
their having been wise enough not to despise

PHILOSOPHY A3 SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM. 37

Metaphysics' rightly understood. There is not
the slightest likelihood of ' Metaphysics ' becoming
extinct. It will be despised only by the foolish
or by those who are ignorant of what it means.
No highly thoughtful man can fail to be some-
what of a metaphysical cast of mind.

In the fourth place, philosophy ought to forecast,
as far as it can, the course of things, — the future
of the world and life, of humanity and science, —
and to determine what the worth of enjoyment is,
and of truth, beauty, virtue, and piety, in relation
to one another, and to the great final end of
existence.

Philosophy as a science of the sciences, as an
inquiry into the nature and limits of knowledge,
and as a doctrine of being and becoming, — or, in
other words, philosophy as positive, critical, and
metaphysical, — is theoretical philosophy in its three
stages, and the whole of theoretical philosophy;
but not the whole of philosophy, because although
philosophy be fundamentally and predominantly
theoretical, a merely theoretical philosophy must
be essentially incomplete. Practical applicability
is a necessary consequence of theoretical accuracy.
The true theory of the relations of the sciences,
of the conditions of knowledge, and of the nature
of existence and causation, must be also the only
true basis of doctrine as to the ends and issues,

38 PHILOSOPHY A3 SCI EN TI A SCIENTIARUM.

the purposes and destinies of the beings which con-
stitute the universe. Whither tends the physical
world ? What is the chief end of man ? To what
goal is society moving? Is life worth living? Is
optimism or pessimism or an intermediate hy-
pothesis the legitimate conception of existence?
Questions like these can only be answered aright
in connection with a general theory of final causes
such as a comprehensive and profound philosophy
alone can provide. The answers given to them
even by the most comprehensive and profound
philosophy of the present age, and of many ages
to come, may be far from distinct and certain, and
yet may gradually approximate to the full truth as
time advances and knowledge increases. Philo-
sophy, when engaged in the study of these ques-
tions and seeking to be helpful in the guidance of
active life, may be appropriately entitled practical
philosophy.

The four regions of thought now indicated com-
prise the entire domain of philosophy. Those who
would successfully explore that vast domain should
begin their investigations with its first region. As
I have already indicated, philosophy as positive
ought to precede philosophy whether critical or
metaphysical or practical. Although the followers
of Comte and the advocates of the so-called " scien-
tific philosophy" err greatly in supposing that

PHILOSOPHY A3 SCIKNTIA SCIBNTIARUM. 39

philosophy is merely the synthesis and generalisa-
tion of the positive or special sciences, they are
perfectly right in maintaining that philosophy must
be based on these sciences, and can only verify
itself through accepting and conforming to their
conclusions. Philosophy must base itself on the
sciences even while searching for their bases. It
may conceivably prove science to be illusory, but
in doing so it must annihilate itself, as it can only
establish its own claim to credence by first vindi-
cating the truthfulness of the sciences and then
appealing to their testimony. Thus philosophy as
positive must precede philosophy as critical, meta-
physical, and practical; and critical philosophy,
metaphysical philosophy, and practical philosophy
must submit to be attested by the conclusions of
a positive philosophy which accepts the well-estab-
lished results of any and every science.

If the view just stated be approved we shall be
freed from the danger of falling into either of two
common and hurtful errors. The first is the identi-
fication of philosophy with some special science or
group of sciences. The narrow notion that one
science belongs to philosophy and another not, that
the mental sciences are philosophical and the physi-
cal sciences non-philosophical, is still prevalent, but
is essentially and intensely unphilosophical. There
is no objection to using the terms science and philo-

40 PHILOSOPHY A3 SCIENTIA 3CIENTIAEUM.

sophy popularly, interchangeably, when no harm
is likely to be done thereby ; but if we distinguish
and delimit them there is but one view of philo-
sophy which can justify itself either historically
or logically, and it is that which regards it not
as exclusive of any of the sciences, but as com-
prehensive of them all. From this view it follows
immediately, on the one hand, that no special
science can claim to be philosophy as against any
other special science, and, on the other hand, that
no special science is excluded from having the
closest connection with and interest in philo-
sophy; that each special science, one may even
say each special subject, has its philosophy; the
philosophy of any subject as distinguished from
the science of that subject being the view or theory
of its relations to other things, to the universe of
which it is a part, as distinguished from the view
or theory of it as isolated or in itself.

The other grave error to which our account of
philosophy is directly opposed is that which would
found it on common-sense, on ordinary knowledge,
on untested and unanalysed consciousness. In pro-
nouncing appeals to common-sense to be illegitimate,
I take common-sense in its ordinary acceptation, and
censure in no degree appeals to those so-called prin-
ciples of common-sense which are simply the ulti-
mate conditions of thought as adequately ascertained

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM. 41

by psychological analysis. What is alone objection-
able is that 'the science of the sciences' should
appeal from science to any lower tribunal. Science
is more definite and better grounded than ordinary
knowledge ; nearer the perfect form of human know-
ledge ; such knowledge in its completest and purest
state. Therefore whenever science can be had it is
with science that philosophy should have to do, and
by science that it must be tried and judged. Each
science reduces to order, each science develops to
perfection or approximate perfection so much ordin-
ary knowledge, and philosophy has to avail itself of
the achievements of the separate sciences. Hence
an important reduction, an important simplification,
of its labour. As far as possible it has to do not
directly with the comparative chaos of common
knowledge, but with the separate systems of order
which constitute the special sciences. Wherever it
can do better it ought never to appeal from the
higher to the lower tribunal, — from Philip sober to
Philip drunk.

III.

Some observations on the various kinds or stages
of knowledge still seem to be called for. To appre-
hend aright the nature of one phase or species of
knowledge acquaintance with that of others is in-

42 PHIL080PHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM.

dispensable. Yet it has long been, and still is,
common to assume that knowledge is only three-
fold, although the assumption is very erroneous, and
has given rise to various false inferences. There are
many stages and kinds of knowledge, and so im-
portant a fact should not be overlooked or the vast
significance of it fail to be realised as fully as
possible. Yet there are even scientists and philo-
sophers who treat of ordinary human knowledge as
if it were the primary source and oldest form of
knowledge. Of course that is a very great error,
one which assumes that there was no animal in-
telligence or knowledge on earth before mankind
appeared on its surface, and that the deepest roots of
consciousness and thought were brought into the
world with the advent of palaeolithic man or a
primeval Adam. There is not only no warrant for
the assumption, but absolutely conclusive evidence
to the contrary.

There was animal consciousness on earth for in-
calculable ages before the genus homo appeared on
it. Human psychology instead of being the whole
of psychology is a very small portion of it. There
is a psychology possible of far vaster extent, — a
comparative psychology the aim of which should be
comprehensive enough to take account of all kinds
of creatures that have lived, suffered, and died
on earth, and capable of realising aright what

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA 8CIENTIARUM. 43

their experiences, their inner as well as outer his-
tories, have been. Its task may be a very difficult
one, but it cannot be reasonably held to be an im-
possible one. Why not ? Just because man has in
his own inmost nature the key to all animal con-
sciousness. In every state of consciousness he has
what are called feeling, knowing, and willing, or, in
other words, sensation, cognition, and volition. But
so has every animal, even the least and meanest.
The three elements of consciousness are inseparable
alike in man and beast, and hence the former may
by a judiciously directed study of the latter acquire
a very considerable amount of knowledge of the
actions, meanings, and experiences of animals of
every kind; and at every stage of their existence.
The course of the history of knowledge on earth
began apparently with the origination of animal life
on earth, although there are some scientists who be-
lieve that it began earlier, and that sentiency and
consciousness had their roots even in the vegetable
kingdom. In proof they have pointed to facts
traceable throughout the vegetable kingdom and to
adaptations between certain plants and their physi-
cal surroundings analogous to those that take place
in consequence of the repetition of animal actions
and the formation even of human habits. Among
the most relevant and best known of such facts are
the curious arrangement and action of the leaves in

44 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM.

the pitcher-plant; the rapid and peculiar motion which
makes* the Dionaea muscipula an efficient fly-trap ;
what Darwin calls the ' nice sense ' of the Mimosa ;
and the elongation and contraction of the stalk of
the Vallisneria according as the waters in which it
grows rise or fall. But however analogous or akin
to animal actions such movements may appear, no
one has as yet proved them to be of the same
nature, whereas it is certain that knowledge began
wherever even the lowest animal life began. All
animals have intelligence, and many of them an
amazing intelligence. Yet not a few attempts have
been made to explain away their intelligence; and to
represent their actions as merely automatic, as due
to the mechanical play of bodily organs, or to irrit-
ability, or to the immediate and sole operations of
deity, or to instinct undefined.

It was a curious fact that so late as the year
1874-75 such men as Prof. Huxley (in The Fort-
nightly Review), and Dr Carpenter, Mr Mivart, and
the late Duke of Argyll (in The Contemporary
Review), should have been discussing the question,
Whether or not animals are automata? Certainly
if animals are automata and their actions automatic
so are men and their actions. 1 Man and beasts are
alike machines in that they are alike influenced by

1 See Janet's Final Causes (E.T.), Bk. I. c. v., Mechanism and
Finality, pp. 137-178.

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM. 45

their physical organisation and alike different from
machines in that they are alike endowed with sen-
tiency, appetite, desire, and activity. Sir Isaac
Newton, Addison, Bonnet, and others have spoken
of the instinctive actions of animals as immediate
operations of Deity. They have represented the
phenomena of so-called instinct as ' the direct mani-
festations of the Divine energy in animals/ as * to
be explained by the continued and universal pres-
ence of a living intelligent Spirit,' and ' the body
of an insect as but a curtain hiding the operations
of the Supreme Artist/ — a view which implies
that * God is the soul of brutes/ — an opinion far
from peculiarly pious, — a theory which, if con-
sistently carried out, would reduce all nervous
actions and all mental processes both in man
and beasts to divine operations, and land us in
complete pantheism.

Others have represented the study of animal mind
as impracticable and futile, on the grounds that we
are either (1) not conscious of what takes place in
animal mind or (2) that animal consciousness is
merely a quasi -consciousness. Both reasons are
exceedingly weak. If we can know only the mental
states of which we are self-conscious it is not merely
the minds of beasts that we must remain ignorant
of, but every human mind except our own, and also
the Divine mind, for all those minds are alike un-

46 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM.

known to us except through their self-manifesta-
tions to us.

As inconclusive is it to assert that animal con-
sciousness cannot be apprehended and interpreted
by us because it is only quasi-consciousness. The
reply to that is obvious. How can what is asserted
as known be known by those who assert it? To
be entitled to say what they do say they must
have already done what they declare cannot be
done ; must have interpreted animal conscious-
ness and - ascertained what it is before they can
rationally believe or pronounce it to be anything —
or even quasi anything — else. Unless they know
what it is, how do they know that it is not such
consciousness as they themselves possess, but a
mysterious tertium quid between that conscious-
ness and unconsciousness. As to the second reason
referred to, a quasi-consciousness is an absurdity.
To call the pain which an animal gives evidence of
suffering quasi-pain should be recognised by every
sane person as an abuse of language. There is no
medium, tertium quid, or quasi in such a case.
There is either pain or not pain, sensation or non-
sensation, knowledge or ignorance.

Seeing that consciousness and knowledge belong
to all creatures in the animal kingdom, man as
the earthly head of that kingdom is not only self-
conscious and self-cognitive but capable of under-

PHILOSOPHY AS SOIENTIA SCIENTIARUM. 47

standing what are the sentiency and knowledge
of the countless active beings which Zoology distri-
butes into its multitudinous divisions, — its types,
classes, orders, sub-orders, and families. The psy-
chical life and consciousness of all mere animals is
much simpler and more limited than that of man,
and may naturally be found, in consequence, to be
much more easily understood. That animal intelli-
gence is, as a whole, however, a lower stage of
intelligence than the human, and that in every
animal species the variation is greater than in the
human, must be admitted, and the main reason for
such being the case seems obviously to be that the
animal mind is much more dependent on the bodily
organism than the human mind is on the human
body. The former is in comparison much less free.
Whereas the manifestations of knowledge in animals
are often seemingly automatic, in man they are, in
comparison, very exceptionally so. Were it other-
wise, the achievements of many species of animals
would be far more extraordinary than those of a
similar character performed by man. Some of the
smallest species of animals display the largest
amount of intelligence. The elephant is sagacious
within certain limits, and in comparison with the
rhinoceros or hippopotamus, but its knowledge is
far less wonderful and exact than the knowledge
of ants, bees, and beavers. Ants are not only cap-

48 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM.

able of giving good lessons to sluggards but they
display a marvellous knowledge in an architecture
of their own, the importance of social organisation,
and how to conduct war with vast numbers. Bees
in the construction of the cells of their honeycombs
not only solved an economic problem of the utmost
practical importance to them, but which was also so
difficult a problem of the higher mathematics that a
completely satisfactory solution was first given by
Colin Maclaurin in the Transactions of the Royal
Society of London. The naturalists who have made
a special study of the operations and habits of
beavers are agreed as to their extraordinary intelli-
gence. In one well-authenticated case these crea-
tures have been proved to have, for generation after
generation during at least a thousand years, con-
structed their lodges, dams, and canals, so as to
have at length changed the entire configuration of
the region in which they had operated.

The whole animal world is participant in know-
ledge. Every kind of living creature has some
measure of intelligence, sentiency, and self-activity.
Whence come they? Whence has every living
creature its share of them ? Surely not from mere
matter in any form, nor from the creatures them-
selves by any self-creative power, but only from an
eternal self-existent Intelligence, an Intelligence to
which no origin or limit can be assigned, an infinite

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM. 49

and ever-living Being creative and comprehensive of
all that knows and all that is known. Apparently
there were many and long ages before there was any
life and intelligence on earth ; but conceivably also
the sources of consciousness and knowledge may
have been present in the cosmic ether before our
world became a globe differentiated from all other
worlds. Nor is it entirely certain, perhaps, that
vegetable and animal vitality may not have had in
an incalculably remote age on earth their origins in
the same protoplasmic substance. What is alone
indubitable is that conscious life has had an exceed-
ingly long history on earth.

That it was preceded by a vastly long history
of entirely dead matter does not seem to have
been adequately proved either in the affirmative
or negative. Even a molecule of matter would
appear to have a history in or behind which alike
the chemist and biologist, geologist and palaeon-
tologist, have failed entirely to decipher. No
educated person, however, thanks to the labours of
those scientists, can now fail to believe that the
history of animal life and intelligence has already
been one of amazing and incalculable length, as
well as vast breadth, and that from its first known
appearance until the present time it has been a
history of unbroken continuity the development
of which can be traced as plainly as the history

D

50 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SOIBNTIARUM.

of any individual It has passed through many
epochs and phases, every epoch having its own
physiognomy and every phase of every epoch having
presented some variation, but there has nowhere
been complete separation of the stages or radical
difference between the species of animals that have
lived and worked, enjoyed and suffered in those
stages. Absolutely new and original species, how-
ever, have been nowhere discovered. From the
earliest time animal nature has had general features
in common with those of to-day. It is impossible
to draw an absolute limit between the beings that
have existed before us and those that are living
around us.

Our animal world is not distinct from the fossil
world, but rests on it and is the continuation of it
at almost every point. The two in alliance have
had a series and history of the stages which are
so many periods of progress alike in the general
history of the animal world and in the special
history of mankind. And hence there has been
in the main a continuous growth of animal and
human intelligence and knowledge towards develop-
ment and improvement. The numbers of animals and
men have been increased. There has been greater
differentiation alike of their physical and mental
organisation. There has likewise been progress as
regards sensibility, intelligence, and activity — e.g.,

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIBNTIA SCIENTIARUM. 51

improvement in sight, hearing, smell, affectionate
and social sentiments, a higher development of the
nervous system, and more combination and co-
operation.

One has a temptation to dwell on so interesting
a subject, but I must not yield to it, as it has been
in recent times dwelt on by many distinguished
scientists. The study of animal mind had been
inaugurated by Aristotle's History of Animals, yet
during the last fifty or sixty years it will scarcely
be questioned to have been more carefully and
fruitfully cultivated than all those which had pre-
ceded them. Comparative Psychology is mainly
the creation of the present age, during which there
has, perhaps, been no more interesting scientific
achievement. It has immensely extended the
sphere of psychological study. Among those who
deserve most credit for that result have been Bingley,
Btichner, Darwin, Gaudry, Houzeau, Huber, Jesse,
Lubbock, Perty, Romanes, Semper, and Wundt
They are all authors of most instructive and easily
procurable works.

Of human knowledge there are universally re-
cognised to be three kinds or stages — viz., ordinary,
scientific, and philosophic knowledge. Ordinary
knowledge is the kind of knowledge common to
all sane men but also such knowledge as is often

52 PHILOSOPHY AS 8CIENTIA SCIENTIARUM.

extremely indistinct, confused, and superficial. It
is not strictly definable and generally very vague
as to its contents. The nature of it is common not
to men only but to all animals. It is distinguishable
from science by its lack of precision and exactness
and from philosophy by its lack of comprehensiveness
and profundity. Even as knowledge of particular
objects and limited ends indeed it implies universal
principles and rational intuitions but is not con-
sciously and distinctly aware of them. Only in the
scientific and philosophical stages do they come
clearly to light. Yet ordinary knowledge is a
knowledge by no means to be despised. A large
portion of it is probably of more value than much
which is called science and believed in as such.
Although less exact than science it is often less
capable of being dispensed with. A human world
composed exclusively of scientific experts might
very possibly, and not very improbably, be not
better but worse than one like the present com-
posed for the most part of merely ordinarily
intelligent men. There is a vast amount of
ordinary knowledge which is more helpful and of
more real human interest than there is of science.
All the roots of scientific thinking are already in
ordinary knowledge. Compared with ordinary
thought the amount of scientific thought is very
limited.

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SOIBNTIARUM. 53

Scientific knowledge is, nevertheless, rightly
regarded as on the whole a higher stage of know-
ledge than non-scientific or ordinary knowledge. It
is a knowledge of more than mere facts or common
observations and experiences, including as it does
a search for the reasons and causes of things as well
as of mere perceptions of them, or, in Greek
phraseology, not merely the art but also the Sioti
of phenomena. And, further, all scientific know-
ledge is knowledge of a specific kind, and differ-
entiated from knowledge not of that kind. Each
science has a sphere of its own, and is not to be
confounded with ununified and indeterminate know-
ledge. The scientist is a specialist, and as such one
who keeps within a province peculiarly his own,
and distinguishes it from other provinces, although
if a wise man he will look beyond it and take note
of what other scientists are doing in contiguous
departments. The methods appropriate to the
several sciences must vary with their objects.
Still less, of course, is scientific knowledge to be
identified with mere belief, or with mere art and
practice, than with ordinary knowledge. To collect
facts, to analyse material objects and mental states,
to distinguish between semblance and reality, to
discover and formulate laws of sequence, to bring
to light the conditions of order and organisation
alike in the physical and spiritual worlds, are what

54 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIBNTIA SOIKNTIARUM.

the sciences have to accomplish, each in its own
province.

Science is often, but not always, what had been
merely ordinary knowledge in an advanced and
improved stage. It is not always so because when
sciences are thoroughly established they are often
capable of evolution from within so as to yield
vast accessions to knowledge such as have never
existed except in scientific form. Mathematics is
constantly thus extending itself into regions where
unscientific intellect has never been, and conse-
quently can predict effects which have never been
observed, and may be carried to developments far
beyond the reach of experiments. But in general
science issues out of ordinary knowledge, and that
knowledge may in every case be regarded as a
step towards scientific knowledge, — as a humbler
stage always, a prior stage generally of the same
movement or process. Science rises superior to
ordinary knowledge in being both more general
and more definite. More general inasmuch as it
regards things not as isolated and individual but
as included under some law, as terms of some fixed
relation, of coexistence, or succession; and more
definite as implying a recognition of the exact re-
lation in which one fact stands to another, whereas
ordinary knowledge in its recognition of connection
between facts is merely of some sort of connection.

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SOLKNTIARUM. 55

In a general way philosophic knowledge may
reasonably be held to be the highest stage and
most comprehensive kind of human knowledge,
but only when it strives with a fair measure of
success to realise the ideal at which it aims. All
that assumes to be philosophy is not to be taken
simply on its own authority. Much of it has
been found to be instead of perfect knowledge
pretentious nonsense. But genuine philosophy is
worthy of all the praise which has been bestowed
upon it. Wherever there has been active and
earnest thinking, wherever the arts have flourished,
wherever the sciences have prospered, wherever
civilisation has spread, there philosophy can be
shown to have been at work. The term itself
and the history of it have been suggestive and
instructive as to what it has meant and ought
to mean. It was as "the love of wisdom," and
not as the acquisition of mere knowledge, that it
was called into existence, and the Pythagoreans
and Platonists continued to regard "the yearning
after divine wisdom" as what was properly dis-
tinctive of it. Cicero spoke of it as " the science
of divine and human things and of the causes
in which they are contained." Descartes changed,
and contributed to modernise, the conception of
it, by representing it as "the pursuit of the
perfect knowledge of all things that men can

56 PHILOSOPHY A8 SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM.

know, deduced from first principles." Kant de-
scribed it as "the science of the relations of all
knowledge to the essential ends of human reason."
Lotze's definition of it (in his Grundziige der
Logik, § 83) is "an effort to import unity and
connectedness into the scattered doctrines of cul-
tured thought, to follow each of these directions
into its assumptions and into its consequences,
to combine them together, to remove their con-
tradictions, and to form out of them a compre-
hensive view of the world; mainly, however, to
subject the ideas which science and life regard
as principles to a special scrutiny in order to
determine the limits of their validity." Even
those few definitions may suffice to show what
has been the course of thought as to the nature
of philosophy. It has been a long course and
one never entirely interrupted. Philosophy has
always preceded what we would call science. Wher-
ever there is earnest human thought as to truth
and error, good and evil, right and wrong, there is
something of the nature of philosophy, and as
such it aspires to be coextensive with human
knowledge, claims the right of criticising and
testing all opinions, and hesitates not to raise
and try to answer the most difficult and per-
plexing yet engrossing and important questions
which can come before the human mind. Hence

PHILOSOPHY AS 8CIENTIA 8CIENTIARUM. 57

philosophy is rightly, and almost universally,
regarded as the last and highest stage of human
intelligence.

Philosophy, in order to be as comprehensive as
it ought, has to deal as its subject with the entire
intelligible universe, the three final existences of
which are God, the world, and self. Its ways or
modes of manifestation and action are : —
1°, Positive or Phenomenological ; 2°, Critical or
Epistemological ; 3°, Metaphysical or Theoretical;
and 4°, Practical ; or, it may suffice to say simply
the positive, the critical, the metaphysical, and
the practical.

Philosophy as universal science has, in the first
place, to deal in a comprehensive and general way
with what all the special positive sciences deal with
in a sectional way. It has to seek to attain to a
knowledge of the unity, self-consistency, and har-
mony of the teachings of these separate sciences,
and to a knowledge of what the universe is accord-
ing to their collective testimony. Philosophy as
thus a synthesis of the positive sciences is Positive
Philosophy. As such it deals only with phenomena,
appearances, particular experiences, — with what the
ordinary man and the positivist scientist accept as
alone facts. According to Comte and the adherents
of all the positivist schools there is no other philo-
sophy than such positive philosophy. In that they

58 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIBNTIA 8CIENTIARUM.

err, but they axe in no way mistaken io maintain-
ing that there is a positive philosophy, and that it
is of primary and fundamental importance. They
are only mistaken in supposing that philosophy can
rationally stop where they would have it to do.

Philosophy should be critical as well as positive.
A merely positive philosophy must be a very
imperfect philosophy. Philosophy as positive is
far from an adequate ideal of philosophy. Even
scientific thought is not necessarily self-criticising
thought; on the contrary, mere scientific thought,
however rigid and methodical, is essentially dog-
matic thought, — reasoned yet unreflective thought.
It builds up what is admitted to be knowledge, but
it does not inquire what so-called knowledge is or
is essentially worth. The mere scientist often
fancies that he is a man who takes nothing on
trust, when, in reality, he is taking everything
on trust, because he accepts without question or
reservation thought itself as naturally truthful, and
its laws as valid. Whatever superficial scientists
may suppose to the contrary, the fact is that the
entire procedure of science, and of philosophy in
so far as it is merely a generalisation of science, is
assumptive and dogmatic. The science which is so
often contrasted and opposed to faith by sceptics is
frequently implicit faith, and in the view of a serious
and consistent scepticism must be deemed a blind

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIBKTIARUM. 59

faith. Thought may assume, however, and is even
bound to assume, a very different attitude towards
itself and its own objects ; not only may but ought
to pass from a believing to an inquiring, from a
dogmatic to a critical stage, from a study merely v
of the superficial and apparent in knowledge to an
examination of the conditions and guarantees of
knowledge. Philosophy, in a word, has not only
to accumulate what passes for knowledge in the
opinion of positivists, but must assure itself as to
the solidity of its own foundations. As critical it
is occupied with a fundamental and universal
problem, the problem as to the possibility and
reality of knowledge of every kind, if philosophy
is not to end in nihilism or agnosticism. It is
essentially epistemology (inclusive of what is philo-
sophical in logic and methodology).

Philosophy, besides being positive and critical,
should also be metaphysical (systematical or theo-
retical). The criticism of what passes for know-
ledge may lead only to a negative or sceptical
result, either to philosophical nihilism or agnos-
ticism. Were it to be successful, however, all so-
called science must be but an inevitable and
ineradicable illusion, and all so-called knowledge
at bottom no knowledge, or the knowledge of
nothing. In that case philosophy might be best
defined as a demonstration of the vanity of

60 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM.

thought. While, however, its criticism of know-
ledge may conceivably lead to philosophical nihilism
or agnosticism, it may also, on the contrary, issue
in the refutation of them and the vindication of the
beliefs which underlie the special sciences, ordinary
knowledge, and common life. In other words, it
may warrant the conviction that objective reality
is the necessary antecedent and universal correlative
of the subjective activity in knowledge, and so far
from being absolutely unknowable is continuously
revealing itself, even to our very limited minds.
But if that result be reached, philosophy is mani-
festly bound to exhibit the nature of the ultimate
which the special sciences presuppose and so far
manifest, but with which they cannot competently
deal — first, because they are special, and, secondly,
because they are logically anterior to the criticism of
knowledge. Philosophy in that phase has for very
long been known as metaphysical or ontological
philosophy. It has also been often termed
systematic, theoretic, or speculative. Of course,
philosophy as metaphysical has to determine
whether or not there is God, the ground and
source of all being, the reason of all existences and
events, and cannot escape the necessity of being
either theistic or antitheistic. It has to deal with
all dogmatic metaphysical theories, and all such
theories must be either theistic or anti - theistic.

PHILOSOPHY AS 8CIENTIA SCIENTIARUM. 61

Hence it cannot itself escape the necessity of being
either theistic or anti-theistic. If the former be
arrived at, it is its obvious duty to tell us what it
can of God, of the world in relation to God, of man
in relation to God, of providence and theodicy, of
revelation and its media, of the destination of man-
kind and the consummation of things, of the aims,
ideals, spheres of action of the religious life, and the
like. A theistic metaphysical philosophy is bound
in self-consistency to exhibit the knowledge of God
as the alone absolute and all-comprehensive know-
ledge, — the idea of ideas in metaphysical language,
— and as inclusive of all the categories of being and
thought in their perfection. A correct doctrine of
the nature and function of the categories in thought
shows what is meant by knowing God as the abso-
lute, why it is erroneous to say that we cannot
know God, seeing that we can only know the
relative or the phenomenal, and the categories are
only valid for experience. In reality, all progress
in speculation, in science, in moral experience, and
in spiritual life, promotes progress in knowledge of
God.

Philosophy as a scheme of the sciences, as an
inquiry into the nature and limits of knowledge,
and as a doctrine of being and becoming, — or, in
other words, philosophy as positive, critical, and
metaphysical, — is theoretical philosophy in its three

62 PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM.

stages, and the whole of theoretical philosophy. It
is not the whole of philosophy, however, because
although philosophy be fundamentally and predomi-
nantly theoretical, a merely theoretical philosophy
must be essentially incomplete. Practical applic-
ability is a necessary consequence of theoretical
accuracy. The true theory of the relations of the
sciences, of the conditions of knowledge, and of the
nature of existence and causation must be also the
only true basis of doctrine as to the ends and issues,
the purposes and destinies, of the beings which con-
stitute the universe. Whither tends the physical
world ? What is the chief end of man ? To what
goal is society moving ? Is life worth living ? Is
optimism or pessimism or an intermediate hypo-
thesis the legitimate conception of existence ? Ques-
tions like these can be answered aright only in con-
nection with a general theory of final causes such
as a comprehensive and profound philosophy can
alone provide. The answers given to them even
by the most comprehensive and profound philos-
ophy of the present age, and of many ages to come,
may be far from distinct and certain, and yet may
gradually approximate to the full truth as time
advances and knowledge increases. Philosophy
when engaged in the study of these questions and
seeking to be helpful in the guidance of active life
may be appropriately entitled practical philosophy.

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM. 63

Philosophy may not unreasonably present a claim
to be regarded as the highest and most comprehen-
sive kind of all human knowledge but certainly not
of all knowledge. There is an infinitely vaster and
more perfect knowledge than any to which man or
any other or even all created beings can pretend to
possess. There is a knowledge which we are very
apt to ignore although all other knowledge in the
universe springs from it and is closely connected
with it. In other words, there are not merely ordi-
nary and human knowledge, science, and philos-
ophy, but omniscience, — divine intelligence and
wisdom, — an all - comprehensive, perfect, and in-
finite knowledge. Nothing can be hid from God.
All is perfectly known to Him in the past, present,
and future, from the highest to the lowest, and
from the least to the greatest. He has all the
perfections of knowledge in himself and also knows
all that there is to know from without. Co-exten-
sive with omniscience is omnipotence. They are
indissolubly united. The former is not inactive
nor the latter unenlightened. More need not here
be said. The subject has been treated of in every
comprehensive system of theology.

A HISTORY OF CLASSIFICATIONS
OF THE SCIENCES

E

A HISTORY OF CLASSIFICATIONS
OF THE SCIENCES.

rpHE first problem with which philosophy, alike
as scientia sdentiarum and as positive phil-
osophy, should deal seems to be how may the
sciences be rationally arranged and classified.
Unless it be so far accomplished obviously no
attempt at the organisation of either knowledge
or science can be successful. Philosophers have
always felt, more or less distinctly, that such must
be the case. They have never shown themselves
wholly unconscious that they ought to aim at the
organisation of knowledge. On the contrary, they
have made many endeavours to realise that aim, and
have always recognised that the first step or stage
to the organisation required is some form of classifi-
cation. From the time of Plato to the present day
there has been a continuous series of attempts to
classify the sciences. An historical and critical
account of them can hardly fail to be useful, even

68 PLATONIC SCHEME OF

although none of them may have been completely
successful. Indeed, no scheme of the sciences can
be final and perfect so long as new sciences remain
to be formed. On the other hand, few have been
entirely worthless, and some may fairly be held to
have been of much value. A study of them is
indispensable at least to those who would improve
on them. It is always helpful towards knowing
how a thing ought to be done to consider how it
has been done. Thus only can all the points of
view, principles, and methods which require to be
considered in connection with any difficult problem
be brought distinctly before us.

L FKOM PLATO TO THE KENAISSANCB.

Platonic Plato was, perhaps, the first who sought to give a
systematic distribution of knowledge. We must be
careful not to confound with that distribution so-
called divisions of his philosophy. Of its very
nature his philosophy will not divide. Those who
have divided it, like Marbach into general and
applied, or, like Krug into theoretical and practical,
have overlooked the fact, which numerous passages
might be brought to substantiate, that, in the eyes
of Plato, philosophy was an essentially practical
spiritual process. It was not theory or practice,

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 69

science or life, nor even theory applied to practice,
science applied to life, but both in one — the striving
of the soul to purify and ennoble itself, to make
itself all beautiful within. There is no right under-
standing of the philosophy of Plato possible if we
forget that he regarded it as primarily a process,
the true life of the spirit, the soul making of itself
a divine poem, the highest music. It is equally
incorrect to divide the Platonic philosophy, as Van
Heusde has done, into a philosophy of the true,
of the beautiful, and of the good. That is an
altogether modern mode of dividing philosophy,
and quite contrary to the spirit of Platonism.
Philosophy was, according to Plato, not only
essentially practical, but also essentially one, and
one because all ideas lead up to the idea of the
good.

The division of philosophy most commonly
attributed to him, however, is that into dialectics,
physics, and ethics. But although Schwegler,
Zeller, Ferrier, Ueberweg, Erdmann, and many
others, have adopted it as substantially warranted,
it can exhibit no valid claims. It is admitted that
Plato nowhere distinctly states it. The very names
physics and ethics are unknown to him, and dia-
lectics is with him not a part of philosophy, but
the whole of philosophy. The way in which he
came to be credited with the division is apparent

70 PLATONIC SCHEME OF

from what Sextus Empiricus, who flourished about
the beginning of the third century, says on the
subject: "Of those who divide philosophy into
physics, ethics, and logic, Plato is virtually the
originator (Swa/xei oLpxvyo*)* having discoursed on
many physical, many ethical, and not a few logical
questions." * The latter clause is here obviously the
explanation and reason of the former. It is because
Plato has discoursed much on physical matters,
much on ethical matters, and not a little on logic
that he is affirmed to have been virtually the author
of the threefold division of philosophy which was
afterwards widely prevalent. There is, in fact, no
other ground on which it can be carried up to Plato
with any plausibility, and this ground is quite
insufficient. That Plato wrote on all these three
subjects cannot in any degree warrant us to call
him even the virtual originator of the distribution.
It was scarcely possible that Plato, or any other
person, should write much on philosophy without
handling to some extent both physics and ethics,
and wholly impossible to handle them without
keeping them in some measure apart, but that was
a very different thing from making physics and
ethics distinct parts of philosophy, co-ordinate with
each other and with dialectics. That Plato certainly
did not. There is no dialogue of Plato exclusively

1 Adv. Math., vii. 16.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 71

dialectical, and no dialogue from which dialectics is
excluded. Physical, ethical, and all other inquiries
are only included in his philosophy in so far as they
are dialectical, and his dialectics exists only as deal-
ing with the idealities of nature and spirit. Plato
knows nothing of a logic which has a province of
its own apart from all definite ideal contents. It
is vain to try to classify his writings as dialectical,
physical, and ethical.

Plato's distribution of knowledge is one involved
in his very theory of knowledge. It has been
discussed so often that I shall treat of it as briefly
as possible, and only because I must. According to
Plato, then, two worlds lie before the vision of man,
—a visible world and an intelligible world. Each of
these worlds, in its turn, divides into two. Thus
the visible world is made up either of things or of
images of things. The former are the rocks, trees,
animals, &c. ; the latter are the shadows and reflec-
tions which they throw off, — such shadows and
reflections as may be seen in water or in a mirror.
All the objects of the visible world are discerned
only through sense (aZcrfycris), but sense in contact
with things generates belief (moris), while in con-
tact with images (cikwcs) it generates merely con-
jecture (eiKaaia). Belief and conjecture are but a
higher and lower form of opinion (Sofa). Belief
differs from conjecture; views based on things are

72 PLATONIC 8CHEME OF

not to be confounded with views based on mere
shadows, and have a greater worth and usefulness ;
but in no form can the informations of sense give
us truth or be entitled to the name of knowledge.

There is, however, an intelligible world, with
objects which reason apprehends and not sense.
These objects are likewise divisible into two classes,
— conceptions and ideas. Conceptions are on the
lower level, and the mind reaches them by the help
of certain objects of sense which are a sort of images
of them. The mathematical sciences are conversant
with them, and in these sciences we make use of
visible figures, and motions, and audible sounds, but
only to help us to the comprehension of forms, pro-
perties, and ratios, which intellect alone can grasp.
They are five in number, and form a naturally and
closely connected series, — Arithmetic, Plane Geo-
metry, Solid Geometry, Astronomy, and Harmonics.
Even the two latter deal not with physical things, —
the visible luminaries of the sky, and the musical
sounds of the voice and other instruments, — but
with permanent truths, mathematical relations, which
eye cannot see nor ear hear.

Plato gives, in the seventh book of the Republic,
a very remarkable account of the sciences conversant
with conceptions. To that account it must suffice
here merely to refer. The great value of those
sciences in his view was that they tended to raise

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 73

the mind above themselves, to develop philosophic
insight, to educate reason to apprehend the absolute
truth which is the light and life of the soul. In
themselves he regarded them as inherently defective.
They begin with certain assumptions and give us
only the consequences which follow from reasoning
on these assumptions. They start from principles
which they cannot prove, which it is beyond their
province to prove. They are essentially hypothetical.
There is need, accordingly, for a higher science;
a science which may make use of the assumptions of
the sciences which deal with conceptions as occasions
and starting-points whence it may ascend to absolute
principles, to what has its reality and evidence in
itself, to ideas. And there is such a science. Its
name is Dialectic. The lower sciences have for their
objects conceptions or scientific assumptions; the
faculty which they employ is discursive reason, and
their procedure is demonstration. The highest
science has for its objects ideas, not conceptions;
absolute, not hypothetical principles; real, not
assumed existences; for its process intuition, not
demonstration, and for its faculty the intuitive, not
the discursive reason. It includes in itself all pro-
perly philosophical investigations. It is at once a
metaphysics, a logic, a theology, an ethics, and an
aesthetics ; a metaphysics, because occupied with the
immutable and invisible ; a logic, because the form

74 PLATONIC SCHEME OF

and method of absolute science ; a theology, because
the supreme idea is the ultimate cause ; an ethics,
inasmuch as conversant with the principles which
are the source of all morality; and an aesthetics,
since true beauty is ideal and transcendental in
nature and origin.

Plato's doctrine of science originated in a profound
conception of the nature of intelligence, and corre-
sponded to a magnificent view of the universe of
existence. From its promulgation to the present
time it has captivated alike the reason, imaginations,
and moral susceptibilities of men as no similar theory
has done. But, whatever were its merits, it had also
defects, which showed themselves very plainly in the
Platonic survey of the sciences, and which led, in
particular, to undue contraction of the sphere of
science. The whole world of sense is not to be
relegated, as Plato advised, to the limbo of mere
opinion. Natural apprehension and ordinary judg-
ment are not so essentially different from scientific
cognition as he assumed. The notion that there is
no science of phenomena, and that consequently
science cannot be reached through the study of
phenomena, but requires us to get beyond phen-
omena, through and above them as it were, into
a region of types, exemplars, conceptions, ideas, is
directly antagonistic to the spirit of modern science,
and has been amply confuted by the splendid achieve-

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 75

ments of modern science. It is a notion which
involves denial of the possibility of the physical or
natural sciences.

It apparently led Plato to that conclusion. For
although in the Timaeus he speculated on the origin
and disposition of the world, and the organisation of
man, he expressly held that nothing could be affirmed
on these subjects as certain. What is called his
Physics was an application of his Dialectics, and of
a character which he himself maintained must be
conjectural. Of physical science in the proper sense
he has shown, I think, no conception. The error
which led him thus unduly to restrict the sphere of
science he also carried into his actual survey and
description of the sciences. There it took the form
of the dogma that the realities of a science are dis-
tinct from its phenomena. The latter do not contain
or manifest, but only suggest the truths of science,
and aid the mind to reach them. The conceptions
of Geometry are ideal assumptions ; its phenomena
are visible illustrations which never exactly cor-
respond to them, and often do them great injustice.
So there is an Astronomy of theories or realities, and
an Astronomy of appearances or phenomena ; and
the latter is not true Astronomy, because the varie-
gated adornments which appear in the sky, the visible
luminaries, beautiful as they are, are only a sort of
admirable diagrams by the help of which we may

76 PLATONIC SCHEME OF

rise to the contemplation of spheres, movements,
and relations, which are real and immutable, and
which can be grasped only in mental conception.

Now, all that is untenable. The diagrams of the
geometer are not phenomena of geometry. Geo-
metrical reasoning refers entirely to ideal figures
and relations, understanding thereby immediately
or mediately defined figures in immediately or
mediately defined relations. However badly drawn
may be the diagrams before the bodily eye of the
geometer, those before his mental eye are always
absolutely accurate delineations. He can only
reason on the supposition that his triangles, squares,
&c, are precisely what they are defined to be.
It is likewise vain to separate and contrast an
astronomy of appearances and an astronomy of
theories. The appearances are in astronomy the
very things and the only things to be explained.
A theory, to be of any worth, must be one which
accounts for the appearances. Plato failed to per-
ceive how phenomena exhibit laws and how laws
manifest themselves in phenomena, and conse-
quently he opposed phenomena to realities in a
way which few will now undertake to defend.

Apart from the error indicated, Plato's survey of
the hypothetical sciences — the sciences which deal
with conceptions — is of remarkable merit, consider-
ing the age to which it belongs. It is especially

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 77

meritorious for the comprehensiveness and correct-
ness of mathematical view which it displays. It
strongly corroborates the historical testimony that
Plato was a proficient in the mathematical knowledge
of his time. He ignored, as we have seen, natural
science. Here, where Aristotle was so powerful,
Plato was comparatively feeble; but, on the other
hand, where Aristotle was weakest Plato was
strongest. All the difficulties which intelligence
meets with may be reduced to two classes,— diffi-
culties of abstraction and difficulties of complexity.
Of superior minds some overcome more easily
the one class of difficulties and some the other class.
Aristotle was the more fitted to deal with the
complex, Plato with the abstract. Hence, Aristotle
was drawn to natural philosophy, and still more to
natural history and psychology, and whatever de-
manded close observation and searching analysis;
Plato to mathematics, and all those loftier problems
which most transcend sense and most exercise pure
intellect. Few thinkers have discerned so broadly
and clearly as Plato the relations of the mathe-
matical sciences to philosophy.

Aristotle's conception of philosophy as distin- Arkto-
guished from science was greatly inferior to that gcheme.
of Plato, and his criticism of the nature of know-
ledge was far less profound and suggestive, yet his

78 ARISTOTELIAN DISTRIBUTION

work was, on the whole, an advance on that of his
predecessor. It was at once its continuation and
complement. Aristotle collected the truths which
Plato had so lavishly scattered, added to them a
multitude of facts acquired by his own indefatigable
industry, and a multitude of reflections suggested
by his own vigorous and penetrating intellect, and
combined with rare judgment his vast acquisitions
into distinct organic systems. He thus became the
founder of more sciences than any other man. He
gave existence and form to almost as many special
scientific disciplines as he wrote books.

That great thinker, than whom there probably
never lived a man of more encyclopaedic mind,
adopted a threefold division of philosophy, science,
or knowledge. He distributed it into Theoretic,
Productive, and Practical Theoretic Philosophy
has no aim beyond the apprehension of truth. It
is conversant with the existent, with being. It
subdivides into Physics, Mathematics, and Meta-
physics. Being, considered in connection with
whatever can be known through perception and
experience, is the subject-matter of Physics, which,
according to Aristotle, includes Psychology. Being,
conceived of apart from the variations of the mate-
rial world, but not apart from matter, is that with
which Mathematics is conversant. Mathematics
consequently differs from Physics not essentially,

OP KNOWLEDGE. 79

but only in degree, as being more general and
abstract. Metaphysics, again, differs from Mathe-
matics just as Mathematics differs from Physics,
being still more general and abstract. It treats of
Being per se, of the existent in its absolute nature
and universal properties. Aristotle called it " First
Philosophy," and sometimes " Theology. " It con-
tained what little theology he taught.

But philosophy, according to Aristotle, although
primarily is not exclusively theoretic. The con-
templation of being is its proper function in its
purest form, but not its only function. It has
regard also to the production of effects and to the
regulation of human actions. In the former case
it is Productive Philosophy ; in the latter case it is
Practical Philosophy. Productive Philosophy differs
from Theoretic Philosophy because it tends to per-
formance instead of to contemplation, and 'from
Practical Philosophy because it does not terminate
in the regulation of actions, but in the origination of
permanent products. It is the theory of the arts.
Aristotle did not subdivide it. His " Poetics " deals
only with one of the "imitative" arts. Rhetoric,
which, judging from its general character, one ex-
pects to find placed by the side of Poetics, was
viewed by him as a science auxiliary to Politics.
Practical Philosophy looks beyond truth to the
good, and seeks so to regulate actions that the good

80 ARISTOTELIAN DISTRIBUTION OP KNOWLEDGE.

may be reached. Its two chief branches are Ethics
and Politics. The former deals with man in relation
to his natural good as an individual ; the latter is
an inquiry as to how society should be constituted
.with a view to the public good.

Within this scheme Aristotle did not place Ana-
lytics, later called Logic. He regarded it not as a
part of philosophy, but as an introduction to philo-
sophy, and especially to "first philosophy." As a
doctrine of the principles and processes of science
he considered that it ought to take precedence of
the sciences. This, of course, was virtually to
exclude it from the sciences and to allow that the
proposed classification of the sciences was not in-
clusive of all departments of knowledge, while it
could, with much appearance at least of truth, be
maintained that the principles and processes of
science are only ascertainable after sciences have
been formed. Logic may, however, have a place
assigned it within the Aristotelian scheme. It may,
indeed, be ranked either among the Productive or
the Practical Sciences ; among the former if its end
be supposed to be the production of arguments;
among the latter if it be held to aim at the regu-
lation of the reasoning faculty. Rhetoric, also, is
virtually excluded from the classification when re-
presented as simply an auxiliary to Politics. It too,
however, like Logic, may easily be placed within it,

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 81

and either as a Productive or a Practical Science, —
the former if its aim be deemed the production of
orations, the latter if it be regarded as looking to
influence on the mind and conduct. Economics is
conjoined by Aristotle with Rhetoric, as being also
a science auxiliary to Politics. It might just as well
be viewed as a constituent member of the group of
Practical Sciences.

The work which Aristotle accomplished in the
way of originating and advancing the sciences which
he arranged or classified according to the plan now
described, gained him a unique position in the
history of science. No one has attained, or can
reasonably hope to attain, any very like position.
The scheme of classification itself, however, has
obvious defects. Thus, in the first place, the dis-
tinction between Productive Sciences and Practical
Sciences ought not to have the importance which is
assigned to it. It is neither broad nor deep, and
certainly not fundamental or primary. Nay, it is
much to be doubted whether it is a distinction
which can be at all applied to separate and distri-
bute the sciences. For as every science is in some
measure both regulative of actions and productive
of results, it would seem that there must be arbi-
trariness in forming sciences into groups by view-
ing some sciences as only regulative of actions and
others as only productive of results. Aristotle

F

82 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

chose to regard Politics, for example, as a Practical
Science, but he might with equal reason have ranked
it as a Productive Science. He might have looked
at the result it seeks to accomplish rather than at
its character as a means, and the result is a perma-
nent product, — an orderly, prosperous, and endur-
ing society.

In the second place, it is erroneous to classify the
sciences according to ends, either of regulation or
production. They should be arranged according to
their natures, their inherent characteristics, not
according to anything lying beyond themselves.
The end of a science is not anything fixed. It is
the sum of the uses to which the science can be put,
and uses always vary with wants. One science may
have many ends, and many sciences may require to
be combined in order to gain one end. It must
be especially erroneous to arrange some sciences
according to their natures and others according
to their ends. It must be illegitimate to employ
two principles of classification, and when one
fails, to have recourse to the other. That is a
procedure which must at once give rise to cross-
divisions, and which has in itself no logical limits.
If we can introduce two principles, why not three ?
And if three, why not as many as there are
things to divide? There can be no legitimate
scheme of classification in which the divisions

CLARIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 83

are not determined throughout by one common
principle.

That leads me to say that a third, and perhaps
the greatest, defect of the Aristotelian survey of the
sciences was the want of unity which arose from the
absence of a philosophy inclusive of, but superior to,
the sciences. Without explicitly affirming that he
did so, he, in reality, viewed philosophy as merely
a whole constituted by the sciences, a sum made up
of the sciences as a unit is made up of its component
fractions. But this leaves no philosophy distinct
from the sciences, and either able or entitled to co-
ordinate and organise them. Hence in the Aristo-
telian arrangement there is a certain grouping of
the sciences, but not a real systemisation of them.
They are not shown to constitute an organic whole.
They have each an independent foundation, and
they are also in some degree classified, but there is
no highest science to comprehend them and to de-
termine the place of each. What Aristotle called
First Philosophy and his commentators Metaphysics,
does not perform this function. Its object is being
as being, and so it is the antecedent and presup-
position of all other sciences, since they all treat of
special concrete beings, but it possesses a merely
abstract universality, and it has no power nor is it
any part of its business to organise the various
sciences into a system. It is not, to use an Aristo-

84 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

telian word, an architectonic science. The science
which Aristotle himself regards as such is Politics,
but its claims to the honour are altogether inadmis-
sible. They amount merely to an affirmation that
Politics is entitled to control other sciences, seeing
that politicians must view the sciences in relation to
the public good. We may be sure, however, that
the order of the sciences has a far deeper source
than the will and the interest of men. It must
spring from the essential truth of things, from the
all-pervasive order of nature.
Modified The Aristotelian classification, notwithstanding its
ian dasBi" radical defects, was widely accepted, although only
fication. ^ a giightly modified form. The narrow, the
really untenable distinction between Productive
and Practical Sciences was dropped, and philosophy
came to be divided simply into two great branches,
the Theoretical and Practical. This division found
recognition both among the Stoics and the Epi-
cureans. Some expressed it by representing Philo-
sophy as either Physical or Ethical, i.e., either
concerned with the contemplation of nature or the
regulation of human action. The great objection
to it is that it identified, or rather confounded,
philosophy with science. It recognised no philo-
sophy distinct from the sciences. It assumed that
the branches of philosophy were the divisions of
the sciences. If that be the case there is either

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 85

no philosophy proper or no science proper, for either
philosophy absorbs the sciences or the sciences leave
no room for philosophy. The division of the
sciences into Theoretical and Practical is still a
favourite popular one. There can be little doubt,
however, that it is faulty, even when science and
philosophy are expressly distinguished. All the
so-called Theoretical Sciences may be regarded as
also Practical Sciences, and all the Practical Sciences
as also Theoretical Sciences, if each class be only
looked at from the point of view previously appro-
priated to the other.

The division of philosophy into Dialectics, Physics,
and Ethics, commonly but erroneously attributed to
Plato, has been also referred to Aristotle, although
it is, of course, admitted not to have been the one
which he himself adopted. It has been referred to,
however, on the authority of a passage which by
no means warrants the conclusion drawn from it.
In that passage (Topics, B. I. ch. xiv.) he says that
" there are three parts of propositions and of pro-
blems; for some propositions are ethical, others
physical, and others logical " ; and he says so only
when treating of the choice of propositions with
reference to disputation. To regard that as a
division of philosophy into Physics, Ethics, and
Logic is to raise a very large superstructure on a
very small foundation. To classify propositions

86

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

with reference to a particular end is a very differ-
ent thing from classifying the sciences. Besides,
Aristotle put forth his classification of propositions
as only generally, only in outline, true (£9 rvma
wepikafUzlv).

Stoic Mid
Epicurean

diatribu-
tion of
Bcienoee.

The threefold division of philosophy into Logic,
Physics, and Ethics can be fairly ascribed neither
to Plato or Aristotle. It may have been enunci-
ated by Xenocrates, as Sextus Empiricus says, but
there is now no proof of that, and not unlikely it
originated with those who attached so much im-
portance to it, the Stoics, They regarded all
knowledge as vain and superfluous which had no
end beyond itself,— which did not help towards
the attainment of that wisdom to which the charac-
ter and conduct ought to conform. They held
that philosophy existed only to perfect human
nature and to guide human life, and that in order
to secure this end it must elicit and cultivate three
virtues or excellences : it must train the under-
standing to distinguish the true from the falsi.' ,
the useful from the useless, must enable the intel-
lect to penetrate into the nature and trace the
order of the universe, and must regulate the will
in the practice of what is good ; in other words, it
must be a Logic, Physics, and Ethics, — a Logic to
guide the reason, a Physics to explain the world,

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE 3CIENCES. 87

and an Ethics to rule the moral life. Each of those
disciplines was deemed to include two sciences.
Logic was not only the science of correct thinking,
but of the correct expression of thought, and so
comprehended both Dialectic and Rhetoric ; Physics
was both a Cosmology and a Theology, Deity being
regarded as not separable from the world, but the
active and formative power immanent in it; and
Ethics embraced Morals and Politics. The Stoics
were not agreed as to the order in which Logic,
Physics, and Ethics ought to stand. They com-
monly placed Logic first, but were much divided
as to whether Physics should precede or follow
Ethics. Logic they likened to the bones and
sinews of the animal body and to the shell of an
egg, but while some thought Physics was like the
flesh of the beast and white of the egg, and Ethics
like the soul of the one and the yolk of the other,
others represented Ethics as the flesh and white,
and Physics as the soul and yolk The Epicureans
accepted the same threefold division of science, but
without differing among themselves as to the order
of the divisions. They were still more narrowly
and exclusively practical than the Stoics; they
looked on philosophy merely as the power which
conducts men to happiness, and as worth attention
only in so far as it contributes to render existence
agreeable ; hence, Logic they confined to an investi-

88 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

gation of the criteria of truth, and cultivated simply
as necessary to Physics, and Physics they entirely
subordinated to Ethics, valuing it only as the means
of delivering the mind from superstitious beliefs
which disquiet and embitter the life.

It is unnecessary to criticise this distribution of
science either in its Stoic or Epicurean form. It is
very obvious that it finds no proper place for, if it
does not expressly exclude, metaphysics, mathematics,
psychology, and theology ; and, in fact, that it ex-
cludes at least as much as it includes. It received,
however, a wide acceptance, rivalling, and perhaps
even exceeding, in its diffusion the Aristotelian
classification. It prevailed among the scholastics,
and has found favour even with Descartes, Locke,
Kant, Herbert, and Hegel, although they have, of
course, suggested certain real or supposed improve-
ments. It will, therefore, come before us again in
later and more elaborated forms.

Vwto. Cicero has no claim to a place in this history, but

his contemporary and friend, the learned and inde-
fatigable Varro, is entitled to be mentioned as, in
all probability, the first who composed a kind of
inventory or encyclopaedia of the sciences. Like
all but two of the 490 works which he wrote, his
treatise Libri novem disciplinarum has been lost
for ages, but it exerted an influence, through the

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 89

writings of Capella, Cassiodorus, and others, on
many generations to which it was unknown. The
nine disciplines of which he treated were the seven
so-called " liberal arts," with the addition of medi-
cine and architecture.

In the fifth century of the Christian era, Marti- Capeik.
anus Capella wrote his bizarre encyclopaedic ro-
mance, the Satyricon. Two books describe the
marriage of Mercury and Philology, the daughter
of Phronesis, and the remaining seven are devoted
to the seven attendants on the bride, the seven
liberal arts, — Grammar, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Geo-
metry, Arithmetic, Astronomy, Music.

Somewhat later Cassiodorus treated of the same Cumo-
departments of knowledge in his De artibus et dis-
ciplinis liberalium litterarum, grouping together
Grammar, Dialectic, and Rhetoric, as Artes or
ScienticB Sermocinales, and Arithmetic, Geometry,
Astronomy, and Music as Disciplines or Sdentiw
Reales. Capella and Cassiodorus definitively estab-
lished the educational curriculum for the studious
youth of medieval Europe. It has to be remem-
bered, however, that it was only a preparatory
course. The studies which it comprised were all
regarded as ancillary to a higher science, as so many
steps and supports leading up to the knowledge of
divine things, the mistress science, Theology.

They were grouped into what was called the

90

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

Trivium
and Quad-

Trivium and Quadriviuni ; the fornier comprehend-
ing Grammar, Dialectic, and Rhetoric, and the
latter Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, and Music,
The general thought which underlay this division of
studies was that those of the lower order were con-
versant with words, those of the higher with things;
that the former were, as they were often termed,
dm serniocinaleSi the litter scientits reales; or,
otherwise, that the former were Logica, the latter
Mathematica. The Trivium corresponded likewise
to the Logic, and the Quadrivium to the Physics of
the Stoics. Ethics was generally included by the
Scholastics in Theology, although it was sometimes
given a place apart. It was usual for students to
pass slowly through the Trivium and rapidly
through the Quadrivium, and not uncommon for
them to omit the latter altogether, so as to pass
at once from logical and verbal studies to what was
then the science of most engrossing interest. This,
more than any other fact, perhaps, is explanatory
of Scholasticism. The scholastics were men whose
minds were nurtured on words divorced from things
and on the forms without the realities of know-
ledge. Even the medieval so-called "real sciences"
were essentially formal sciences; Arithmetic and
Geometry manifestly so, and Astronomy and Music
less plainly yet, in the main, indubitably so, as the
physical bases and material contents of both these

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 91

sciences were almost wholly ignored. No wonder,
therefore, that so many of the representatives of
scholasticism should now seem to us, as we look
back upon their exertions, like " metaphysic mills
vigorous in grinding the air."

Isidore of Seville (560-636), a celebrated Spanish Isidore,
bishop, and two illustrious Englishmen, the Vener-
able Bede (673-735) and Alcuin (736-804), greatly
contributed to give currency and authority to the
scheme of classification of the sciences introduced
by Capella and Cassiodorus. Isidore did so by the
work entitled Originum s. Etymologiarum Libri xx,
which at the time of its appearance, and for several
centuries afterwards, was supposed to form a com-
plete encyclopaedia of all extant departments of
knowledge. It was the chief source from which in
those times general information was drawn, and had
there been no such book, the darkest period of the
medieval world would have been even darker than
it was. The author's scheme and description of the
sciences are contained in his first three books, and
the order of their arrangement runs thus : (1) Gram-
mar, (2) Khetoric, (3) Dialectic, (4) Arithmetic, (5)
Geometry, (6) Music, (7) Astronomy, (8) Medicine,
(9) Jurisprudence, and (10) Chronology.

The influence of Bede, owing to his zeal for Bede and
acquiring and diffusing knowledge, his piety, his cum *
authorship of such a work as the Historia Ecclesi-

92 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

astica Gentis Britonum, and the compends which
he wrote to facilitate for students a mastery over
various disciplince, could not fail to be strong and
of the same character and tendency as Isidore's.
Alcuin, doubtless, owed much to what Bede had
been and done, but he was called to work in a far
wider sphere. Fortunately, he was well prepared
for his mission in life by an admirable and appro-
priate education in the renowned schools of York,
and when he became the friend and preceptor of
Charlemagne he zealously sought to have similar
schools founded throughout that monarch's wide
empire. The king was his first pupil, gave him
always his complete confidence, and placed him
wherever he could be of most use. During the last
years of Alcuin's life he was abbot of the famous
monastery of St Martin of Tours, and there, as he
had done in other positions, he gave not only
lessons on the Bible, but also on ancient languages,
grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, and astronomy.

Between the ninth and twelfth century there was
little if anything which here concerns us. It must
be remembered, however, that from the twelfth
century onwards the scholastic doctors, although
not independent students of the sciences, or com-
petent to organise satisfactorily the system of the
sciences, knew all that Aristotle had taught, much
besides which the Jews and Arabs had added, and

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 93

the vast body of doctrines which had been gradu-
ally derived from the statements or suggestions of
Scripture. Only minds of the largest capacity
could contain those stores of thought and learning
possessed by an Albertus Magnus, a Thomas
Aquinas, or a Dante.

The most characteristic medieval attempts at
classification of the various kinds of knowledge
were those which subordinated all secular studies
to theology, and represented the former as so many
stages by which the soul might gradually raise itself
to communion with the Divine. It may suffice to
indicate the character of three such attempts, viz.,
those of Hugo of St Victor, St Bonaventura, and
Vincent of Beauvais. Mysticism was a prominent
feature of all three, and the mysticism was of a
kind which has been appropriately called Latin, in
order to distinguish it from the earlier Greek mysti-
cism of the pseudo-Dionysius and Scotus Erigena
and the later German mysticism of Eckhart, Tauler,
and Thomas k Kempis. In all three stages medi-
eval mysticism was prominent, and naturally so as
a much-needed counterpoise to the crude and coarse
views, the empiricism, dogmatism, and formalism so
prevalent in the medieval world.

The classification of Hugo of St Victor (1096- Hugo of
1141) is to be found in his Eruditio didiscalica.

94 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

Three books in that work treat of worldly sciences,
and four of sacred and ecclesiastical history. The
former are of most interest. The main object of the
entire work, however, is distinctly avowed to be to
serve as a propedeutic to theology. All kinds of
secular knowledge are held to be of right subor-
dinate and auxiliary to religion. The entire scheme
of classification is comprised in three classes or divi-
sions. First, there are the theoretical sciences.
These include, — physics (which is occupied with
what is temporal and material), — mathematics
(which is represented as comprehending the whole
four divisions of the quadrivium, not merely arith-
metic and geometry but also astronomy and music),
— and above all theology (the object of which is the
eternal and divine, and in which alone the reason
and heart can find their full satisfaction). Secondly,
there is the division of practical sciences. It is held
to consist of ethics, economics, and politics. And,
thirdly, there is a sevenfold distribution of so-called
mechanical or technical arts. They are arranged in
the following order, — weaving, smith-work, naviga-
tion, agriculture, hunting, medicine, and the histri-
onic art. When one considers that Hugo was a
thorough recluse, of a feeble and sickly constitu-
tion, and who is said to have been only once away
from his monastery, it must seem marvellous that he
should have been able to acquire so much know-
ledge as he did of such arts as those mentioned.

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 95

He did not include psychology in his classification,
but he was a student of psychical facts. As he
assigned the different faculties of mind to different
divisions of the brain, he may be held to have so
far anticipated the phrenology of Gall and Spurz-
heim. In that, however, he was not original.
Phrenology should be regarded as not a modern
but a medieval invention.

The " Seraphic Doctor," St Bonaventura (1221- Bonaven-
1274), wrote a treatise entitled De reductione ar-
tium ad theologiam, in which he sought to refer the
varieties of knowledge to the one source of truth —
the Father of light. Cognitions he distributed
into artificial, natural, intellectual, and revealed,
according to the character of the Divine illumina-
tion in which he supposed them to originate ; for,
in this view, there are four kinds or degrees of
light, — the external light, by which we learn the
mechanical arts, — the inferior light, which shines
through the senses, and by which we apprehend
individuals or things, — the internal light, the
reason, which by reflection raises the soul to in-
tellectual things, the universals in conception, —
and the superior light, the light of grace, which
reveals to us sanctifying virtue, and elevates us to
universals as they are in their reality — i.e., in God
himself. It is, according to Bonaventura, from the
internal light that theoretic science or philosophy

96 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

flows, and such science or philosophy may be three-
fold, natural, rational, and moral, — the natural in-
cluding the three sciences of physics, mathematics,
and metaphysics, — the rational those of grammar,
logic, and rhetoric, — and the moral those of ethics,
economics, and politics.

Vincent of A contemporary of Bonaventura, Vincent of Beau-
r. Bacon, v &is, w &s the author of a very learned work of an
and Dante, encyclopaedic nature, the Bibliotheca mundi, other-
wise known as the Speculum quadruplex, since the
first part was meant to be a "mirror of nature"
(speculum naturale) ; the second a " mirror of doc-
trine " or science (speculum doctrinale) ; the third a
" mirror of history " (speculum historiale) ; and the
fourth a " mirror of morals " (speculum morale). In
the same century Roger Bacon did noble service to
the cause of science by insisting on the regard due
to experience, and enlarged men's conceptions of its
domain by his advocacy of linguistic, optical, and
experimental studies.

Some of our readers will recall to mind how
Dante in his Convito has represented the dis-
tribution of the sciences as corresponding to the
divisions of the heavens. Heaven in general
is science in general, — science abstract and un-
divided, — and as there are ten heavens, so are
there ten spheres of science. The seven heavens

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. 97

nearest to the earth are those of the planets, and
the planets in ascending order are as follows, — the
Moon, Mercury, Venus, the Sun, Mars, Jupiter, and
Saturn; to them correspond the seven sciences of
the Trivium and Quadrivium ; and mysterious ana-
logies — so the poet, with an imaginative subtility
impossible to describe, seeks to prove — exist be-
tween each planet and the science of which it is a
symbol, — between the Moon and grammar, Mercury
and dialectics, Venus and rhetoric, the Sun and
arithmetic, Mars and music, Jupiter and geometry,
Saturn and astronomy. Above those planetary
heavens are three others, the heaven of the fixed
stars, the crystalline heaven, and the heaven of
eternal rest, the all-embracing empyrean, not in
space but formed solely in the primal Mind ; and
these heavens represent the highest sciences, — the
starry sphere corresponding to physics and meta-
physics united, the crystalline to moral philosophy,
and the empyrean to theology.

n. FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO KANT.

We must come down to the Renaissance period PoiiaMio.
before we meet with any better schemes of scientific
co-ordination. The Panepistemon (published in
1491) of the renowned poet and classicist, Angelo

98 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

Poliziano, was merely a prelude to more serious
attempts. It delineates the tree of knowledge as
dividing into the three great branches of revela-
tion, of discovery, and of divination. To revelation
corresponds positive theology, — the theology which
springs from the fountain of inspiration. To dis-
covery or invention corresponds philosophy, of which
the general divisions are these three, — 1. Specta-
tiva 9 theoretic or intuitive, including mathematics,
physics, psychology, and ontology with natural
theology; 2. Actualis, practical, comprising ethics,
economics, and politics ; and 3. Bationalis, rational,
conversant with grammar the art of expression,
history the art of narration, dialectics the art of
demonstration, rhetoric the art of persuasion, and
poetics the art of intellectual delectation.
Nisoiio. There is some originality in the scheme of classi-
fication propounded by Mario Nizolio in his De
veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi
contra pseudophilosophos (1553). Nizolio was a
keen opponent of scholasticism, an extreme nomin-
alist, and a decided positivist almost three hundred
years before Comte. He held that metaphysics was
either false or useless, and to be excluded from
among the sciences (partim falsam, partim inu-
tilem et supervecuam . . . ab omni artium et
scientiarum numero removendam). He equally re-
jected dialectics and sought to retain only a logic

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 99

which would concern itself simply with experience,
induction, and the simple, clear, and correct use of
words. He laid great stress on language, holding
thought and speech to be related as soul and body.
Hence he represented the tree of the sciences and
arts as primarily dividing into the two branches of
Philosophy and Oratory, the former tending to
wisdom and the latter to its appropriate expression.
Philosophy he distributed into natural (Physics)
and civil (Politics), — natural philosophy including
geography, meteorology, physiology, and even the-
ology, — and moral philosophy comprising ethics,
politics in the special sense of the word, economics,
jurisprudence, &c. Under Oratoria he ranked all
disciplines conversant with speech and composition,
e.g., grammar, rhetoric, poetics, and history. At
the same time he admitted that numerous depart-
ments of knowledge and practice, such as the var-
ious branches of mathematics, the mechanical arts,
the fine arts, and medicine, could not be included
simply and entirely under any one of these three
great divisions — Physics, Politics, Oratory — but
must be referred to two or even to all of them.

Now we reach Thomas Campanella (1568-1639), campan-
who was one of the best representatives in Italy of e
that great movement of philosophical reform which
in the same age produced DesCartes in France and

100 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

Bacon in England. Like these two great men he
refused to be the slave of the past or to bow down
to authority, — summoned the real and reputed
doctrines of Aristotle before the bar of reason in
order to be tried and tested by their conformity to,
or deviation from, nature, — and sought, by substi-
tuting experience and induction for dogmatism and
a priori reasoning, to reconstruct the whole edifice
of science, — while, by the courage with which he
braved danger and the patience with which he
endured persecution, he displayed a strength of soul
of which both were destitute and which entitles
him to a place in the foremost rank alike of the
heroes and martyrs of all time. Campanella, as
well as his great English contemporary, endeavoured
not only to recall men from an old and false to a
new and true method of scientific inquiry, but to
map out the provinces of knowledge according to
their natural order and relationship. It must be
admitted, however, that in this part of his task his
services were less brilliant than those of Bacon;
that he has not lavished on it the same intellectual
wealth; or indicated with the same clearness of
vision on his chart of the intellectual world where
there are lands to discover; or given utterance to
the same magnificent prophecies respecting the
future of science. But if his conceptions were not
so large and magnificent, neither were they so

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. 101

vague and confused The principle of his classi-
fication was also sounder, inasmuch as he did not
set out from a purely subjective position, but
aimed at an objective arrangement : in other words,
he attempted to classify knowledge not according
to the faculties conversant with it, but according
to its own nature.

According to Campanella, all knowledge is latent
and in germ in sensation, — sentire est scire, — but
it can only be realised and rendered explicit by
intellection ascending from the immediate to the
remote, from the known to the unknown, from per-
ception to theory. The foundation, consequently,
of all science is history, and as history is either
divine or human, the sciences must be divided
into divine and human. God is the truth, and all
truth must be received from him, but he gives truth
in two ways, — he places the book of nature before
our eyes, and he speaks to us through the prophets
and in our own hearts. Revelation and nature,
these are the two sources of all knowledge, the
primary divine autographs of which all human
systems are but the imperfect and inaccurate copies,
and with which they need to be constantly com-
pared to see if they contain anything false. On
revelation theology must be built; on nature,
micrology. Micrology in its turn is divided in a
twofold way, into natural and moral science; the

102 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

principal branches of the former being geometry,
cosmography, astronomy, astrology, and medicine;
and of the latter, ethics, politics, and economics,
with rhetoric and poetic as auxiliaries. All these
sciences, however, treat of particular objects, and
there must be another which treats of the universal.
They are but parts of a whole ; and there must be a
study which shows how they are so concentrated
and co-ordinated as to form the whole, and what
principles pervade and unify them. This study is
metaphysics. Its office is to supply principles to
all the arts and sciences, and it comprehends a
threefold inquiry, namely: (1) into principles of
knowledge, (2) into principles of existence, and (3)
into principles of action.

Thus Campanella surveyed the domain of science
and mapped out its provinces. It is unnecessary
to criticise its details, its subordinate divisions, and
its delineations of the limits of the special sciences.
These, of course, were not, and could not be expected
to be, correct. It is of more importance to note that
there is hardly a part of the scheme — scarcely a
science included in it — on which Campanella has
not written with learning and ingenuity; that in
holding that a classification of the sciences ought to
have regard to their objective aspects, their own
natures, their inherent characteristics, he took up
the only right position; and that in representing

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 103

theology as overlying and metaphysics as under-
lying all the other sciences, and the intervening
sciences as composed of two series of sciences, he
made a remarkable approximation to a system
of co-ordination of the sciences true at least in
outline.

DesCartes has not entered on the subject under DeeCarte*
consideration in any formal or elaborate manner.
The most explicit passage regarding it in his writings
is the following : " When a man has acquired some
skill in discovering truth, he should commence to
apply himself in earnest to true philosophy, of which
the first part is Metaphysics, containing the prin-
ciples of knowledge, among which is the explication
of the principal attributes of God, of the immortal-
ity of the soul, and of all the clear and simple
notions that are in us; the second is Physics, in
which, after finding the true principles of material
things, we examine, in general, how the whole uni-
verse has been framed; in the next place, we
consider, in particular, the nature of the earth, and
of all the bodies that are most generally found
upon it, as air, water, fire, the loadstone, and other
minerals ; in the next place, it is necessary also to
examine singly the nature of plants, of animals, and
above all of man, in order that we may thereafter
be able to discover the other sciences that are useful

104 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

to us. Thus, all Philosophy is like a tree, of which
Metaphysics is the root, Physics the trunk, and all
the other sciences the branches that grow out of this
trunk, which are reduced to three principal, namely,
Medicine, Mechanics, and Ethics. By the science
of Morals I understand the highest and most perfect
which, presupposing an entire knowledge of the
other sciences, is the last degree of wisdom." x

In the context DesCartes informs us that he
meant by Philosophy "all that the human mind
can know," so that his distribution of Philosophy
must be regarded as a distribution of all knowledge.
Logic, indeed, he did not include, although he had
been speaking of it immediately before, because he
looked on logic from an altogether practical point
of view, so that it was in his eyes not a part, but the
method, of philosophy. Notwithstanding this, his
division was nearly the same as that generally
adopted by his followers — e.g., by Sylvain Regis,
Clauberg, Geulinx — viz., a fourfold division into
Logic, Metaphysics, Physics, and Ethics.

Baconian The Baconian survey of the sciences is a very
celebrated one. I venture not to pronounce it
unworthy of its fame, although I cannot regard
even its leading divisions as accurate. If not a
particularly accurate, it was a comprehensive and

1 Preface to the Principles of Philosophy.

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 105

attractive, sketch of the intellectual world, in-
dicating in a striking way, difficult to forget,
not only what provinces had been acquired by
the human mind, but where, and in what manner,
new conquests were still to be made. It is difficult
to judge what importance Bacon himself attached
to it; probably he valued it chiefly because it
afforded a convenient framework within which he
could arrange his criticisms and counsels regarding
each separate science, and his suggestions as to
how the "deficiencies" in the literature, learning,
and science of his age might be supplied. But
whatever was his own estimate of it, Diderot and
D'Alembert believed that they could not do better
than, in the main, adopt it as the basis of the
French Encyclopaedia. "If we emerge from this
vast operation," wrote the former of these authors
in the Prospectus, " we shall owe it mainly to the
chancellor Bacon, who sketched the plan of an
universal dictionary of sciences and arts at a
time when there were not, so to speak, either
arts or sciences. This extraordinary genius, when
it was impossible to write a history of what men
already knew, wrote one of that which they had
to learn." A circumstance so remarkable as that
the famous French Encyclopaedists of the eighteenth
century should derive from Bacon's scheme the
plan and guiding principles of their gigantic work

106 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

has naturally of itself drawn much attention to
that scheme.

It is a scheme which rests, as I have already
observed, on a subjective foundation. Its basis
is a division of the faculties of the rational soul.
These, according to Bacon, are three, — Memory,
Imagination, and Reason. "The sense, which is
the door of the intellect, is affected by individual
objects only. The images of those individuals —
that is, the impressions received by the sense —
are fixed in the memory, and pass into it, in the
first instance, entire as it were, just as they occur.
These the human mind proceeds to review and
ruminate on ; and, thereupon, either simply
rehearses them, or makes fanciful imitations of
them, or analyses and classifies them. Therefore
from these three fountains — Memory, Imagination,
and Reason — flow these three emanations — History,
Poesy, and Philosophy; and there can be no
others."

Memory, then, which accumulates facts, gives
rise to History, which is either Natural or Civil
—either of the works of nature or of the works
of man. Natural History subdivides into the
history of generations, of prseter-generations, and
of the arts, since nature is, "(1) either free,
proceeding in her ordinary course, without molest-
ation; or (2) obstructed by some stubborn and

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. 107

less common matters, and thence put out of her
course, as in the production of monsters; or (3)
bound and wrought upon by human means, for
the production of things artificial." Civil History,
in general, subdivides into literary, sacred or eccle-
siastical, and civil history strictly so called; the
first treating of the progress of literature and
learning, the second of the church, prophecy,
and providence, and the third of the fortunes
of states.

Imagination operates on sensible materials, com-
bining, magnifying, and idealising them at pleasure,
and so gives rise to poetry, which, according to
Bacon, is simply feigned history, verse being but
a character of style. Poetry subdivides into —

1. Narrative Poetry, " a mere imitation of history,
such as might pass for real, only that it com-
monly exaggerates things beyond probability";

2. Dramatic Poetry, "history made visible, for
it represents actions as if they were present,
whereas history represents them as past"; and

3. Parabolical Poetry, "typical history, by which
ideas that are objects of the intellect are rep-
resented in forms that are objects of the sense."

Reason operates on things by analysis and
classification, by abstraction and generalisation,
and so produces philosophy. But philosophy is
not inclusive of all science; it must be distin-

108 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

guished from the knowledge due to revelation —
from theology. Theology descends from heaven,
philosophy springs from the earth; theology is
derived from divine inspiration, philosophy from
external sense. At the same time, the knowledge
based on revelation may be distributed in the
same way as that based on natural perception.
" Nor do I think that any other division is wanted
for Theology. The information derived from rev-
elation and the information derived from the sense
differ, no doubt, both in the matter and in the
mode of conveyance; but the human mind is the
same, and its repositories and cells the same. It
is only as if different liquids were poured through
different funnels into one and the same vessel.
Theology therefore consists either of Sacred History
or of Parables, which are a divine poesy, or of
Doctrines and Precepts, which are a perennial
philosophy. For as for that part which seems
supernumerary, namely, Prophecy, it is but a kind
of history : for divine history has this prerogative
over human, that the narration may be before
the event as well as after."
Divi«on The first division of the sciences, according to
Theology Bacon, is into Theology and Philosophy; but in
mdPha- Theology is not included Natural Theology, which
is regarded as a part of Philosophy. " Philosophy,"
he says, " has three objects, viz., God, Nature, and

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. 109

Man; as also three kinds of rays — for Nature
strikes the human intellect with a direct ray, God
with a refracted ray, from the inequality of the
medium betwixt the Creator and the creatures, and
Man, as exhibited to himself, with a reflected ray :
so that it is proper to divide Philosophy into the
doctrine of the Deity, the Doctrine of Nature, and
the doctrine of Man." These, then, are the main
branches of philosophy, but the branches must join
in a common trunk; the special sciences must di-
verge out of a general science, consisting of the
axioms common to several or to all of the other
sciences, and including an inquiry into " transcend-
ental, or the adventitious conditions of beings."
This general science Bacon would name Primary Primary

Phil*

Philosophy. " As the divisions of the sciences are ^phy.
not like different lines that meet in one angle, but
rather like the branches of trees that join in one
trunk, it is first necessary that we constitute an
universal science as a parent to the rest, and as
making a part of the common road to the sciences
before the ways separate. And this knowledge we
call philosophia prima, primary or summary phil-
osophy ; it has no other for its opposite, and differs
from other sciences rather in the limits whereby it
is confined than in the subject as treating only the
summits of things."

The doctrine of Deity or Natural Theology Bacon

110 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

SuMivi- does not subdivide. The doctrine of Nature or

nous of

Natural Natural Philosophy he first separates into Specu-
<*ophy. lative and Practical; then, subdivides the specu-
lative branch into Physics and Metaphysics — the
one the investigation of efficient causes and matter,
the other of final causes and form ; and the practical
branch into Mechanics, and what he calls Magic,
which answers in some measure to Experimental
Science. To Natural Philosophy, Speculative and
Practical, he adds Mathematics, Pure and Applied,
but merely as an appendix, not as an independent
science or distinct division of the sciences.
Human The doctrine of Man he divides into Human and
Phii- Civil Philosophy. Human Philosophy he distri-
080p 7 ' butes into a doctrine of the body, a doctrine of the
soul, and a doctrine of the things common to the
body and the soul. The doctrine of the body is to
be divided according to the goods of the body, and
therefore comprises four sciences — Medicine, which
aims at health; Cosmetic, which has regard to
beauty ; Athletic, which looks to strength ; and
Voluptuary, what Tacitus calls "eruditus luxus,"
which is conversant with pleasure. The doctrine of
the soul comprehends the doctrine of the Substance
of the Soul and the doctrine of the Faculties of
the Soul, and the latter again includes Logic and
Ethic ; the one treating of the understanding and
reason, and the other of the will and affections.

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. Ill

Civil Philosophy he divides into the Art of Con-
versation, the Art of Negotiation, and the Art of
State Policy.

The Baconian scheme of classification is now Criticism
before us. We do not overlook its many incidental un cimm-
merits, although we require to confine ourselves to fication -
the rapid indication of its chief defects. The main
objection to it, as has been often pointed out, is the
character of its fundamental principle. The rational
soul does not exercise memory, imagination, reason,
so much apart, or in as isolated a manner as is
assumed, but together, so that all these faculties
co-operate in every department of intellectual
activity. Take history as the example. Not even
in its lowest form is it a mere product of memory ;
not even in the case of the most stupid historian is
it a mere recollection of facts, but a record of facts
selected according to certain real or supposed prin-
ciples of reason. In a higher form, when it aims to
reproduce the life of the past, it involves the most
difficult and delicate exercise of imagination ; and in
its highest form, the form of philosophical history,
it requires a most comprehensive combination of
mental gifts, and one in which mere memory is very
subordinate to reason. Further, history and poetry
neither admit of entire separation from science nor
of distinct co-ordination with it. They are on a

112 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

different level from science, and may both be
covered by science. There is a science of history.
Every fact of every kind of history requires to be
explained, — that is, to be brought under the domain
of science. Historical knowledge is knowledge' on
the road to scientific knowledge. The perfect hist-
ory of anything, the complete exhibition of what,
how, and why anything is, must be also the science
of that thing. In like manner, poetry in all its
forms, imagination in all its workings, art in all its
varieties and developments, conform to laws and are
explicable by reason, and consequently are subjects
of science. There is a science, philosophy, or doc-
trine of the Fine Arts. ^Esthetic is the common
name for it.

As to the distribution of science, properly so
called, there is obviously much that is arbitrary in
Bacon's scheme. Theology is separated from Phil-
osophy with a sharpness and absoluteness for which
there is no sufficient warrant. Revelation may pro-
ceed from divine inspiration, but theological science
must be built up on adequately evidenced facts, and
by strictly rational processes, even when its facts
have their source in revelation and inspiration.
The great mass of the facts recorded and of the
truths stated in the writings which Christians
accept as embodying a revelation, are facts of
history and truths accessible to reason ; only a

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. 113

very small percentage of them can be exclusively
referred to special inspiration. Philosophy cannot
admit, consistently with loyalty to reason, that
theology is outside of its domain. The separation
of natural theology from other theology is the
separation of a foundation from the edifice which
it supports. Then, the threefold division of philo-
sophy into the doctrine of Deity, of Nature, and of
Man is unsatisfactory, requiring, for example, the
body of man to have a science to itself widely
distinct from the science which studies the bodies
of other animals. It implies that the physiology of
the human body is more related to psychology than
to general physiology. The bringing together of
Physics and Metaphysics as both parts of Natural
Philosophy is another error which needs no refuta-
tion at the present day ; the representing of Mathe-
matics as a mere appendix to Natural Philosophy
does so still less. The view given of the relation of
Logic and Ethics, although at first sight plausible,
will be found on examination untenable.

The state of knowledge in Bacon's age can prob- Aiated's
ably be more fully and distinctly learned from the j^L/
Encyclopedias of John Henry Alsted than from
any other works. The first appeared as a quarto
volume of upwards of three thousand pages in 1620;
and the second, considerably more elaborate, in two

H

114 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

large folio volumes in 1630. Alsted was a clear-
headed, learned, logical person, skilful in schematis-
ing knowledge, indefatigable in composing com-
pends, and his Encyclopedia of 1630 was a highly
creditable production both in regard to matter and
arrangement. By its rigidly methodical character
it is no mere dictionary of arts and sciences, but
entitled to the name of encyclopaedia, as few so-
called encyclopaedias have been. It consists of
thirty-five books. The first four are preliminary,
treating of the intellectual habits involved in the
acquisition of learning, the characteristics, order,
and divisions of the various departments of know-
ledge, and the ends and methods of study, its aids,
hindrances, &c. The six books which follow deal,
under the general heading of Philology, with Lexi-
cology, Grammar, Rhetoric, Logic, the Art of
Oratory, and Poetic. Philosophy is divided into
Theoretical and Practical. Theoretical Philosophy
has ten books devoted to it, since it includes ten
sciences : Metaphysics, Pneumatics, Physics, Arith-
metic, Geometry, Cosmography, Uranometry, Geog-
raphy, Optics, and Music ; Practical Philosophy
four books, because it comprehends the four sciences
of Ethics, Economics, Politics, and Scholastic. In
the three following books the three " Faculties," of
Theology, Jurisprudence, and Medicine, are the
subjects of dissertation. Theology is distributed

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. 115

into (1) Natural, (2) Catechetic, (3) Didactic, (4)
Polemic, (5) Casuistic, (6) Prophetic, and (7) Moral;
Jurisprudence into (1) General Civil, (2) Special
Civil, and (3) Ecclesiastical : and Medicine in a way
requiring more space than we can afford to describe.
The three next books give an account of the
mechanical arts. The last seven books are miscel-
laneous and supplementary : prsecipuae farragines
disciplinarum : mnemonica, historica, chronologia,
architectonica, critica, &c.

From the Instauratio Magna of Bacon the Comenius.
great Moravian educational reformer, John Amos
Comenius (1592-1671), derived the conviction that
universal wisdom — the sum of all science — might
be so arranged and presented that it could be
acquired without difficulty by any ingenuous and
intelligent youth. This belief in the attainability of
a Christian pansophy — of an encyclopaedic culture
which would surely, easily, and solidly lead up, step
by step, from the most obvious facts of sense to the
secret things of God revealed through Christ — was
one of the chief inspiring motives to those labours
which have made his name for ever immortal. The
aim of his life was to show how his ideal could be
realised by means of pansophic schools and pan-
sophic universities. He expounded his conceptions
in the Didactica magna, Prodromus pansophia,
ScholoB philosophies delineatio, and other writings

116 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

contained in his Opera didactica omnia, 4 vols.,
Amst., 1657. The reader will find an excellent
account of what is essential and of abiding interest
in these works in the John Amos Comenius of Pro-
fessor Laurie of Edinburgh. Comenius' sketch of a
pansophic university is reproduced by Professor
Laurie in the following words : " As all knowledge
was to lead to God, and to God as revealed through
Christ, Comenius spoke of his encyclopsedism as a
Christian Pansophy, and gave the * special titles of
the seven parts of the temple of Christian Pansophy.'
The first was to show the necessity and possibility
of the temple and to give its external structure or
outline — to be called the Templi Sapientice Pro-
pylceum. The second part was to give the first
approach to a knowledge of all knowable things — a
general apparatus of wisdom — in which the highest
genera and fundamental principles and axioms were
to be exhibited, from which, as the primal sources of
truth, the streams of all sciences flow and diverge —
to be called the Porta. The third part (the primum
Atrium) was to exhaust visible nature. The fourth
(the Atrium medium) was to treat of man and
reason ; the fifth part (Atrium internum), of man's
essential nature — free-will and responsibility, and
the repair of man's will in Christ as the beginning
of the spiritual life. The sixth part (Sanctum
sanctorum) was to be theological, and here man

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE 8CIENCES. 117

was to be admitted to the study and worship of
God and his revelation, that thereby he might be
led to embrace God as the centre of eternal life.
The seventh part (Fans aquarum viventium) was
to expound the use of true wisdom and its dis-
semination, so that the whole world might be filled
with a knowledge of God " (pp. 72, 73).

Comenius in the last period of his life yielded to w«geL
the seductions of mysticism. Another religious en-
cyclopaedist or pansophist, Erhard Weigel (1625-
1699), went much farther in the same direction. He
was a proficient in mathematical science and fancied
that everything must be explained mathematically.
He became a mystic through his excessive trust in
the powers of mathematics, and hence while a mystic
he was also a precursor of the Wolfian philosophical
rationalism. The conception of philosophy as the
universal science, and that all philosophy ought
accordingly to be treated by the methods of mathe-
matics, is fundamental in his Idea totius encyclo-
paedias, Universi corporis pansophici prodromus de
gradibus humancB cognitionis, Eihica Euelidea, and
other works. The organisation of knowledge pro-
posed by Comenius was made with a view to the
practical requirements of teaching, and that proposed
by Weigel was meant to confirm and illustrate a
narrow conception of the nature of scientific method.
It was not to be expected, therefore, that either

118 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

scheme should have much value in the way of in-
dicating the real relationships of the sciences.

Hobbes. The greatest English philosophical contemporary
of Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, also attempted a classi-
fication of the sciences, and his classification, although
it has been little remarked, is, in reality, very re-
markable. While Hobbes had not the philosophical
breadth or general wealth of mind characteristic of
Bacon, he had far more analytic keenness and
subtility, far more deductive vigour and self- con-
sistency, and, in a word, decidedly greater specially
scientific capacity. In spite of his dogmatic one-
sidedness, few English thinkers have surpassed him
in energy or range of intellect in the departments in
which his strength chiefly lay. His scheme of the
distribution and co-ordination of the sciences is ex-
hibited with characteristic conciseness and precision
in ch. 9 of Leviathan (1651).

Two philosophical theories mould and control it
from commencement to close, — sensationalism and
nominalism, — of both of which Hobbes was one of
the most strenuous and thoroughgoing advocates.
Knowledge, he says, is of two kinds, — of facts and of
the consequences of one affirmation to another. The
knowledge of facts gives rise to history, and history
is either natural history or civil history. The know-
ledge of consequences gives rise to science, which

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. 119

is manifold according to the diversity of matters con-
sidered. Its primary division is into Natural Philo-
sophy and Civil Philosophy, according as conse-
quences are from the accidents of bodies natural
or of bodies politic.

Natural Philosophy is, in its turn, divided in a
twofold manner, according as the consequences of
which it consists are drawn from the accidents
common to all bodies, which are quantity and
motion, or from the qualities of bodies. Conse-
quences from quantity and motion indeterminate
constitute Primary Philosophy ; from quantity and
motion determined by figure, Geometry; from
quantity and motion determined by number, Arith-
metic ; from quantity and motion of bodies in special,
if the larger parts of the world, as the earth and
stars, Geography and Astronomy ; for special kinds
of motions and special figures of bodies, Engineer-
ing, Architecture, Navigation, &c. Then, going back
to physics or consequences from the qualities of
bodies natural, these consequences are either from
the qualities of bodies transient, such as some-
times appear and sometimes vanish, whence Meteor-
ology ; or from the qualities of bodies permanent.
Among permanent bodies are the stars, whence
Sciography conversant with their light, and Astro-
logy conversant with their influences ; the ether,
whence a science of atmospheric fluids; terrestial

120 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

bodies, which are either non-sentient or sentient.
Consequences drawn from parts of the earth without
sense are Mineralogy and Botany : the one con-
versant with the qualities of minerals, and the other
with the qualities of plants. Consequences from the
qualities of animals are either of animals in general
or men in special. If of animals in general, Optics
is knowledge of consequences from vision; Music
of consequences from sound; and some unnamed
science or sciences of consequences from the rest of
the senses. If of men in special, then, knowledge of
consequences from the passions is Ethics ; from
speech in magnifying, vilifying, &c., Poetry; in
persuading, Rhetoric; in reasoning, Logic; in con-
tracting, the Science of Just and Unjust.

Civil Philosophy Hobbes did not subdivide into
more special sciences. He supposed it to be largely
his own creation, and that its history might be said
to have begun with the publication of his De Cive
(1646).

Thus it was that Hobbes, with clear and sys-
tematic genius, mapped out the various provinces
of science. The praise of ingenuity and consider-
able truthfulness cannot reasonably be denied to
his arrangement. It shows a deeper and truer
insight into the relations of the physical sciences
than the chart of Bacon. At the same time, it
is not difficult to see defects in it. Some of

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 121

these, as, for instance, the absence of psychological
science, might be supplied without any alteration
of the principles on which it proceeds. Others
are irremediable, resulting from those principles
themselves. Of this character is the exclusion —
deliberate exclusion, not simply omission — of theo-
logical science. Hobbes maintained there could be
no such science, on the ground that there could be
no ideas except of the finite and contingent — that
body or matter is alone intelligible; that spirit,
being beyond the range of experiment and sense, is
beyond comprehension, outside of the domain of
science. His philosophy was essentially incom-
patible with a recognition of the existence of theo-
logical science.

The strange and arbitrary way in which Hobbes
in his classification deals with moral science may
also be noted. Ethics is plainly united in the closest
manner with Politics, and yet he separates Politics,
under the name of Civil Philosophy, from Ethics, by
almost as great a distance as his scheme allows.
Civil Philosophy stands by itself — isolated, as the
counterpart of Natural Philosophy — and Ethics is
made a branch, or rather twig, of Natural Philosophy.
Nor is this all ; but Ethics, as a science conversant
about the passions, is separated from the Science of
Just and Unjust, and this last, Hobbes, pushing his
nominalism to the utmost, represents as a purely

122 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

verbal science, since, according to him, contracts are
the origin or ground of just and unjust.

Locke. The last chapter of John Locke's Essay concerning

Human Understanding (1690) treats "of the divi-
sion of the sciences." Locke rightly judged that the
consideration of that subject would be a fitting con-
clusion to such an inquiry into the origin and nature
of knowledge as he had instituted. It is only to be
regretted that the consideration given was but slight
and superficial. The division adopted was threefold
— Physica, Practica, Semeiotica — "for a man can
employ his thoughts about nothing, but either the
contemplation of things themselves for the discovery
of truth ; or about the things in his own power,
which are his own actions, for the attainment of his
own ends ; or the signs the mind makes use of both
in the one and the other, and the right ordering of
them for its clearer information." I. Physics, in the
wide sense in which the term is used by Locke, is
" the knowledge of things as they are in their own
proper being, their constitution, properties, and opera-
tions" ; it has for end bare speculative truth, " and
whatsoever can afford the mind of man any such,
falls under this branch, whether it be God himself,
angels, spirits, bodies, or any of their affections."
II. Practics is " the skill of right applying our own
powers and actions, for the attainment of things good

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 123

and useful. " Its chief branch is Ethics, " the seeking
out those measures and rules of human actions which
lead to happiness, and the means to practise them."
III. Semeiotics is the doctrine of signs, and includes
Logic, or the doctrine of words, "these being the
signs which the mind makes use of for the under-
standing of things, or conveying its knowledge to
others."

This division of science is much the same as that
employed so long before by the Stoics. It has,
however, even as presented by Locke, obvious and
serious defects. Thus, for instance, the grouping
together of all sciences the objects of which can be
said to be " things," as distinct from " actions " and
"signs," whatever be the characters otherwise of
these .objects, and however great may be the differ-
ences in the modes and methods in which they
must be apprehended and studied, so far from being
helpful towards a true correlation of the sciences,
is productive of confusion which tends to render
their correlation impossible. Further, either of the
first two of Locke's groups includes the other two
groups. Thus, if Physics comprehend a knowledge
of man and of what pertains to man, it must
embrace Semeiotics, which is conversant with man's
reasoning and speech; and Practics, which is con-
versant with his activities. So Practics would
include all Physics, since whatever knowledge man

124 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

can attain of Deity, nature, or his own mind, may
be turned to use. Strictly speaking, indeed,
Practics ought not to be regarded as a kind or
branch of science, but as the application of science.
The representation of Logic as merely a doctrine of
signs may also be set down as erroneous. It implies
an extreme of nominalism of which few will be
found to approve. Further, as Dugald Stewart
observes, "it is difficult to reconcile one's self to an
arrangement which, while it classes with Astronomy,
with Mechanics, with Optics, and with Hydrostatics,
the strikingly contrasted studies of Natural Theology
and the Philosophy of the Human Mind, disunites
from the two last the far more congenial sciences of
Ethic and Logic." In fact, Locke's discussion of
the problem — " the division of the sciences " — is so
inferior alike to Bacon's and to Hobbes' treatment
of it that one can hardly suppose that he had read
what they had written regarding it.

Leibnis. Leibniz, in the last chapter of the Nouveaux
Essais, criticised the classification of Locke, and
easily succeeded, of course, in showing it to be
radically defective. In particular, he urged with
force the objection that each part of the division
proposed might absorb the whole. He provided,
however, no substitute for Locke's scheme. It does
not help us to be told by him that the truths or

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. 125

doctrines of science may be arranged in three ways,
viz.: (1) synthetically or theoretically, according to
proofs ; (2) analytically or practically, according to
ends ; and (3) lexically, according to letters or terms.
What is wanted is an arrangement of the sciences,
not of their parts. Only through the right defini-
tion and division, constitution and correlation, of
the sciences, can their parts, their component truths
or doctrines, be scientifically arranged. Besides,
the objection which Leibniz urges against Locke's
division of sciences applies equally to his own
division of methods of arranging truths, if it be
presented as the basis of a classification of truths.
Any one of these methods is capable of including all
truths. Only one of them can be employed at one
time, and whichever method be preferred, the
classification of truths which is to be in accordance
with its principles will have to be made without any
help having been afforded by Leibniz.

In fact, Leibniz had no real sense of the im-
portance or clear conception of the nature of the
problem before him. Hence his nearest approach
to a classification of the sciences is included in
a plan for the catalogue of a library, — Idea Leib-
nitiana Bibliothecce ordinandce contractior. Now,
the classification of the sciences and the classi-
fication of books are so far connected that a good
classification of the sciences must be of consider-

126 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

able use to one who wishes to classify books, and
that a good catalogue raisonnee of books may well
afford assistance to one who would classify the
sciences; but the two classifications are neverthe-
less essentially distinct. The classification of the
sciences is a fundamental problem of philosophy, the
first step toward the correlation of the sciences, and
so toward the positive philosophy of the sciences ;
the classification of books is merely a practical
problem of very limited interest, the convenience
of bookish people. The classification proposed by
Leibniz is one of books, and therefore, like those of
Brunet, Girard, Home, Lubbock, and the general
plans of all classed catalogues, necessarily non-
philosophical His classes are, — 1. Theology; 2.
Jurisprudence; 3. Medicine; 4. Intellectual Phil-
osophy, which is either Theoretical (Logic, Meta-
physics, Pneumatics) or Practical (Ethics and
Politics) ; 5. Mathematical Philosophy, which in-
cludes not only Pure Mathematics, but Astronomy,
Mechanics, and all sciences specially dependent on
vigour of imagination ; 6. Physical Philosophy, com-
prehending Physics Proper, Chemistry, Mineralogy,
Botany, Zoology, and all sciences which rest on a
knowledge of the things of sense ; 7. Philology ; 8.
History; and 9. Miscellanies. According to this
arrangement, all knowledge belonging to the three
Faculties of Theology, Law, and Medicine is severed

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. 127

and separated from Philosophy or Science, Phil-
ology, and History. Thus, to give only a single
example, Ecclesiastical History is expressly with-
drawn from History in order to be planted in
Theology. Of course, this is most arbitrary and
unnatural. It would be a mere waste of time,
indeed, to discuss at length any scheme of classifi-
cation in which the subject-matter is divided both
according to ' Faculties ' and Sciences.

The Italian philosopher, Giambattista Vico (1688- Vioo.
1744), cannot be said to have proposed any new
classification of the sciences, and yet ought not to
be altogether ignored. In this, as in so many
other regions of thought, his power of profound
and prophetic vision revealed itself. He was the
first to state and expound as a fundamental law
of human development the truth which Comte is
often credited with having discovered, but which he
merely so exhibited as to secure the general recogni-
tion of its importance, — the truth that the entire
movement of society must correspond to that of
knowledge, the preponderant factor of historical
evolution being the growth of intelligence. This
truth he laid down as the foundation of his New
Science not less explicitly or confidently than
Comte affirmed it as the basis of his Positive
Philosophy. The order of social evolution accord-

128 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

ing to Vico, as according to Comte, is a necessary
order determined by the advance of reason. Hence,
a law of three periods of history through which all
sciences and arts, ideas and institutions, naturally
pass. The periods are designated by Vico the
Divine, the Heroic, and the Human, and the root
of each is described by him as a peculiar mode of
conception or form of wisdom. Therefore, he main-
tains, there are three stages of science, three kinds
of nature, three types of character, three epochs of
religion, three species of language, of writing, of
governments, of natural law, of jurisprudence, <fcc.
Another equally original idea of his is entitled
to be noted here. The "New Science" which he
claimed to have founded he maintained to be the
central and regulative science. He regarded his
discovery of it as not merely an addition to the
sciences, but a revolution in the whole system of
the sciences, inasmuch as it showed that not
metaphysics or physics, but the science of the
development of the human mind in history was
the fundamental and governing science. In his
view the science of history was the most compre-
hensive science, and all other sciences were rooted
or included in it, and had their character and rank
determined by their relationship to it. All science,
he held, is the production of the human mind ; the
whole science of any age is only a transient stage in

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 129

the history of the human mind ; the perfect state of
a science is but the last period of its history ; there-
fore, the science of history is not merely a special
and rather limited science, as we are apt to suppose,
but an all-comprehensive science, the true science of
the sciences. It is so because the fundamental, con-
stitutive, and regulative principle of all science is not
the abstract, transcendent, objective, but the actual,
immanent, subjective — the all -productive reason.
This was a singularly bold and luminous conception.
To demonstrate its truth may be said to have been,
consciously or unconsciously, the ultimate aim of all
the labours of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and
their followers. 1

With Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and his school, Wolffi
German philosophy passed into a stage of dogmatic
rationalism. The general contents of the current
philosophy and religion, the teachings of the special
sciences, the leading principles and main tenets of
Cartesianism, and the distinctive views of Leibniz
with certain modifications, were attempted to be
systematised and demonstrated by logical deduction
of a mathematical rigour and certainty. Wolffian-
ism was essentially encyclopaedic. It sought to
include and absorb all science. And yet it was

1 See the author's Vico in Blackwood's "Philosophical Classics."
The book has been translated into Italian.

130 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE 8CIENCES.

thoroughly one-sided. It ignored the fact that the
methods of science must vary with the objects of
science; that each science must have its own
appropriate modifications of method; that an ade-
quate philosophy can recognise no uniform universal
method. It was one-sided also in this respect, that
it confounded philosophy with the special sciences.
It represented the special sciences as simply sections
of philosophy. That is an error so radical as to
make unnecessary any other criticism of the Wolffian
classification.

Wolff distributes knowledge into historical, mathe-
matical, and philosophical. Philosophy he divides
into two great departments corresponding to two
fundamental faculties of the soul, — Metaphysics to
a facultas cognoscitiva and Practical Philosophy to
a facultas appetitiva. At the same time he treats
Logic — chiefly, however, on educational grounds —
as antecedent and preparatory to both Metaphysics
and Practical Philosophy. In Metaphysics he
includes Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology, and
Natural Theology. These sciences he regards as
following in natural order from more general and
simple to more special and complex. In Practical
Philosophy he includes Ethics, Economics, and
Politics. His follower Baumgarten did good service
by vindicating the right of ^Esthetics to a place by
the side of Ethics.

The Wolffian philosophy was followed by a so-

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THB SCIENCES. 131

called " Popular Philosophy," which was a con-
tinuation of its rationalism, but a reaction from
its formalism. The period of the prevalence of
this Popular Philosophy was one in which great
desire was shown to make the acquisition of science
easy. It accordingly abounded in " Introductions,"
" Outlines," and " Methods." It was a period in
which even special Encyclopaedias — Encyclopaedias
of particular departments of knowledge, e.g., Ency-
clopaedias of Theology — began to appear. It was
also the period when the want of a propaedeutic to
the study of the sciences made itself so strongly
felt as to give rise to the conception of a special
science for its satisfaction and to various attempts
to construct such a science; the period in which
Gesner, Schade, Mertens, and others sought to raise
what they called Hodegetic or Isagogic to the rank
of a separate and fundamental discipline. It was,
above all, the period in which the idea of the organic
unity, diversity, and interrelationism of the sciences
obtained a universality and clearness of recognition
which it had never previously received, although it
had at no time since Plato gave it magnificent
expression been entirely ignored. It was not, how-
ever, a period in which philosophical problems were
investigated with depth or thoroughness. As to
the problem even of which we are tracing the
history it cannot be said to have produced any
solution of much value.

132 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

III. FROM KANT TO DE TRACY.

Kant. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), by the publication

of his Critique of Pure Reason, inaugurated a new
and great epoch of philosophy — a philosophy which
has had an enormous influence on the higher
thought of mankind. He also treated expressly of
the very subject we are dealing with, a classifica-
tion of the sciences, in the chapter of his Critique
headed " The Architectonic of Pure Reason," and
has left elsewhere in his writings various passages
supplementary to the views expressed by him in
that chapter. He is not therefore to be here
ignored. Neither is there, however, any good
reason why he should have a large place in any
account of a history of our subject.

Science is regarded by Kant as an organism
which grows from within, not an aggregate which
increases from without. A science, according to
Kant, is a system of conceptions unified and dis-
tributed by a central and regulative idea; or, in
other words, a system organised on what he calls
architectonic principles, or constituted by parts
which possess an essential affinity and can be de-
duced from one supreme and internal aim. The
idea out of which a science is developed — which is
the condition of its possibility, and which deter-

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. 133

mines its form and end — is a constituent element
of reason; and hence not only is each science a
unity in itself, but all sciences are related as parts
of one grand system of knowledge. Knowledge is
either rational or empirical. Rational knowledge is
based either on conceptions or on the construction
of conceptions. In the former case it is philosophy,
in the latter mathematics. Philosophy is either a
criticism of the powers of reason, Critical Philos-
ophy, or a systematic presentation of the truths
given by pure reason, Metaphysic. Metaphysic,
again, is either of the speculative or of the practical
reason — either a metaphysic of nature or a meta-
physic of ethics. The metaphysic of nature divides
into two parts — Transcendental Philosophy and
Rational Physiology. The former, which may be
also called Ontology, presents the system of all the
conceptions and principles belonging to the under-
standing and reason which relate to objects in
general, but not to any particular given objects;
the latter has nature or the sum of given objects for
its subject-matter, and is either immanent or tran-
scendent. Immanent Physiology considers nature
as the sum of the objects of experience presented
according to a priori conditions ; and when these
objects are those of the external senses it is Rational
Physics, when those of internal sense, Rational Psy-
chology. Transcendental Physiology, on the other

134 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

hand, relates to connections of nature which take
us beyond all possible experience, and is, when it
embraces nature as a whole, Rational Cosmology,
and when it views nature in connection with a
Being above nature, Rational Theology. Mathe-
matics, Critical Philosophy, Ontology, Rational
Physics, Rational Psychology, Rational Cosmology,
Rational Theology, and the Metaphysic of Ethics
are consequently the sciences of pure reason. Dis-
tinct from, yet related to, Rational Physics and
Rational Psychology are to be placed Empirical
Physics and Empirical Psychology as parts of Ap-
plied Philosophy, the a priori principles of which
are contained in Pure Philosophy.

This scheme of the sciences suggests various ob-
jections. It is not a result of a direct study of the
sciences and of their relations to one another, but a
consequence of assent to a peculiar metaphysical
theory. It is such as was to be expected from
treating the problem involved at a wrong place and
in a wrong way. The division of knowledge into
rational and empirical is radically erroneous, for all
knowledge is at once rational and empirical. There
is no reason without experience, or experience with-
out reason. That Kant knew this — that he was
aware that reason entirely pure, altogether un-
touched and unaffected by experience, is absolutely
ignorant and inactive, and that experience is only

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. 135

constituted by the synthetic activity of reason — far
from excusing, is precisely what makes inexcusable
his opposing and contrasting, as he does here, reason
and experience, rational and empirical knowledge.
The division of rational knowledge into Mathematics
and Philosophy is as little to be commended.
Mathematics is as subject to philosophy, as much
comprehended within the sphere of philosophy, as
any other science or group of sciences. Philosophy
has to deal with the construction of conceptions as
well as with conceptions themselves, for it has to
treat of the methods of science not less than of its
principles. It is universal science. Then, the place
which Kant gives to Metaphysic is quite exorbitant
and extravagant. In fact, he assigns to it and
Mathematics the whole world of science, properly
so called. Pure thought — thought which may have
a relation to experience, but borrows nothing from
it — is represented as able to establish and con-
struct all science worthy of the name, and like-
wise to lend out of its fulness to empirical studies
the principles which alone give them a sort of delu-
sive appearance of science. But neither Kant nor
any one else has demonstrated that reason has such
a strength and wealth of power, or is more than a
faculty or mental instrument of discovering truth
about the universe in and through experience.
During the latter half of the eighteenth century

136 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

there were, as already indicated, owing to the in-
fluence of Wolffianism, Kantianism, and the Auf-
klarung, a considerable number of attempts made
by German authors to give easily intelligible ency-
clopaedic surveys of the whole field of science.

Suker. J. G. Sulzer was one of the most highly appre-

ciated German authors of his day. His Short Sum-
mary of all Sciences mentioned above was not un-
worthy of his reputation. It was, however, of far
less importance than his General Theory of the Fine
Arts (Allgemeine Theorie der Schonen Kunste) y
first announced in 1760, and published only in 1771-
74. Baumgarten, it is true, by the publication of
his JSsthetica (2 vols., 1750 and 1759), preceded
him, and had the honour of first adding ^Esthetics
to the list of the sciences. A scarcely less honour,
however, seems to have been due to Sulzer, as his
work apparently was the first in which there was
given a comprehensive view of the fine arts (literary
included) in their various relationships. For more
than half a century he was considered in Germany
the chief authority in aesthetics, and that even by
those who differed from him in important respects.
Sir William Hamilton, to the close of his profes-
sional career, and while criticising the psychological
basis of Sulzer's views on aesthetics, acknowledged
those views to be the best he was acquainted with,

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 137

his own and Aristotle's excepted. 1 Yet the author
of a generally able and admirable History of
^Esthetic, Professor Bosanquet, has not once men-
tioned in it even the name of Sulzer. That is surely
a strange and large omission. In any general history
of aesthetic Sulzer's contribution to the science of
aesthetic, instead of being overlooked, ought to
have a considerable and prominent place. The
general distribution of the sciences proposed by
Sulzer was one in which they were referred either
to the faculty of knowledge or the faculty of
feeling. The inadequacy of it for the purpose
intended will now, in all probability, be univers-
ally recognised.

Gesner's Primary Lines of Introduction to all operand
Learning, Meinecke's Synopsis of all Learning, ° ****
Klugel's Encyclopedic Survey of the different
kinds of Knowledge and Science, Roth's System
of the kinds of Human Knowledge and Science,
and Von Berg's Essay on the Foundations and
all parts of Science, were all in their day well-
appreciated works. Their authors felt themselves
to have a mission, endeavoured not unsuccess-
fully to write with clearness and simplicity, and
largely contributed to diffuse throughout Germany
desire for a many-sided culture. While aiming,
however, at an encyclopaedic knowledge they

1 Metaphysics, voL ii. pp. 467-471.

138 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THB SCIENCES.

arrived at no satisfactory classification or co-
ordination of the sciences.

Krug. W. T. Krug (1770-1842) was an even more

influential author than any of those just men-
tioned. He had carefully studied the philosophies
of both Wolff and Kant without making any sur-
render of his own independence of mind. And
although he did more than any one else to
popularise many of the views of the latter, he
freely criticised others, and is justly enough classed
as only a Semi-Kantian. He was acknowledged to
have a very wide acquaintance with almost all the
recognised sciences. As regards the fundamental
science of Logic, his opinions were both more
accurate and more advanced than those of Kant
himself, a fact which may so far explain why Sir
Wm. Hamilton in his Lectures on Logic made far
longer and more numerous quotations from him
than from Kant, or indeed from any other logician
except Aristotle. Although not so ingenious or
profound as Kant, he was very worthy of the
successorship to his chair. I have thus far men-
tioned only his 'Lecture' (Vorlesung) of 1795, as
it only had appeared early enough to be in the
eighteenth century. A mere 'Lecture/ however,
could only be of slight value in comparison with
his Outline of a New Organon of Philosophy

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 139

(1801), his Handbook of Philosophy (1803), and
his magnum opus, his Universal Handbook of the
Philosophical Sciences (5 vols. 1827). Hence I
must in this case cross the boundary between two
centuries in order to be able to state what his
classification of the sciences was, as it is only on
the hither side of the line, only in the later works
mentioned, that the scheme was elaborated. I shall
do no more, however, than merely state the abstract
and general result, — the bare scheme itself. It was
as follows : —

The Sciences are either Free or Natural, Bound
or Positive, or Mixed.

A. The Free or Natural Sciences are formed
solely by the free activity of the human mind,
and are reducible to three general groups : —

1. The Empirical, divisible into (a) Philo-

logical and (6) Historical Sciences;

2. The Rational, comprehending (a) Mathe-

matical and (6) Philosophical Sciences;
and

3. The Empirico- Rational, which is either

(a) Anthropological or (6) Physical
Science.

B. The Bound or Positive Sciences are depen-
dent on authority, and fall into two groups: —

1. The Positive Theological Sciences, and

2. The Positive Juridical Sciences.

140 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

C. The Mixed Sciences are those which are
theoretically free, but practically and in appli-
cation subject to and controlled by authority.
They comprise —

1. The Politico-Economical, and

2. The Medical Sciences.

Such was the scheme of classification of the sciences
ultimately arrived at by Krug. Presented as it
necessarily is here, i.e., as a skeleton in all its bare-
ness, it must seem to have little if anything to
recommend it. On the contrary, grave objections
to it must make themselves felt. One is that no
sciences are formed solely by the free activity of the
human mind. All of them are to a large extent
dependent on the nature of the objects on which free
human activity is exercised. Another objection is
that no true sciences, either theological or juridical,
are bound or positive in the sense of being dependent
on authority. In so far as they are so treated they
cannot be truly sciences. The free exercise of
rational activity is inseparable from all true science.
It holds good of what Krug calls the Mixed Sciences
no less than of those which he represents as Bound
or Positive Sciences. Only in so far as Political
Economy and Medical Studies are free can they be
truly sciences, and what is true of them is just as
true of Theology and Jurisprudence and all other
studies or sciences. In all genuine study science

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 141

and philosophy, truth and freedom, are inseparable.
Notwithstanding these remarks I should greatly
regret were any one to infer from them that the
works in which Krug's scheme of classification is
imbedded are unworthy of study. They are very
much the reverse.

In the latter half of the eighteenth century there Encycio-
was nowhere shown so strong a desire for encycio- efforts,
paedic views of the sciences as in Germany. Our
English freethinkers of that time showed little
interest in the study of scientific or speculative
problems. Yet even then England had a Cyclopaedia,
of a kind now well known and fully appreciated,
prior to any other country. I refer to the English
Cyclopaedia compiled and edited by Ephraim Cham-
bers. It appeared first in 1728, then in 1738, and
next in 1739, — the later editions being greatly
enlarged by supplementary volumes. It was trans-
lated into French and Italian, originated Cyclopaedias
in all other European countries, and in England
became the basis of the greatly extended work of
Dr Eees, published in 45 vols. (1802-19). The
most widely famed and politically influential of
Encylopaedias was the French Encyclopidie, ou Dic-
tionnaire raisonnS des sciences, arts et metiers, par
une sociStS des gens de lettres (17 torn, fol., 1751-65).
Its two leading contributors were D'Alembert and

142 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

Diderot, both highly gifted men, the former a great
proficient in mathematics and physics, and the latter
endowed with wonderful readiness of thought and
mastery of exposition on any subject. The Dw-
cours prSliminaire was the work of D'Alembert,
the article on EncyclopSdie of Diderot, and the
Prospectus (afterwards incorporated in the Discours
pr&iminaire) of both. In the Prospectus the plan
of Chambers is admitted to be excellent but the
execution is said to be very indifferent. The plan,
indeed, alike of Chambers and of D'Alembert and
Diderot, was mainly borrowed from Bacon. Neces-
sarily the French Encyclopedic with its large SocUt6
des gens de lettres was much superior in execution
to the English Encyclopedia, which was almost the
work of one man.

iyAiem- D'Alembert was unfortunate when he adopted
the Baconian scheme of classification as the founda-
tion of his own. The chief alterations made by
him on it in his Preliminary Discourse have been
well indicated by Prof. Fowler in the following
passage (Francis Bacon, pp. 75, 76): "The places
of Imagination and Reason, Poetry and Philosophy,
are reversed, so that in the scheme of the Encyclo-
pedic Poetry comes last; the Imagination being
regarded by D'Alembert as a more mature faculty
(he is, of course, speaking of the creative, not of
the merely reproductive Imagination) than the

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 143

Reason, and posterior to it in the order of develop-
ment. Revealed Theology, instead of being treated
as co-ordinate with and distinct from Human
Learning, is included under that part of Philosophy
which is concerned with the knowledge of God,
Natural Theology and the Science of evil spirits
being the co-ordinate branches. Metaphysics is
used in no less than three senses. In one sense,
it stands at the head of Philosophy, and has a
certain affinity to the Philosophia Prima of Bacon.
In another sense, it is employed as the equivalent
of Pneumatology, or the science of souls as distinct
from bodies, and in this sense is called Particular
Metaphysic. Finally, there is a metaphysic of
bodies, or general physic, which treats of extent,
movement, impenetrability, &c, or the properties
common to all bodies. Mathematics is made one
of the main divisions of the Philosophy of Nature,
instead of a mere appendix, and the mathematical
as well as the physical sciences are much more
elaborately divided than in Bacon's classification.
The various medical sciences, or those which have
to do with the care of man's body, are classified
on a more scientific basis, and transferred from
the Philosophy of Man to the Philosophy of Nature.
Morals are divided into general and particular:
general ethics being concerned with discussions on
the nature of good and evil, on the necessity of
being virtuous, &c. : particular ethics with the

144 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

special duties of the individual when regarded
alone, of man in the family, and of man in society,
denominated respectively Natural, Economical, and
Political Jurisprudence, a similar division being
applicable to the conduct of states. Poesy is not
confined to Poetry proper, but is made coextensive
with the Fine Arts in general "

Those alterations of D'Alembert, however, neces-
sarily failed to improve to any great extent a
scheme so radically erroneous as Bacon's, — one of
which the root-principle was the separation of three
inseparable mental states or faculties. No advan-
tage was gained, or could be gained, by reversing
the places of Imagination and Eeason, Poetry and
Philosophy, as was done by D'Alembert. His put-
ting poetry after history and science, and repre-
senting imagination as a more mature faculty than
reason, was going farther astray than Bacon had
done, and more inconsistent with the testimony
of history and psychology. That poetry and art
are posterior to history and science is not in accord-
ance with known facts and with the real order of
intellectual development. To assign historical
studies and their products to memory alone has
been already indicated to be erroneous.

The division of history into sacred and secular,
ecclesiastical and civil, although a very common
one, is also a very misleading one. A history of

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 145

mankind or the history of a nation is, or at least
should be, as sacred and religious as a history of
a church or churches. All history is sacred in so
far as it is pervaded by the power and spirit of
God. No clear, sharp, fixed distinction can be
drawn between sacred and secular, ecclesiastical
and civil. The larger or so-called civil society is,
or at least may be, as well entitled to be deemed
sacred and religious as the smaller and so-called
ecclesiastical societies within it. The Old Testa-
ment is throughout historical, but it certainly
never represents history as divisible into sacred
and secular, religious and political. There were
no ecclesiastical denominations in apostolic times,
and the New Testament ecclesia never means an
ecclesiastical denomination. The ecclesia in its
distinctively Scriptural sense is not a visible cor-
poration at all, although it manifests itself in all
spheres of human activity wherever there is the
working of spiritual life. The kingdom of God
which is so prominent in the New Testament is
certainly not one in which Churchmen are described
as having any exclusive or prominent place, but
certainly one which from the New Testament point
of view is as wide as history itself, because as wide
as the whole providential and redemptive work of
God as traceable in the history of mankind.

Under the head of 'Memory' D'Alembert adds

146 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

to ' Sacred ' and ' Civil ' History ' Natural History/
and gives a very elaborate distribution of its objects
and of the uses to which they might be applied
in arts, trades, and manufactures. This was an
important addition to the Baconian scheme, — one
most creditable to the editor (or editors) of the
JEncyclop4die 9 and necessarily helpful to those who
contributed to it. As 'History' is represented in
the scheme to be related only to 'Memory/ so
is 'Philosophy' to 'Reason.' Philosophy itself is
subdivided into the Science of God, the Science
of Man, and the Science of Nature. The first
of these is represented as including Natural and
Revealed Religion and the Science of Good and
Evil Spirits, — a worse than worthless view, such
as can hardly be regarded as a serious one.

The Science of Man is divided into Logic and
the Doctrine of Morality, and each of these again
into Arts. The scheme is elaborate, but to a
large extent artificial. The Science of Nature is
identified with General Metaphysics, Ontology, or
Science of Being in general, and divided into
Mathematics and Physics. Mathematics again is
divided into Pure and Mixed, and Physics into
General, Particular, and Chemistry. Subdivision
is carried still farther, and, indeed, too far. On
the whole, however, the scheme of classification
under the head of Philosophy must, with all its

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. 147

faults, be regarded as a very remarkable and
valuable piece of work. It seems impossible to
determine how far D'Alembert was aided by
Diderot in the elaboration and exposition of
it, but there can, I think, be little reasonable
doubt that it must have been in the main the
work of the former, the more scientific of the two
men.

Under the head of ' Imagination ' Poetry is
divided into Sacred and Profane, then subdivided
into Narrative, Dramatic, and Parabolic, and each
of these subdivisions into others. But in that
there seems to be no merit whatever. In fact,
there is not a single science properly so-called
included in the section 'Imagination.' The ex-
tension given to the term 'Poesie' so as to make
it coextensive with 'the Fine Arts in general*
was a misapplication of it. Baumgarten had
previously found the appropriate term for 'the
Fine Arts in general/ — the term Aesthetik.

The extraordinary philosophical activity to which
Kant's critical investigations into the nature and
foundations of knowledge gave rise early in the
nineteenth century was applied much more to what
was called the doctrine of science ( Wissenschafts-
lehre) than to direct study of the sciences them-
selves or of their relations to one another. Fichte,
Schelling, Hegel, and their followers felt the neces-

148 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

sity of giving to the fundamental problems as to the
reality and validity of all that had been assumed to
be knowledge better and more constructive solu-
tions than those of Kant. Indeed his solutions
seemed to them essentially destructive, and himself
'der zermalmende/ — an even greater 'smasher' of
all old theories and doctrines than the Scottish
Hume. Hence they felt that their own work must
necessarily be not only essentially critical but also
essentially constructive, the discovery and proof of
a fundamental philosophy or science of knowledge
which could not be destroyed like the older theories
and systems that Hume and Kant had discredited
without finding for them any credible or adequate
substitutes. The sciences properly so called could
not fail to be influenced by the turn thus taken by
speculative thought, nor could they fail to be to
a large extent influenced to their disadvantage.
Imagination and dreaming got inextricably com-
bined and confused with reason and reality. The
minds of the Teutonic philosophers of the time
ceased to be conscious of the laws and limitations
of human thought. The main result of that was an
extraordinary activity in the formation of systems
of belief based on some so-called science of know-
ledge ( Wissenschaftshhre) of a thinker's own inven-
tion and maintained by him to be the only true and
correct standard of all kinds of knowledge.

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 149

Fichte (1762-1814) led the way, and a singularly Fichte.
gifted leader he was. He is certainly entitled to
an eminent place in a history of the Doctrine
of Science. He showed that pure Kantianism —
Kantianism as taught by Kant himself — could not
be rationally maintained owing to the self-con-
tradictoriness pervading the whole system from
beginning to end. With eagle glance he gazed,
with eagle swoop he struck, straight at the quest-
ion around which Kant floundered with whale-like
awkwardness, What is the essential unifying factor
in all knowledge and in all that is known? He
saw that in Kant's teaching there was no such
factor, and made it manifest not only that he
himself but that Schelling, Hegel, and other
eminent thinkers could not consistently rest in
a teaching so radically inconsistent as was that of
Kant. Hence Fichte must be adjudged entitled to
an eminent place in a history of the doctrine of
science or philosophy of knowledge.

He has, however, no special claim to any such
position in a history of the distribution or classifi-
cation of the sciences. He was far from having as
wide or accurate an acquaintance with any of the
positive sciences as Kant, for example, had; and
did little, if anything, in the way of showing how
those sciences are related to one another and to the
world of science as an intelligible whole. What he

150 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

really did, or attempted to do, was to represent
various kinds of knowledge or action as offshoots
of the Wissenschaftslehre. It he held to be the
fundamental philosophy on which all special studies
should be based, to which they must be traced
back, and by the spirit of which they should be
permeated and vivified; and hence in his various
writings he brought into connection with it such
subjects as (1) Revelation, (2) Theoretical Philo-
sophy, (3) Practical Philosophy, (4) Law of Nature,
(5) Systematic Ethics, (6) Philosophy of History,
&c. Indeed, he assumes or affirms all sciences to
have their principles in the Science of Knowledge.
That, however, does not yield a classification of the
sciences.

Schelling (1775-1854) has often been credited with
having dealt with the subject under consideration in
a rather effective manner, and, in particular, with
having anticipated, if not suggested, the solution of
it given by Comte. The following words of Morell
have been frequently quoted with approval : " The
influence of Schelling was not confined to Germany.
His attempt to unite the process of the physical
sciences in some affiliated line with the study of
man, both in his individual constitution and historic
development, has also had a very considerable result
out of his own country. No one, for example, who
compares the philosophic method of Schelling with

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIBNCE8. 151

the ' Philosophic Positive ' of Auguste Comte can
have the slightest hesitation as to the source from
which the latter virtually sprang. The fundamental
idea is, indeed, precisely the same as that of Schelling,
with this difference only — that the idealistic language
of the German speculator is here translated into the
more ordinary language of physical science. That
Comte borrowed his views from Schelling we can by
no means affirm ; but that the whole conception of
the affiliation of the sciences, in the order of their
relative simplicity, and the expansion of the same
law of development so as to include the exposition
of human nature and the course of social progress, is
all to be found there, no one in the smallest degree
acquainted with Schelling's writings can seriously
doubt." 1

Since Morell thus wrote documentary evidence
has come to light which proves that Comte could
not possibly have borrowed from Schelling. It is
unnecessary, however, to bring forward that evi-
dence, seeing that the Comtist classification of the
sciences has no real connection with the procedure
of Schelling affirmed to be, in the main features,
identical with it. Schelling's procedure is in no
sense a classification of the sciences, and the prin-
ciple of it is utterly antagonistic to that of Comte.
Comte's principle is that of a methodical study of

1 " Modern German Philosophy " ; Manchester Papers, 1856.

152 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

phenomena. Schelling's is that of the self-movement
and potentiation of the Absolute, from the lowest
manifestation of so-called matter to the highest
activity of reason. The method of Comte is that of
science directly studied, generalised, and distributed.
The method of Schelling is that of a high-soaring
ontology. It is altogether illusory to compare the
successive " potences " of Schelling with the funda-
mental sciences of Comte. Yet it is only just to
add that Schelling at all stages and in all phases of
his theorising took a keen interest in the sciences,
and wrote much of a very suggestive although
not infrequently very dubious character. Many a
scientist, I imagine, may read, for instance, with
considerable pleasure and profit, the Lectures on the
Method of Academic Study, published in 1803.
The subjects treated of in them are the following : —
1. The Absolute Idea of Science; 2. The Scientific
and Ethical Functions of Universities ; 3. The
Primary Presuppositions of a University Course of
Study ; 4. The Study of the Pure Sciences of Reason,
Mathematics, and General Philosophy; 5. The
Ordinary Objections to the Study of Philosophy ;
6. On the Special Study of Philosophy; 7. Upon
some of the Departments which are to be discrim-
inated from Philosophy — Specially the Positive
Sciences ; 8. The Historical Construction of Christi-
anity ; 9. The Study of Theology ; 10. The Study

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 153

of History and Jurisprudence; 11. Natural His-
tory; 12. Physics and Chemistry; 13. Medicine
{Pathology) ; and 14. Philosophy of Art (^Esthetics).
In his other numerous works he has so far treated
of those subjects in relation to absolute science.
Although his treatment of them leads neither to
a tenable classification nor a satisfactory organisa-
tion of the sciences, it has already been, and may
perhaps still be, of some value to them.

In the decade from 1806 to 1816 a number of dis-
tributions and surveys of the sciences appeared in
Germany. It may suffice merely to mention them.
Hefter published, in 1806, a Philosophical Exposi-
tion of a System of all Sciences ; Topfer, in the same
year, a General Encyclopaedic Chart of all Sciences,
to which he added, in 1808, a Commentary; Ortloff,
in 1807, a Systematic Distribution of the Sciences,
&c. ; Burdach, in 1809, an Organism of Human
Science and Art; Simon, in 1810, a Tabular
Survey of the Sciences; the celebrated Lorenz
Oken, in 1809-11, a Handbook of the Philosophy
of Nature (tr. by Tulk for the Ray Society) ; and
Jasche, in 1816, an Introduction to an Architectonik
of the Sciences. The works of the first five authors
mentioned have quite passed into oblivion. Jasche
is known chiefly as the editor of Kant's Logic.
Oken is still recognised as a man of genius, but

154 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

the scheme of science indicated in his Handbook
has been generally found by those who tried to
appreciate it as so original as to be unintelligible.

Hegel Hegel, in 1817, exhibited, in his Encyclopedia

of the Philosophical Sciences, a vast system of
thought which he believed inclusive of all the
fundamental sciences, and necessarily assigning to
each of them its appropriate place in the organic
and rational whole of knowledge. Judging his
work even exclusively from the point of view
which here specially concerns us, it must, I think,
be pronounced a prodigious advance on those which
preceded it, as any one may easily discover for him-
self by comparing it with the best of the produc-
tions mentioned in the previous paragraph. Hegel
connects and groups the fundamental sciences in an
order which is to a large extent true, and presents a
very remarkable exemplification of a most magnifi-
cent conception of a Science of the Sciences. He
supposes that through the various stages of in-
dividual and collective experience and activity
described in the Phcenomenology of the Spirit, and
in the "Introduction" to the Encyclopedia, con-
sciousness is enabled to rise to absolute cognition,
to knowledge of the thought which is all-originative
and all-inclusive, to apprehension of the Idea which
is the essence alike of nature and of man, the source

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. 155

and explanation alike of existence and of science.
The Idea, which is the only appropriate and
adequate object of absolute cognition, Hegel be-
lieves himself to have attained, and his whole
philosophy, as exhibited in the Encyclopcedia, is
an attempt to trace the chief phases and forms of
its development. In direction the development is
from abstract to concrete, from simple to complex,
from barest poverty to fullest wealth of content ; in
character it is rhythmic, reasoned, dialectic; and
the character of the movement determines its
direction, its whole course, and ultimate goal,
seeing that in affirming itself the thought with
which philosophy is conversant likewise denies
itself, yet so as thereby, instead of destroying
itself, to reconcile itself to itself, and this through
innumerable forms which become ever more con-
crete and comprehensive, until the whole content
of the Absolute Idea is evolved. Owing to the
very nature of the Hegelian dialectic, the Hegelian
philosophy is threefold alike as a whole and in its
parts. It must treat of the Idea in itself, in which
case it is Logic; or of the Idea in its other or
external form, and then it is the Philosophy of
Nature ; or of the Idea in its return to itself, when
it is the Philosophy of Spirit. In like manner the
threefold rhythm of the dialectic process causes
Logic to resolve itself into the Science of Being, the

156 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

Science of the Essence, and the Science of the
Notion ; the Philosophy of Nature into Mechanics,
Physics, and Organics ; and the Philosophy of Spirit
into the Doctrine of Subjective Spirit, the Doctrine
of Objective Spirit, and the Doctrine of Absolute
Spirit, the first of which comprehends Anthro-
pology, Phenomenology, and Psychology, while
the second deals with Legal Right, Morality, and
Ethical Obedience, and the third embraces the
spheres of Art, Religion, and Absolute Philosophy.
Thus the fundamental sciences are represented as
having each a fixed and appropriate place, as bound
together by ties of rational affinity, and as the
necessary and constituent members of a vast har-
monious and organic system of knowledge. Hegel
must, consequently, be credited with having made
an enormous advance on all schemes of classification
of the sciences by mere logical division, external
arrangement, or figurate representation. He has
aimed at a real incorporation of the special sciences
into a general science, at a thorough reduction of
them under a comprehensive doctrine, at a correla-
tion of them based on consideration of the entire
contents of each. This may well render us averse
to dwell on errors of detail in his views. These are
neither few nor difficult to discover, and have been
often indicated. Hegel has, perhaps, oftener failed
than succeeded in defining the limits of the par-

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 157

ticular sciences. It is only in a very general way
that his scheme of co-ordination can be defended.
The defects of his Philosophy of Nature are notori-
ous, and the great merits of his Philosophy of Spirit
are blended with serious faults. But to ignore the
truth and grandeur of his general theory of the
correlation and combination of the sciences in
critically gazing at such imperfections must be
pronounced almost as irrational and unjust as to
doubt or deny the brightness of the sun because a
telescopic examination shows it to be mottled over
with a number of dark spots. Whatever be the
faults of Hegel's Encyclopedia — although they be
even "thick as dust in vacant chambers" — this
glory, I think, cannot fairly be denied to it, that
there, for the first time, appeared a system of such
a character and scope, so vast in its range of con-
ception, so rich in suggestion and doctrine, and so
skilfully constructed, as to present to the mind
something like what a Science of the Sciences
ought to be.

I refrain not only from urging particular objec-
tions to the Hegelian scheme of scientific co-ordina-
tion, but also those general objections which might
be drawn from the nature of the Hegelian Idea, and
of the Hegelian dialectic. These objections may be
both relevant and conclusive, but they obviously
raise the whole question of the truth or falsity of

158 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCE8.

the Hegelian philosophy, which is a question far too
large to be here discussed. The late Prof. Harms,
in his Geschichte der Psychologie (pp. 42-48), has
rejected the Hegelian classification especially on
the ground that the dialectic process is a form
of evolution inconsistent with either the sciences
or their objects differing otherwise than in degree,
although the facts of experience show that they
differ essentially and specifically. It is an objec-
tion to which I cannot attribute much weight.
It may be difficult to conceive that any process
of evolution can produce certain differences, but
it is also difficult to show that they may not, and
off-hand appeals to experience on the question are
to be deprecated. Then, of all forms of evolution,
the Hegelian seems to be the one against which
the objection must strike with the least force,
seeing that the Hegelian dialectic, while a process
which goes on without interruption or cessation, is
also one of which each stage has a certain essence
and peculiar character of its own, each of the three
moments or acts included in it being relatively
distinct. The evolutionism of Hegel does not
attempt, like that of Darwin, and at least like
that of contemporary materialism, to explain de-
velopment entirely by gradation. It affirms un-
broken continuity of movement, but at the same
time maintains that the movement throughout

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. 159

includes distinctions of nature, not merely differ-
ences of degree. The only objection on which I
deem it necessary to insist is that a doctrine of
the sciences ought to be based on, and built up
by, a direct study of the sciences, instead of being
drawn out of the bosom of a metaphysical philo-
sophy. It must be reached through induction,
not from deduction ; through analysis and general-
isation, not by synthesis and specialisation ; by an
upward, not a downward movement. It should be
the product of philosophic thought, but of such
thought in its first stage of advance on the thought
which has produced the various sciences. It is
one of the means with which the intellect must
provide itself in order to apprehend ultimate and
absolute truth. The view that a doctrine of the
sciences must be derived from a doctrine of science,
and even from a doctrine of Being, is very plausible,
yet very erroneous. A doctrine of the sciences
undoubtedly implies a doctrine of science, and even
a doctrine of Being; but for this very reason it
must precede them, and they can only be attained
through it. What is first in the order of nature
is last in the order of knowledge. To reach the
centre of truth, every point which lies between it
and the circumference must be passed through.
Hegel disregarded all considerations of this kind.
He started from what he believed to be truth

160 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCE8.

higher than the truths of science without having
made use of the sciences to reach it. He began
with philosophy at its highest, sought to work it
all out by a uniform method from an absolute first
point, and so to incorporate into it the sciences,
to assign to each of them its place, and to exhibit
their relationships. This I hold to have been a
radically erroneous procedure. I must be content,
however, simply to state the conviction, having
indicated at the commencement of my previous
paper what I deem to be the true position and
function of a doctrine of the sciences in the organ-
ism of philosophy.

De Tracy. Two years before the publication of Hegel's
jEneyclopcedia a celebrated French philosopher,
A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, completed a Cours
d'Ideologie (1801-15, 5 vols.), in which he attempted
to trace a plan of the whole edifice of science in
accordance with the general philosophical prin-
ciples of Locke and Condillac. He maintains that
the foundation of all science must be acquaintance
with the principles implied in the formation of
science — the knowledge of how knowledge, which
consists of ideas, is obtained from sensations or
feelings. Ideology must be, consequently, the
fundamental science, and it includes three depart-
mental sciences — Ideology in the narrower sense,

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 161

Grammar, and Logic — which treat respectively of
the formation, the expression, and the combination
of ideas. Then, our means of knowledge may be
applied either to the study of what is within or
of what is beyond our power — either to the study
of the operations of the will or of the properties
of nature — and hence there are other two groups
of sciences. The sciences which refer to the will
are Political Economy, Morals, and Jurisprudence;
those which refer to external nature are Physics,
Geometry, and Arithmetic.

Such is De Tracy's scheme of classification.
Obviously the enumeration of sciences in the
second and third divisions is very incomplete, and
the arrangement of them careless. The omission
of ^Esthetics, the Science of History, and especially
Theology, cannot fail to be remarked. And even
the leading conception of his scheme — the view
that the primary science must be a science of the
conditions and processes implied in the formation
of science — is extremely questionable. How are
we to ascertain the conditions and processes of
science except through a study of the sciences,
and how shall we study them unless they exist?
An Ideology not drawn from ideas, a Grammar not
dependent on languages, a Logic which does not
presuppose the reasonings and methods of science,
must be most unworthy to be called sciences.

L

162 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

IV. FROM BENTHAM TO GIOBERTI.

Bentham. Jeremy Bentham and Samuel Taylor Coleridge
were the Englishmen who at the period now
reached discussed the problem of the classification
of the sciences. The former in the fifth appendix
to his Chrestomathia, first published in 1816, did
so. His scheme assumes that " directly or in-
directly, wellbeing, in some shape or other, or in
several shapes, or all shapes taken together, is the
subject of every thought, and object of every action,
on the part of every known Being, who is, at the
same time, a sensitive and thinking Being"; that
" art and science so run along everywhere together
that every division performed on the one may, on
any occasion, be considered as applying to the
other " ; that all the arts and sciences meet in, and
proceed from, a central, common, and comprehen-
sive art and science — Eudsemonics; and that the
distribution of this art and science into the various
arts and sciences ought to be exhaustive, and may
be made so through lengthened dichotomous divi-
sion, continued bifurcate ramification. These as-
sumptions are not to be admitted. The first is
the basis of utilitarianism, but denied by all who
reject utilitarianism; the second ignores the fact
that the points of view of science and of art are

\
CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 163

so different that every science is of use in several
arts, and that every art presupposes several
sciences ; the third falls with the two assump-
tions which precede it and on which it rests;
and the fourth has been so discredited in every
department of inductive study that the belief in
the applicability of dichotomous division either to
the realities of nature or to their reflections in
thought is now justly deemed by scientific men
a superstition.

The all-comprehensive art and science of Eudae-
monics may be regarded, according to Bentham,
specially either as art or science, and the name
Eudaemonics may be specially appropriated to the
former, and Ontology to the latter. " In every part
of the common field, concomitant and correspondent
to EudcBmonics, considered as an art, runs Ontology,
considered as a science." Ontology is, therefore,
the trunk of the tree of science, while the other
sciences are branches of that tree formed by suc-
cessive bifurcations. The tree itself is, conse-
quently, a Ramean tree. Thus Ontology is divided
into Coenoscopic (Metaphysics) and Idioscopic ;
Idioscopic Ontology into Somatology and Pneu-
matology ; Somatology into Posology and Poiology,
and Pneumatology into Nooscopic and Pathoscopic ;
and so on, until the result is reached that Poso-
scopic Somatics includes Geometry, Arithmetic, and

164 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

Algebra ; Poioscopic Somatics, Astronomy, Botany,
Zoology, Experimental Philosophy, and Technology;
Nooscopic Pneumatics, Logic, Grammar, and Rhet-
oric ; and Pathoscopic Pneumatics, ^Esthetics, Exe-
getic Ethics, Private Ethics, and the Political
Sciences. The process by which this result is at-
tained is not only long and wearisome, but at
almost every stage very questionable. Theology
is entirely ignored. Bentham, like Hobbes, sup-
posed it not entitled to any place among the
sciences. His whole scheme, indeed, reminds us of
that of Hobbes. It is as self-consistent and even
more elaborated, but shows less vigour and perspic-
acity, and more narrowness and pedantry of mind.
Its nomenclature is hideous, but ingenious and
significant. In the encyclopaedic language of Ben-
tham, Arithmetic is Gnostosymbolic, Alegomorphic,
Pososcopic, Somatic, Coenoscopic Ontology ; Zoology
is Embioscopic, Epigeioscopic, Physiurgic, Poso-
scopic, Somatic, Idioscopic Ontology ; and Rhetoric
is Pathocinetic, Ccenonesioscopic, Nooscopic, Pneu-
matic Ontology. These are wonderful and fearful
propositions at first sight or first hearing, but any
reader possessed of a little Greek may easily trans-
late them into English, and will learn something by
doing so. 1

1 Bentham's Chrestomathia is contained in vol. viii. of Bowling's
edition of his works.

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. 165

Coleridge divided the sciences into Pure Sciences, Coleridge,
which axe built on the relations of ideas to each
other, and Mixed and Applied Sciences, which are
built on the relations of ideas to the external world.
The Pure Sciences he subdivided into Formal and
Real, the former exhibiting the forms of thought,
and the latter treating of Being itself, of the true
nature and existence of the external universe, of
the guiding principles within us, and of the Great
Cause of all. Grammar, Logic, and Mathematics
he classed as the Formal Sciences; Metaphysics,
Morals, and Theology as the Real Sciences ; Mech-
anics, Hydrostatics, Pneumatics, Optics, and As-
tronomy as the Mixed Sciences; and the various
branches of Experimental Philosophy, the theories
of the Fine Arts and of the Useful Arts, and
Natural History, with its applications to Medicine
and Surgery, as the Applied Sciences.

It is not difficult to discover grave defects in this
classification. The Real Sciences cannot be Pure
Sciences if Coleridge's own definitions of Real
Sciences and Pure Sciences be correct. The Mixed
and Applied Sciences, if only mixed and applied,
have no right to be classed as co-ordinate with the
Pure Sciences; and if in any degree distinct and
independent sciences, they must be to the same
extent either Formal or Real Sciences. Most of
them are obviously entitled to be ranked among

166 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

the so-called Real Sciences. Within the several
groups the order in which the particular sciences
follow one another is not the most natural order.
For all defects of this kind Coleridge himself may
not be responsible, as he complained that under
editorial revision his work was (to use his own
words) "so bedeviled that I am ashamed to own
it." 1

Janneiii. Cataldo Jannelli, a clear-headed Italian author,
while endeavouring to correct and develop in his
Cenni Bulla natura e necessity delle cosse e delle
storie umane (1817) the doctrine of Vico, dealt,
although only to a slight extent, with the problem
of the classification of the sciences. While recog-
nising the value of the work achieved by Vico in
the Principii di Scienza Nuova, and his right to
be regarded as the founder of the philosophy of
history and the improver of all sciences dependent
on that philosophy, he was sufficiently independent
to criticise even the central doctrine and most com-
prehensive generalisation in the great Neapolitan's
system of thought. For Vico's divine, heroic, and
human ages he substituted three ages partly corre-
spondent to and partly corrective of them — namely,

1 As to Coleridge's classification see the third section of his Treatise
on Method, prefatory to the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, which
began to appear in 1817.

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 167

the ages of sense, imagination, and reason — and
thus with a considerable measure of success im-
proved on his predecessor's description of the stages
of human development and distribution of the kinds
of knowledge, without rejection of the great idea of
a natural law of the development of life in the
history alike of the human race and the human
individual His criticism left psychology, sociology,
and evolutionism none the less indebted to Vico,
while it led him to recognise as of supreme import-
ance the claims of two other sciences — namely,
teleologia (the science of final causes) and ideologia
(the science of first causes). His general dis-
tribution of the sciences is into intuitive or
theoretical and operative or practical sciences, —
a much too simple classification.

G. D. Romagnosi (1761-1835), a very eminent Romag-
Italian jurist and publicist, and a wise and inde-
pendent citizen in a very difficult and critical
period of his country's history, gave expression in
one of his many writings to what may well be
regarded as an extravagant view of the importance
of an encyclopaedic distribution of the sciences. I
quote his words below. 1 So far as I am aware, he

1 Vedute fondamentale sxdV Arte Logica, Lib. i. Sez. i., § 18 : " Un
albero enciclopedico delle scienze ben fatto forma V ultima e la piu
grande espressione del logico magistero."

nosL

168 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

himself made no attempt to supply the sort of
classification he so highly appreciated.
Longo. It seems certain, however, from the Appendix to

the second volume of Prof. Vincenzo di Giovanni's
Storia della FUosofia in Sicilia, — a very inter-
esting and every way admirable work, — that the
problem must have been long and earnestly dealt
with by a Sicilian scientist, the Cav. Agatino
Longo. Greatly to my regret I have not been
able to obtain his writings on the subject — one
which must have occupied his mind more or less
for over thirty years. Unfortunately for my pur-
pose Di Giovanni has given no information as to
their contents beyond what is implied in their
titles, and as they have all been published in Sicily,
and for the most part in Sicilian periodicals, gener-
ally short-lived and of very limited circulation, I
have not been able to obtain them, and must there-
fore content myself with reproducing a few of the
titles given by Giovanni in the work already
mentioned, viz. :—

Longo, Cav. A. —

Prolusioni accademiche, lette nell* universiti di
Catania. (La prima di esse ivi stampata nei
1820 presenta una nuova classificazione delle
scienze : la seconda inserita nel t. xiii. del. Gior.
di scienze lettre ed arti offre partizioni della
erudizione e delle arti.

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 169

Sul bisogno d' una nuova classificazione delle cog-
nizioni, Cat. 1827, e nel tomo xxii. del Giorn. di
scienze lettre ed arti per la Sicilia.

Atlante universalle delle cognizioni, o Tavole sinottiche
contenenti la classificazione sistematica delle
scienze secondo il metodo naturale. (Di questa
grand opera ne dk V annunzio nel t. xxxiv. di
detto Giornale, e nel xiii dell' Efemeridi sicole.)

Osservazioni sulla Geneografia dello scibile del sign.
Pamphilis: nel t. xxxv.

Sul valore del vocabolo Filosofia, ed enumerazione delle
scienze che vi s' includono. Cat. 1850.

Delle partizioni della filosofia generate, e dei metodi
di classificazione. Cat. 1850.

Father Giovachino Ventura set forth his views on Ventura,
the classification of the sciences in his De Methodo
Philosophandi, published at Rome in 1828. But
his traditionalism, his subjection of reason to au-
thority and of science to faith, his want of secular
knowledge and exclusively theological habits of
thought, rendered it impossible for him to discuss
the theme with much success. He assigned to the
encyclopaedic tree of knowledge three branches —
one bearing the sciences of authority, another the
sciences of ratiocination, and the third the sciences
of observation. These he represented as coincident
with the Ethics, Logic, and Physics of ancient
philosophy. That view, it need scarcely be said, is
utterly erroneous. It is, however, not more so than

170 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

this other, closely connected with it, that the object
of Ethics, thus understood, is God ; of Logic, Man ;
and of Physics, Body. Ethics is divided into
Metaphysics and Jurisprudence ; Logic into Ideology
and Logic strictly so called; and Physics into
General and Special Physics. The process of sub-
division is pushed to a great length. 1 The self-
confidence of the renowned Theatine orator was
undimmed by any suspicion of ignorance, and so he
mapped out the universe of knowledge with magis-
terial minuteness. It would serve no good purpose
to follow him in details, which are without interest
in themselves, and which belong to a scheme false
in its principles and misleading in its main lines.

Ferrarese. L. Ferrarese published, in 1828, a Saggio di una
nuova classificazione delle scienze. It contains good
remarks on the importance of a right distribution
of the system of knowledge, but the classification
which it sets forth is not based on sound principles,
and by no means satisfies the necessary requirements.
According to Ferrarese, the Science of Man must be
the foundation of all the sciences ; but he has for-
gotten to attempt to prove that there can be a
Science of Man without a foundation supplied by
other and simpler sciences. He classifies the sciences
exclusively according to the modes of their helpful-

1 Op. cil, art vii., pp. 241-300.

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 171

ness to man, on the ground that they will not
otherwise be so useful to him as they might be ;
but in so doing he overlooks that even if this
allegation were correct — which it is not — it would
be altogether insufficient to establish that the
sciences should have their place and rank deter-
mined, not by intrinsic, but by extrinsic considera-
tions; not by the nature of the truths of which
they consist, but by the uses to which they may
be put. To the tree of science he assigns three
great branches, because the sciences contribute, in
his opinion, to one or other of three great ends
— the maintenance of man in health or sound-
ness (salute) of body or mind, the furtherance of
his perfection, and the prevention of his degradation
— although these ends are obviously so closely as-
sociated that any one of them can only be realised
in the measure that the others are promoted, and
that, consequently, to distribute the sciences by them
into distinct groups must be futile. The fundamental
science Ferrarese calls Anthropography, and he de-
scribes it as dividing into Descriptive and Compara-
tive Anthropography. To these two branches the
mathematical, physical, natural, and medical sciences
are represented as belonging. The third branch
begins with Telestics, the general science of the
perfection of man, alike as regards his bodily, in-
tellectual, and moral faculties. It is supposed to

172 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

support Paedagogy, the philosophical, juridical, and
moral sciences, history, and literature.

De Pam- The treatise of Giacinto de Pamphilis — Geneografia
p dello Scibile — was published a year later than that

of Ferrarese, 1 and is even more ingenious. It places
the centre of the sciences not in man alone, as the
work of Ferrarese does, but both in nature and
man, since the former is the objective cause, and the
latter the subjective cause, and these causes act
incessantly on each other. It refers the origin of
knowledge to "the reciprocal circular influence"
between nature and man, and makes this fact the
principle of the division of the sciences. Hence it
distributes the sciences into three orders: 1. Ob-
jective Sciences, those of the Not-Me ; 2. Subjective
Sciences, those of the Me; and, 3. Objective-sub-
jective and Subjective-objective Sciences, those of
the Me in relation to the Not-Me, and of the Not-
Me in relation to the Me ; or, in other words, into
Physical, Metaphysical, and Moral Sciences. These
orders are brought into connection in a somewhat in-
tricate and arbitrary manner, so as to yield such
groups as Grammar, Logic, and Morals ; Cosmology,
Psychology, and Theology ; Philoagathy, Philocaly,
and Philosophy ; Metaphysics, Ontology, and Ideo-
logy ; all the members of which deal directly with

1 A second edition appeared in 1869.

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 173

the phenomenal, yet imply the transcendental and
absolute. It would occupy too much of the space at
my disposal to explain and criticise the processes by
which these groups are formed. Any reader whose
curiosity regarding the scheme is unsatisfied may be
referred not only to the work in which it was pro-
pounded, but also to the examination of it by Prof.
Longo, Osservazioni sulla Geneografia dello scibile
del sig. Pamphilis. 1

Dr Neil Arnott, in the introduction to his Elements n«i
of Physics, — a popular work, of which the first edi-
tion appeared in 1828, — divided the whole sum of
man's knowledge of nature into Natural History and
Science or Philosophy. The former treats of the
materials of the universe — e.g., minerals, vegetables,
animals ; or, in other words, describes the kingdoms
of nature. The latter treats of the manners or kinds
of motion or change ; or, in other words, exhibits
the general truths or laws of nature. It ought, in
Dr Arnott's opinion, to be distributed into four dis-
tinct sciences — Physics, Chemistry, the Science of
Life, and the Science of Mind — because all pheno-
mena are referable to four distinct classes, — the
physical, chemical, vital, and mental. These four
sciences " may be said to form the pyramid of
Science, of which Physics is the base, while the

1 Giorn. di scienze lettere ed arti per la SicUia, t xxxv.

174 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

others constitute succeeding layers in the order
mentioned, the whole having certain mutual re-
lations and dependencies well-figured by the parts
of a pyramid." Mathematics " may be considered
as a subsidiary department of human science,
created by the mind itself, to facilitate the study
of the others." Theology is included in the Science
of Mind. It was thus that Arnott enunciated
an idea of a hierarchy of fundamental sciences
closely resembling that of Comte, and, indeed,
superior to it in the two points in which it differs
from it — namely, in neither representing Astron-
omy as a fundamental science, nor the Science of
Mind as merely a department of the Science of
Life. There is no evidence, so far as I am aware,
that his anticipation of Comte was due to any
acquaintance with the writings of Saint - Simon.
He enunciated, however, Saint - Simon's general
idea, although only in a very general way. He
made no attempt to build on it, as Comte did,
a universal philosophy, a science of the sciences.
How incompetent he was to perform such an achieve-
ment, had he been ambitious enough to undertake
it, we may judge from the feeble book he published
in 1861, entitled A Survey of Human Progress.
Yet in this work he developed in some degree the
conception just indicated as contained in his earlier
one. He, as Dr Bain says, "brought out more

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 175

decisively the distinction between Sciences and Arts,
and between the Concrete and the Abstract Depart-
ments of Science." Still distributing that know-
ledge of phenomena to which he restricted the term
Science or Philosophy into the' four fundamental
Sciences of Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, and
Psychology, he represented the knowledge of things
or objects called Natural History and the devices or
practical applications of knowledge called Art as
similarly divisible, so that the departments of
Natural History, of Science, and of Art form three
parallel and co-ordinate series, Astronomy and Geo-
graphy corresponding to Physics, Mineralogy and
Geology to Chemistry, Botany and Zoology to Physi-
ology, and the History of Man to Psychology, while
the Arts must be classified as Mechanical, Chemical,
Physiological, and Mental.

We now reach Auguste Comte, than whom, Comte.
perhaps, no one has done more for philosophy as
positive. He owes the high place he holds among
philosophers to the power and skill and general
truthfulness of his elaboration of the doctrine of the
so-called positive sciences as a whole, not to the
merits of his treatment of the particular problem
of the classification of the sciences. He claimed,
but had no right whatever to claim, that he
originated the classification which he adopted. If

176 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

that classification possess any merits, they must
be ascribed to Dr Burdin, who conceived it, and to
Saint-Simon, who first received and published it;
not to Comte, although he showed how much could
be made of it. As it is with Comte's name, how-
ever, that the classification is almost universally
associated, it is in connection with him, and as ex-
pounded in his Cours de Philosophie Positive (1830-
42), that I shall briefly consider and criticise it.

The classification cannot be dissevered from the
celebrated so-called " law of the three states." That
alleged law, as it is understood and expounded by
Comte, means that the human mind in every de-
partment of thought and inquiry reaches such rela-
tive truth as it can attain, and so enters into the
state called positive, or, in other words, arrives at
science only by passing through a theological and
metaphysical state, both essentially false and con-
jectural, although both containing some measure of
truth and pervaded by a certain nisus toward the
certainty of science. Thus apprehended, the law
necessarily implies that there can be no true the-
ology or true metaphysics, and that whatever
professes to be theological or metaphysical science
must be discarded as pretentious delusion. Comte
cannot be charged in this respect with want of
consistency ; he refused to assign either to theology
or metaphysics any place among the sciences. That

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. 177

in doing so he most seriously erred I shall not here
endeavour to show, as I have elsewhere examined
his views on this point at considerable length. 1

Comte further defined and limited the field of
his investigation by excluding from consideration
merely composite and derivative sciences. He
distributed the sciences into two classes — Abstract
Sciences conversant with general laws, and Con-
crete Sciences conversant with the explanation of
particular existing things by means of general
laws ; and held the former only to be fundamental,
and alone to require from the philosopher classifi-
cation. He thus greatly simplified his task. There
can be no doubt that the distinction on which he
rested the simplification is a very valuable one.
It is now almost universally accepted.

The Abstract Sciences, Comte held, must fall into
a single linear series, each member of which has
its place determined by its relative simplicity,
generality, and independence. This does not pre-
vent them from being divisible into Mathematical
and Physical, or the Physical Sciences from being
divisible into Inorganic Physics (comprehending
Astronomy and Physics proper) and Organic Physics

1 Philosophy of History, pp. 267-278. Iu ch. x. of my Historical
Philosophy in France I have treated somewhat folly of the natural-
ism and positivism in the doctrine of Comte, bat not at all of his
attempted classification of the sciences.

M

178 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

(containing Biology and Sociology) ; but it implies
that Mathematical Science must precede Physical
Science, and that the five fundamentally distinct
Physical Sciences must have been evolved in the
following order: Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry,
Biology, and Sociology. A relatively simple,
abstract, and independent science must always
precede one which is more special, complex, and
dependent.

These views of Comte raise various questions.
One is this : Is there, even of sciences of the kind
which he calls positive, only one series? Is there
not, for example, a Psychical as well as Physical
series of such sciences ? The material and the
mental spheres of existence are conspicuously
different and appear to be essentially distinct.
The facts on which the physical sciences are built
are all observed externally by the senses, while
those on which mental science is built must be
apprehended by internal consciousness; we cannot
observe a single fact of physical nature by intro-
spection, nor a single fact of mind by perception.
From this it seems to follow that, although Psy-
chology may possibly be the root of a series of
sciences parallel to the Physical Sciences, neither
itself nor any science springing from it — as, for
example, Sociology — can be included in a series of
Physical Sciences. And certainly Comte has not

CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES. 179

shown this conclusion to be unwarranted. The
views he maintained as to the position, character,
and method of the Science of Mind cannot com-
mend themselves to any competent student. The
arguments from which he inferred that Psychology
is merely a department of Physiology, and may
even be identified with Phrenology, are singularly
weak and irrelevant, and have often been adequately
exposed.

There is a still more penetrating question: Is
there a fixed line or series either of the physical
or psychical sciences? Is there in any group of
the sciences a straight line of succession and neces-
sary order of filiation? Comte maintained that
there is, while Herbert Spencer, in an essay on
"The Genesis of Science," has argued, with great
ingenuity and vigour, that there is not ; that " the
conception of a serial arrangement of the sciences
is a vicious one " ; that " there is no ' one rational
order among a host of possible systems'"; that
" there is no • true filiation of the sciences/ " That
Comte's doctrine is very inadequate and inaccurate
Spencer seems to me to have conclusively shown.
Indeed, a very general inspection of the procedure
of the mind in the formation of the sciences must
suffice to convince us that Comte has erred in his
views as to the filiation of the sciences. The
nature of the connection, or so-called filiation of

180 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

the sciences, must depend on the nature of their
formation or genesis. The former must be simple
or complex according as the latter is simple or
complex. Now Comte supposed the latter to be
simple, while in the positive sciences, both physical
and psychical, it is really and obviously complex.
It is not a single, but a twofold process. In the
formation of any of the positive sciences, since a
positive science is the explanation of facts by laws,
the mind for some time predominantly and always
to some extent follows an ascending direction, rising
from facts to laws, from sense to science. On this
path its instruments are induction and its auxiliary
processes, and with their aid it evolves laws of
ever-increasing comprehensiveness and simplicity.
But the reverse method, the descending order, must
likewise be followed. The results of induction
become the premisses of deduction. The laws in-
ductively reached yield deductive solutions of
problems previously inexplicable. But since the
progress of science thus depends not on one pro-
cess of discovery, but on two processes, the one
the inverse of the other, the order of the evolution
of the sciences must manifestly be very different
from what it would be if determined by a single
process, whether induction or deduction. If the
formation of science were an exclusively induc-
tive process, the law of the development of the

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 181

sciences would be one of continuous movement
from complexity and particularity to simplicity
and generality; if exclusively deductive, the re-
sultant law would be just the opposite, and precisely
what Comte supposed it to be, one of uninterrupted
advance from the general to the special, from the
simple to the complex, from the abstract to the
concrete; but the process of scientific discovery
being both inductive and deductive, the order of
the evolution of the sciences cannot be entirely or
continuously in either of the directions indicated,
and cannot be either so absolute in itself or so
easily ascertainable by us as Comte would have us
to believe. In laying down his law of the filiation
of the sciences he overlooked all that is empirical
and inductive in the sciences, treated each science
as if it had been a single truth, and assumed that
the order of the succession of the sciences was de-
termined solely by pure deductive reason. In all
this he erred most grievously, and simplified his
problem most unduly. If science can be built up
only by the combined resources alike of induction
and deduction, we may be entitled to say, in a
general way, that this science must precede that,
but not to say, in an absolute way, that this whole
science must precede that whole science.

Are we to conclude, then, that Spencer is wholly
right and Comte wholly wrong? That is by no

182 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

means necessary. The association of induction and
deduction, of generalisation and specialisation, of
analysis and synthesis, in the growth of science,
requires us to believe that the sciences spring up
together and influence each other to an extent
unrecognised by Comte, but not to disbelieve that
some sciences are naturally antecedent to others,
or even that the sciences of which the phenomena
are most general and simple must be further de-
veloped than those conversant with phenomena
more special and complex. Biology may not only
develop simultaneously with Physics and Chemis-
try, but even suggest to them problems on the
solution of which their progress is greatly de-
pendent, while yet all its doctrines must be super-
ficial unless based on the teachings of a Physics
and a Chemistry which have attained a relatively
high perfection. Although Comte did not see
with sufficient clearness to what extent the sciences
develop spontaneously and simultaneously, he was
not mistaken in so far as he held that* one fun-
damental science does come before another — on
the whole, although not wholly — and that in
virtue of the relative simplicity, generality, and
independence of the laws which they set forth.
We may assign full weight to all that is true in
the objections urged by Spencer in his criticism of
Comte's scheme of filiation of the sciences, and yet

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 183

reasonably hold that, in the main, it is Comte who
is in the right, and that Spencer's view that there is
no true order of filiation of the sciences is an ex-
aggerated inference from his facts, and implies that
the progress of knowledge is without method or law.
Let us now confine our attention for a moment
to the fundamental physical sciences of Comte —
Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, and Physiology.
It is obvious, I think, that the first — Astronomy —
is not of the same rank as the others. It is not
a science of general properties, but of particular
objects, which is what no fundamental science is.
The fundamental sciences are not classed accord-
ing to individual objects. Every object is com-
plex, and can only be fully explained by the
concurrent application of various sciences. The
stars have a mathematics, physics, and chemistry;
a mineralogy also, and perhaps a botany and
zoology, and conceivably a psychology and soci-
ology. What Comte means by Astronomy is, of
course, only the mathematics and physics of the
stars; but why, then, make it co-ordinate with
the mathematics and physics which include it,
or by their synthesis constitute it? The mathe-
matics and physics of the stars would require to be
entirely distinct from the mathematics and physics
of the earth — i.e., to be no mathematics and physics
at all, but things essentially different, before they

184 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

can be entitled to the place which Comte assigns
them — a place separate from all other mathe-
matics and physics. Even if it were true that
Astronomy became positive science long before
terrestrial physics, this would prove no more than
that it was the simplest and most manageable part
of physics ; it would in nowise prove that it was
no part of physics. But the alleged fact cannot be
made out. For just as it was impossible to under-
stand the geometrical relations of the celestial
bodies while ignorant of the geometrical relations
of terrestrial bodies, so it was impossible to apply
physical conceptions and generalisations to the stars
without having drawn them from our experience of
the earth, or at least without applying them at the
same time to the earth. The laws of motion, weight,
force, &c., which rule in celestial, rule also in ter-
restrial physics. The great law of gravitation,
which regulates the motion of the stars, was,
according to the well-known story, suggested to
Newton by the fall of an apple, and could certainly
not have been ascertained and verified by him if he
had been ignorant of the laws of falling bodies, the
law of the composition of forces, and the law of
centrifugal force, which Galileo and Huygens had
previously discovered to rule terrestrial phenomena.
We must, therefore, strike out Astronomy from the
list of fundamental physical sciences. There then

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 185

remain only Physics, Chemistry, and Biology. Are
these fundamental physical sciences ? Are they the
only fundamental physical sciences ? So far as our
present knowledge goes, we must, I believe, answer
both questions in the affirmative. These sciences
are fundamental, not being able to be resolved into
any other sciences or into one another. They are
the only fundamental physical sciences because the
only irresolvable attributes of matter are physical
forces, chemical affinities, and vital properties. Those
who make a longer list overlook a distinction without
which the whole subject of the relationship of the
sciences must be an inextricable imbroglio — the dis-
tinction between fundamental and derivative, prim-
ary and secondary, simple and complex sciences.

Another French philosopher, contemporaneously Ampfee.
with but quite independently of Comte, strenuously
occupied his mind during many years on the classi-
fication of the sciences, and published, in 1834, the
first part of an Essai sur la Philosophic des Sciences,
the second part of which, completing the work, only
appeared in 1843. This philosopher was the illus-
trious Andr^-Marie Ampere, a man equally remark-
able for the extent and the profundity of his
knowledge, keenly interested in all the sciences, a
brilliant discoverer in several of them, and in par-
ticular, as a thoroughly competent authority, the

186 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

late Principal Forbes, of St Andrews, observed, " at
least as well entitled as any other philosopher who
has yet appeared to be called 'the Newton of
Electricity.'"

M. Ampere proposes his classification as founded
upon a consideration of the sciences themselves. It
is, he conceives, in accordance with the conditions
of natural classification as exhibited, for example,
in Botany. It aims to bring together analogous
sciences, and to group them according to their real
affinities. It is certainly remarkable for its regu-
larity and symmetry. It proceeds thus : All science
has reference to one of two general objects — the
material world and thought. This gives rise to the
natural division of the sciences into sciences of
matter and of thought, or, as Ampere calls them,
cosmological and noological sciences. Hence all our
knowledge is embraced under one or other of two
kingdoms. Each kingdom is in its turn the subject
of a twofold division. The cosmological sciences
separate into those which have for object the in-
animate world, and those which occupy themselves
with the world of life and organisation, the first of
these classes comprehending the mathematical and
the physical sciences, and the second the sciences
relative to natural history and the medical sciences.
In like manner, the sciences of thought divide into
two sub-kingdoms, of which the one includes the

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 187

noological sciences properly so called, and the other
the social sciences. From these spring, in conse-
quence of another division, four branches, as in the
case of the cosmological sciences.

We need not exhibit farther the general scheme.
If we confine our attention to the strictly noological
branch we shall find that it separates into two —
the philosophical and the moral sciences. And if
we confine ourselves to the moral sciences, we find
these also to be two — Ethics and Thelesiology.
Then, Ethics, which embraces all that can be known
relative to the characters, manners, and moral con-
duct of man, divides into two parts — Elementary
Ethics, which includes Ethography and Physiog-
nomony — and Ethognosy, which comprises Practical
Morality and Ethogeny. Thus in Ethics, a science
of the first order, there are, according to Ampfere,
two sciences of the second order and four sciences
of the third order.

In the same way Thelesiology, which is con-
versant with the will, with duty, and the end
of man, embraces two sciences of the second order
— Elementary Thelesiology and Thelesiognosy —
and four of the third order — Thelesiography,
Diceology, Apodictic Morality, and Anthropotelic.
Thus Moral Science comprehends two sciences of
the first order, four of the second order, and eight
of the third order. There can be no doubt that this

188 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

is ingenious, and it is but a very small specimen of
the ingenuity of the scheme as a whole. Every
science of the first class includes, according to
Ampere, four sciences of the third order, and this
alleged fact he explains by an alleged law of scien-
tific thought. Intelligence in examining any sub-
ject whatever must, he holds, follow a process of
four stages. In the first stage, called autoptic,
it is limited to the simple inspection of its objects ;
in the second, the cryptoristic stage, it investigates
their inner and hidden natures; in the third, or
troponomic stage, it traces the changes which they
undergo in time and place, and seeks, from the
experience of these changes, to ascertain their laws
of change ; and in the fourth, or cryptologic stage,
it occupies itself with what is most uncertain, ab-
struse, and difficult to discover in their causality
and destination. These stages consequently corre-
spond to four epochs of intellectual growth in indi-
vidual and social development.

The very regularity of the foregoing scheme is an
objection to it. Nature is less symmetrical than it
represents her to be. She observes order, indeed,
and obeys mathematical laws ; but she does not in-
cessantly go on dividing by two. She is free and
varied in her operations, and none of her secrets of
much value will be discovered by so simple a pro-
cess as a succession of divisions by two. Further

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 189

division is, in Ampere's scheme, pushed to an excess
which tends to defeat the great end of a classifica-
tion of the sciences. That end is so to group and
co-ordinate the sciences that they may be seen to-
gether as harmonious parts of a great whole in which
the universe is truthfully mirrored. But if we pro-
ceed to divide and divide, unsatisfied, as Wordsworth
says, " while littleness may yet become more little,"
we break down all grandeur, destroy all life, and
amid the multiplicity of details lose sight of those
fundamental laws and relations which are most
worthy of our study. If Ampere had divided less
he would certainly have succeeded much better in
his attempt to form a philosophy of the sciences.
The elaborateness of his scheme weighed him down
and prevented his rising to a general doctrine ex-
hibiting the unity of science and reflecting the unity
of the universe. He found that even in two volumes
he could do no more than give a general idea of each
of the multitude of sciences to which he assigned
a place, although aware that an exposition of the
fundamental truths and general methods of science
is essential in a philosophy of the sciences. If the
trees did not hide from himself the forest, they cer-
tainly prevented him from describing it to others.

The scheme under consideration has, however,
even greater defects than those just indicated. One
is that it makes no distinction between arts and

190

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES,

sciences, but treats the former as of the same nature
and as to be placed on the same level and ranked in
the same line with the latter. It represents, for
example, Technology as following Chemistry and
preceding Natural History, and often thus puts arts
and sciences side by side- This ignoring of the true
relationship of science and art — this confounding of
knowledge and its application, of the quid and quid
hwri — renders a true classification of the sciences
absolutely impossible. And it involves another
error as great as itself — the ignoring of the distinc-
tion between fundamental and derivative sciences.
Unless the arts are separated from the sciences the
sciences themselves cannot be distributed into funda-
mental and derivative. To set aside the distinction
between dependent and independent at one point
of the scheme is to necessitate its being set aside
throughout.

It would not be difficult to show that Ampere's
sciences of the third order are seldom natural divi-
sions of his sciences of the first order. In fact, the
very conception of there being in each science of the
first order four sciences of the third order corre-
sponding to four distinct points of view from which
their common subject may be studied is illusive.
Even conceding the four points of view, it cannot be
reasonably held that there are separate sciences to
correspond to them. The points of view represent

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES. 191

only stages of the scientific process ; they are only
the series of steps by which science is attained.
Science corresponds to the process as a whole, not to
any particular point or stage of it. Science may
well begin with the simple inspection of objects, and
must, of course, end with their full comprehension ;
but this is not the slightest reason for supposing,
as Amp&re does, that there are sciences of simple
inspection and sciences of full comprehension —
autoptic sciences and cryptologic sciences. With
all his knowledge and ingenuity Ampfere failed to
classify the sciences aright, and still more to found a
philosophy of the sciences. His work, however, is
most instructive, and not unworthy even of his
great reputation.

The celebrated socialist, P. J. Proudhon, published Proudhon.
in 1843 a work entitled De la Creation de VOrdre
dans FHumanitS, in which traces of the influence
both of Comte and Ampere are deeply marked.
Comte's law of three states is unqualifiedly adopted
in substance, although the terms in which it is
expressed are changed, metaphysic being called
philosophy or sophistic, and the doctrine of the
sciences or positive philosophy being designated
metaphysic, so that in Proudhon's phraseology
the Comtist law runs thus : " Religion, philosophy,
science ; faith, sophistic, and method (metaphysic)

192 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

— such are the three moments of knowledge, the
three epochs of the education of the human race."
Ampere's classification of the sciences is expounded
and highly commended. At the same time, it is
held not to be the absolute or only true classification
of them. " The mind," says Proudhon, " may find
in Nature a multitude of systems, according to the
point of view which it takes up, although Nature
herself follows none of them exclusively. " He under-
takes, in particular, to show that for the quaternary
distribution of Ampere a ternary may be substituted,
not less natural, regular, and precise. Of this ternary
classification he would make the ordinary distribu-
tion into kingdoms in Natural History — mineral,
vegetable, and animal — the basis, and then would
divide the sciences, according as they are descriptive
or declarative of phenomena, or as they study forces,
motions, progress, changes, or as they formulate laws
and determine relations. In other words, he would
reduce Ampere's four points or stages of the scientific
process to three, but retain his vicious principle of
regarding such mere points or stages as the roots
of distinct sciences. He has not exhibited his
ternary classification in detail, but he professes to
have worked through the whole scheme of Ampere,
changing it everywhere from quaternary to ternary
— " absolutely as if I had transcribed our decimal
arithmetic into a duodecimal arithmetic." This I

PROM BENTHAM TO GIOBERTI. 193

can readily believe, although I would infer from it
not, as Proudhon does, that both systems are alike
natural, but that both are alike arbitrary. ^^^

J. Duval- Jouve in his Traitide Logique> ou Essai Duval.
sur la Thforie de la Science, 1844, has dealt with
the classification of the sciences in pp. 374-393. He
distributes them into cosmological and noological
sciences, and subdivides the former into mathe-
matical and physical classes. That is manifestly
insufficient. The work, however, can be safely com-
mended for its judicious counsels as to the study
of the sciences of reasoning and of physical and
psychological observation.

Two Italian philosophers of rare genius, and whose RownfoL
influence on the thought and life of their nation was
great and salutary, — Antonio Rosmini and Vincenzo
Gioberti, — now claim our attention ; but, of course,
only in so far as they have dealt with the special
problem which at present concerns us. Neither
dealt with it as an independent problem, only to
be solved by a comparative study of the sciences
themselves; on the contrary, both professedly
evolved their classification of the sciences from the
fundamental principle of their philosophies. That
seems to me an altogether illegitimate procedure,
resting on an assumption as to the relation of phil-

N

194 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

osophy to the sciences just the reverse of the
truth.

Rosmini's views on the classification of the
sciences are to be found in his New Essay on the
Origin of Ideas (first edition, 1830), Philosophical
System (first edition, 1845), and Logic (first edition,
1854), the first two of which have appeared in Eng-
lish. On the ground that every cognition must
have matter and form, he represented the sciences
as primarily divisible into material and formal;
and on the ground that the form of cognition is
at once the source of all intelligence and alone
knowable per se, he held that the science of the
form must precede all other sciences and supply
the principle of their encyclopaedic arrangement.
This first science, which he called Ideology, he re-
garded as the only pure science, all other sciences
being in relation to it only applied sciences. But
he was not content merely with this division, and
so proposed another corresponding to the aspects of
Being, that one necessary and objective form of
intelligence to which he believed all the other forms
of cognition could be reduced, and also to the
modes of mental activity by which these aspects
of Being are apprehended. Thus, viewing Being as
ideal, real, and moral, and intelligence as possessed
of intuition, perception, and reason, he classified
the sciences in the following threefold manner:

FROM BBNTHAM TO GIOBERTI. 195

1. Sciences of intuition, which treat of the ideal
and include Ideology and Logic; 2. Sciences of
perception, which treat of the real and comprehend
Psychology and Cosmology; and, 3. Sciences of
reasoning, which treat of what is only discoverable
through inference and may be subdivided into
Ontological and Deontological Sciences. The Math-
ematical Sciences have no place in the scheme, nor
even the Physical Sciences, the Kosminian Cosmo-
logy being only a department of Metaphysics. The
Ontological Sciences are said to be Ontology,
properly so called, and Natural Theology. The
Deontological Sciences are those which treat of the
perfection of being, and of the way in which this
perfection may be acquired and lost; and as they
are distributed in a somewhat minute and decidedly
artificial manner, it may suffice to say that they
comprehend not only Moral sciences usually so
called, but ^Esthetic sciences, Political sciences,
Pedagogics, and Economy. Language and history
are not represented as the special objects of distinct
sciences, but a scientific study of history is recog-
nised to be an important means of advancing the
Philosophy of Politics.

To Gioberti the first principle of Bosmini seemed QiobertL
a vain abstraction and his method essentially false ;
and he resolved for his own part to start not with

196 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

indeterminate ideal being, but with an object at
once ideal and real, and to evolve what it implied,
not by a psychological method, which can only
reflect the mind's attention to itself, but by the
only true philosophical method, the ontological,
which reflects the nature and manifestation of the
object. He deemed that he found at once a point
of departure and a law of procedure satisfying the
requirements of the case in a synthetic judgment,
comprehensive of all being and knowledge, for
which the appropriate expression is the ideal for-
mula Ens creat existentias — Being creates exist-
ences. In his Introduzione alle studio della Filosofia
(vol. iii. cap. v.), published in 1840, he has ex-
plained how the sciences may be arranged in accord-
ance with his formula. It is by a method which, if
not eminently satisfactory, is at least eminently
easy. The ideal formula is itself the "suprema
formula enciclopedica" and all sciences, it is held,
may be directly referred to one or other of its
terms. The subject (Being) is the theme of Philo-
sophy Proper, which includes the sciences of Onto-
logy and Theology. The copula (Creates) yields
the sciences which are concerned with the relation-
ship of Being to Existences and of Existences to
Being, the relationship of Being to Existences being
treated of by the Science of time and space (Mathe-
matics), and the relationship of Existences to Being

PROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 197

by the Sciences of the true, the good, and the
beautiful (Logic, Ethic, and ^Esthetics). The pre-
dicates (Existences) originate the sciences which are
conversant with the effects or results of the creative
act— namely, Psychology, Cosmology, and the various
special Physical Sciences. Besides these Rational
Sciences there are Super-Rational Sciences based on
revelation ; they are, however, to be classified in the
same manner as the Rational Sciences. Such is the
scheme of classification proposed by Gioberti. It
has various obvious faults, but these it seems unne-
cessary to specify, seeing that the foundation of the
whole scheme is utterly untrustworthy. The " ideal
formula," on which everything is made to depend, is
admittedly the expression of an act of mystic intui-
tion, and really an arbitrary affirmation.

V. FROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER.

Dr William Whewell, a man of extraordinary wheweii.
versatility, industry, and knowledge, published in
1837 a History of the Inductive Sciences, and in
1840 a Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. In
the latter he treated of the classification of the
sciences. The work was greatly altered, even in
the arrangement of its parts, in the third edition,
where the discussion of the problem and the classi-

198 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

fication proposed will be found in the volume en-
titled Novum Organon Renovatum, B. II. ch. ix.
" The classification depends neither upon the facul-
ties of the mind to which the separate parts of
our knowledge owe their origin, nor upon the
objects which each science contemplates, but upon
a more natural and fundamental element — namely,
the Ideas which each science involves. The Ideas
regulate and connect the facts, and are the founda-
tions of the reasoning, in each science." It is not
necessary, Dr Whewell observes, that the Idea on
which a science is founded should be an absolutely
ultimate principle of thought, or that it should be
the only Idea involved in the science. "Each
science may involve, not only the Ideas or Con-
ceptions which are placed opposite to it in the
list, but also all which precede it." WhewelTs
groups of sciences are as follows : 1. Pure Mathe-
matical Sciences, including Geometry, Arithmetic,
Algebra, and Differentials, and based on the ideas
of space, time, number, sign, and limit. 2. Pure
Motional Sciences, including Pure Mechanism and
Formal Astronomy, and based on the idea of
motion. 3. Mechanical Sciences, including Statics,
Dynamics, Hydrostatics, Hydrodynamics, and Physi-
cal Astronomy, based on the ideas of force, matter,
inertia, and fluid pressure, which are modifications
of the idea of cause. 4. Secondary Mechanical

FROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 199

Sciences, including Acoustics, Optics, Thermotics,
and Atmology, and based on the ideas of outness,
medium of sensation, intensity of qualities, and
scales of qualities. 5. Analytico-Mechanical Sciences,
including Electricity, Magnetism, and Galvanism,
and based on the idea of polarity. This group
and the immediately preceding one may, it is indi-
cated, be brought into connection as constituting
the two branches of Physics. 6. Analytical Science,
identified with Chemistry, and held to correspond
with the ideas of element, chemical affinity, and
substance or atoms. 7. The Analytico-Classifica-
tory Sciences — namely, Crystallography and Sys-
tematic Mineralogy, which have symmetry and
likeness for ideas. 8. The Classificatory Sciences —
namely, Systematic Botany, Systematic Zoology,
and Comparative Anatomy, which have as their
ideas degrees of likeness and natural affinity. 9.
The Organical Sciences, or Biology, founded on
the ideas of vital power, assimilation, irritability,
organisation, and final cause. 10. Metaphysics,
coincident with Psychology, and corresponding to
the ideas emotion and thought. 11. The Palsetio-
logical Sciences, comprehending Geology, Distri-
bution of plants and animals, Glossology, and
Ethnography, and springing from the idea of his-
torical causation. And, 12. Natural Theology,
which rests on the idea of a first cause.

200 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

In examining this scheme its fundamental as-
sumption, that each science presupposes a special
a priori idea, is by no means found to be borne
out. Reasons to doubt its truth soon present
themselves. Suspicion thereof is forced on us by
Dr Whewell himself, even in regard to the mathe-
matical sciences. Algebra, for example, rests, he
tells us, on the a priori idea of sign. But is
Sign an a priori idea ? And if so, will it not be
difficult to discover any a posteriori idea ? Natur-
ally, however, as soon as Dr Whewell passed beyond
the province of mathematics his difficulties greatly
increased; and, in fact, with every forward step
he took the ineptness and inapplicability of the
principle he had assumed were made more mani-
fest. He soon reached sciences which he had to
refer to things never heard of before as a priori
or fundamental ideas — e.g., fluid pressure, medium
of sensation, intensity of qualities, polarity, atoms,
&c. The mental sciences he wisely refrained from
attempting to subdivide or trace to root ideas.
There are other serious defects in WhewelTs scheme.
Thus, Mechanical Science and Analytical or Chemi-
cal Science have no higher rank assigned them
than Secondary Mechanical Science and Analytico-
Mechanical Science; that is to say, they are put
on a level with sciences which are only branches
or applications or combinations of themselves.

FROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 201

Then there follow as Analytico-Classificatory and
Classificatory Sciences what are simply the un-
scientific parts of Mineralogy, Botany, and Physi-
ology. Observation, classification, and description
of phenomena are not science, although they neces-
sarily precede it. Anatomy, for instance, regarded
merely as descriptive, is a subordinate science; it
is the series of observations and classifications pre-
paratory to the science of Physiology; it is no
more a complete science than would be a descrip-
tion of the lines and figures employed in Geometry.
Then, tracing the scheme a little farther, we find
Metaphysics identified with Psychology, which in
reality amounts to the entire elimination of Meta-
physics ; and Geology and the Science of the dis-
tribution of plants and animals appearing, as
Palaetiological Sciences, after Metaphysics or Psy-
chology, quite separated from Mineralogy, Botany,
and Zoology, with which one would naturally have
expected them conjoined, and with which they are
certainly in much closer connection than with Meta-
physics or Psychology. It savours of the ludicrous
to represent Natural Theology as in closer contact
with the Palaeontological Sciences than with any
others, on the ground that they are conversant
with historical causes and it with the first cause.
There is, finally, an objection of wider sweep which
I have not time to work out. Whewell fixes the

202 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

order of the sciences by referring them to what
he deems their corresponding ideas. But how has
he determined the order of the ideas ? And has he
determined it aright? It would be easy to show
that he arranged them in a haphazard way, with
extremely little regard to their rational connections.

Lubbock. The Remarks on the Classification of the Different
Branches of Human Knowledge, published in 1838
by J. W. Lubbock, possess hardly any value. The
general division of the classification recommended
is into History, Philosophy, and Fine Arts ; and
Philosophy is subdivided into Religion, Juris-
prudence, Intellectual, Moral, and Political Phil-
osophy, Logic, Mathematics, Natural Philosophy,
Natural History, Medicine, and Arts, Trade, and
Manufactures.

Lindiay. In Progression by Antagonism, published by the
late Earl of Crawford (when Lord Lindsay) in 1846,
a "classification of human thought" is put forth
based on the general theory of development ex-
pounded in that exceedingly interesting book.
While the admission is made that no art or
science springs from imagination alone or reason
alone, it is also held that each art or science
must be distinguished by and classed under the
predominant faculty which originates it. Spirit
ruling sense predominantly by imagination gives
rise to Symbolism, Fine Arts, Rhetoric, Poetry,

FROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 203

and History; ruling predominantly by reason to
Science, which is Speculative or Pure and Practi-
cal or Applied, both subdivisible into Physical
and Metaphysical, each of which contains many
separate sciences; and ruling by reason and
imagination in harmonious co-operation to Phil-
osophy, also to be distributed into Speculative
and Practical. The order of classification is said
to be " determinable by that in which the in-
dividual, national, and universal mind applies
itself to the respective arts and sciences."

In 1847 the late Sir George Ramsay published Ramsay.
A Classification of the Sciences, in Six Tables.
The primary division is into : 1. Mental Sciences ;
2. Physical Sciences ; and 3. Mathematics. It does
not seem to have occurred to the author that, even
if these were the chief classes of the sciences, the
order in which they are arranged is the reverse of
natural. Theology finds a place only under Moral
Philosophy, one of the mental sciences. The group-
ing is altogether of an external and unphilosophical
kind.

In 1844 Schopenhauer, in the second edition of Schopen
his chief work, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,
proposed a scheme of distribution of the sciences
which, perhaps, deserves to be noted only as an
ingenious curiosity. Schopenhauer, it has been
said, accepted one of Kant's categories, and threw

204 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

the other eleven out of the window. It is on his
one working principle of the sufficient reason that he
hangs his scheme of classification. Every science
is regarded as exemplifying predominantly one of
the forms of that principle. The main division
is into I. Pure a priori sciences, and II. Empirical
or a posteriori sciences. The former are subdivided
into (1) the doctrine of the principle of Being in (a)
Space — Geometry, and in (6) Time — Arithmetic and
Algebra; and (2) the doctrine of the principle of
knowledge — Logic. The latter are concerned with
the principle of becoming, or law of causality, and
in its three forms of cause, stimulus, and motive.
Hence they are grouped as follows : (1) The
doctrine of causes, (a) General : Mechanics, Hy-
drodynamics, Physics, Chemistry. (6) Special :
Astronomy, Mineralogy, Geology, Technology,
Pharmacy. (2) The doctrine of stimuli (a) General :
Vegetable and Animal Physiology, with Anatomy
as auxiliary science. (6) Special : Botany, Zoology,
Comparative Physiology, Pathology, Therapeutics.
(3) The doctrine of motives, (a) General : Ethics,
Psychology. (6) Special : Jurisprudence, History.

p. E. Dove. Patrick Edward Dove, in his Theory of Human
Progression (1850), — published at first anonymously,
but afterward acknowledged, — treated the problem
under consideration with great clearness and vigour.

PROM WHEWBLL TO ZBLLER. 205

The general aim of his work was to show the natural
probability of the coming of a reign of justice, — the
advent of a moral millennium, — and, as essential to
this, to prove that there is a natural progression
of the mind in the extension of its knowledge and
the improvement of its practice. Such a progression
implied, according to Mr Dove, the consecutive evolu-
tion of the sciences and their logical dependence on
each other. The classification which he proposed
rested on the principle that every science must have
a distinctive object-noun, the place of which among
the categories of the mind determines the place of
the science among the series of the sciences. The
object-noun of a science is the primary condition
of its existence, and of the forms of that noun the
science exclusively treats. The connection of object-
nouns is such that the sciences follow in a deter-
minate order, the one in which they must necessarily
be studied and also that in which they must neces-
sarily be discovered. It is an order of ever-increasing
complexity, each later science including not only its
own distinctive concept, but those of all the sciences
which precede it. Thus, Logic is the first and simplest
science. Arithmetic is nothing more than Logic
applied to number. Algebra is Logic and Arithmetic
applied to quantity. Geometry (in its larger sense)
is Logic, Arithmetic, and Algebra applied to space.
Statics is Logic, Arithmetic, Algebra, and Geometry

206 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

applied to force. And if we look at the object-
nouns or substantive concepts we shall find,
according to Mr Dove, that Logic has two branches,
the one treating of identity and the other of equality;
that Arithmetic adds to identity and equality num-
ber; Algebra to identity, equality, and number
quantity ; Geometry to identity, equality, number,
and quantity space ; and Statics to all these forces.
" In this order," we are told, " the mathematical
sciences must necessarily be classed, and in this
order the mathematical sciences must necessarily
be discovered. Ten thousand men originating the
mathematical sciences by a process of independent
investigation would necessarily discover them in
this order ; and were ten thousand worlds peopled
with human beings to go through the process of
making anew the mathematical sciences, every one
of those human races would pass through the same
intellectual course, and evolve the abstract sciences
exactly in the same necessary order. The constitu-
tion of human reason forbids that it should be
otherwise, one science being impossible until its
antecedent is so well known as to be capable of
subjective operation. Thus, unless the laws of
identity are known, there can be no investigation
of the laws of equality; and until the laws of
equality are known, there can be no investigation
of the laws of number ; and until Arithmetic is

FROM WHEWELL TO 2ELLEE. 207

known, there can be no investigation of the laws of
quantity ; and until the laws of quantity are known,
there can be no investigation into the relations of
space ; and until Geometry is known, there can be
no Statics."

The sciences which have just been mentioned
— the mathematical sciences — are all devoid of
any idea derived from sense. When, however,
they are applied to the substantives and opera-
tions of real life, they originate another order of
sciences — the physical sciences — which arise one
after another in similar order of complexity. The
first and simplest of these sciences is Dynamics,
which is closely connected with the last of the
mathematical sciences — Statics — Statics dealing
with forces which neutralise each other, and
Dynamics with forces which produce motion, the
simplest and most universal function of matter. It
is by adding to motion one physical characteristic
after another that the physical sciences are con-
secutively evolved. Thus, add to it weight or
resistance, the next most general property, and you
have Mechanics ; add still further sound, light, and
heat, and you have as corresponding sciences
Acoustics, Optics, and Thermology; add again
magnetic force, electric force, and affinity, and you
have the sciences of Magnetism, Electricity, and
Chemistry; and these three sciences are, in their

208 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

turn, the necessary preparations for a new, a third
order of sciences — the sciences of organisation —
comprehending Vegetable and Animal Physiology.
These again lead to another, a fourth order of
sciences, the man -sciences, or sciences of human
action, which are a sensational and inductive
science called Political Economy and conversant
with utility, and a moral and deductive science
called Politics and conversant with equity. The
last science is Theology. It closes and completes
the book of science properly so called. But beyond
science lies Critical Philosophy. Science is direct
and spontaneous, and seeks only to determine what
is true in that which it makes its object, whether
mind or matter; whereas Philosophy is subjective
and reflective, and inquires not into the truth of
thought, but into its form and mechanism, endeav-
ouring with the whole mass received from the whole
circle of the sciences to read aright the phenomenon
of knowledge.

The scheme of Dove, it will have been remarked,
has an obvious resemblance to that of Whewell.
It proceeds throughout on the same assumption,
although that assumption is applied with much
greater tact and plausibility by Dove than by
Whewell. These two objections may be urged
against the scheme as a whole : 1. The conception
of object-nouns on which it rests is erroneous. An

PROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 209

object-noun is implied to be something very different
from what is ordinarily meant by the object of a
science — namely, that about which the science is
conversant; it is supposed to be some single idea
the application of which to appropriate objects
constitutes science. But it is only of the purely
abstract sciences that this can be with any appear-
ance even of truth maintained. Inductive science
at least originates in no such way ; it needs only an
object in the sense of a certain kind of material
subject to laws discoverable by the inductive
process. 2. More even than the scheme of Comte
that of Dove is vitiated by the hypothesis that the
order of the formation of the sciences is absolutely
fixed and necessary, proceeding on one straight
line, and incapable of being other than it is.
Comte only makes his scheme exclusively rational
and deductive in the working of it out and by
taking no account of induction as counteractive of
deduction, whereas Dove lays down a priori prin-
ciples and a deductive procedure as the very
groundwork of his whole system. In so doing
he builds upon the sand. Reason shows that the
order of the formation of the sciences must be
different from what he affirms it to be. Facts
prove that it is different. Spencer, in his masterly
criticism of the Comtist classification, has decisively
established the truth of both of these affirmations.

o

210 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

Let us now look a little at the details of Mr
Dove's scheme. Logic is placed at the head of the
sciences; it is said to be the first, because the
simplest, of the sciences. But simplest in this case
means most abstract, and the most abstract, instead
of being always first, is generally last. That Logic
is more abstract than Arithmetic, Algebra, and
Geometry, instead of being a conclusive reason for
supposing it to be in the order of study and dis-
covery before them, is a reason for suspecting it to
be behind them. And, in fact, both Arithmetic and
Geometry preceded it. If it be said there can be
no reasoning in number or space which does not
presuppose identity and equality, the answer is
twofold, for, first, in a more relevant sense identity
and equality presuppose number, space, and other
concepts regarded as later, since one thing is not
identical with or equal to another unless identical
or equal in number, space, &c. ; and, secondly, it
needs no science to give us the notions of identity
or equality before we can proceed to study any
other science, as these notions are firmly and oper-
atively in our minds before all science.

Then, further, why confine Logic to reasoning
in identity and equality? Why not extend it to
all reasoning? It will be said, because Arithmetic
is conversant with reasoning in numbers, Algebra
with reasoning in quantity, Geometry with reason-

FROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 211

ing in space, &c. But no ; these sciences are con-
versant with number, quantity, space, and their
laws, while reasoning and its laws in number,
quantity, space, or any other concept or matter,
are the object of Logic, which is therefore not,
strictly speaking, before any science, but pervasive
of all science, having to trace the connective
tissue of all knowledge, the forms and methods
of all sciences. This view of it, however, would
have quite deranged Mr Dove's serial arrange-
ment. It leaves, likewise, no place for his phil-
osophy; for, according to him, it is Philosophy
which has to do with the form and method of
thought. If, therefore, he had taken a sufficiently
comprehensive view of Logic he would have seen
that it included and fulfilled all the functions
which he assigned to Philosophy.

As to the sciences grouped as Mathematical
— Arithmetic, Algebra, Geometry, and Statics — it
is obvious to remark that important mathematical
sciences are entirely omitted; and that to de-
scribe Algebra as Logic and Arithmetic applied
to quantity, or Geometry as Logic, Arithmetic,
and Algebra applied to space, conveys no meaning,
and cannot be asserted to be erroneous only be-
cause unintelligible. Dove represents Arithmetic
as the first of the mathematical sciences, whereas
Whewell, it will be remembered, assigns that

212 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

honour to Geometry. Both are, perhaps, right
and both wrong. Either science may have origin-
ated before the other, or they may have been of
simultaneous origin and growth. Statics is not a
mathematical science at all. Instead of force being,
as Dove supposes, a mathematical conception and
motion, the first and simplest of physical concep-
tions, it is motion which is the mathematical and
force which is the physical conception. There is a
science of pure motion, the science now generally
called Kinematics ; and it is a mathematical science,
not only because it treats of motion, displacement,
and deformature, tortuosity, and curvature, alto-
gether independently of force, mass, elasticity,
temperature, magnetism, electricity, which are all
physical attributes, the first not less than~the last.
The arrangement of the Physical Sciences is also
defective. In particular, secondary sciences are put
on a level or equality of rank with those of which
they are branches, or at least from which they are
derived. Passing from the Physical Sciences, Psy-
chology is found to have been omitted altogether,
although it must be regarded as the very foundation
of the so-called Man-Sciences. There can be no
science of human actions if there be none of human
nature. Yet Psychology is not merely a Man-
Science. There is a Comparative Psychology as
certainly as there is a Comparative Physiology.

FROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 213

The sphere of Psychology includes every fact of
sensation, every form of consciousness, animal as
well as human ; it has to do with the psychical life
of all sentient creatures from the animalcule to the
man. This of itself shows that it must always be
arbitrary to make an exclusive instead of an in-
clusive group of Man - Sciences. In his Theory
of Human Progression, Dove ranked Politics or
Ethics as one of the Man -Sciences, erroneously
identifying Politics and Ethics. It is curious to
observe how, in his Elements of Political Science,
published four years later, he gave Ethics or
Politics a quite different position. He placed it,
in this latter treatise, as an abstract science immedi-
ately after Statics ; in other words, he ranked it as
a mathematical science, and held that, owing to the
ideal character of its truths, it stands on a higher
level than the mental or other inductive sciences.

M. Couraot, a man of remarkable capacity both Coumot
for philosophical speculation and scientific research,
treated of the co-ordination of the departments of
human knowledge in his Essai sur les fondements
de nos connaissances (torn. ii. ch. xx.-xxii.), pub-
lished in 1851. He followed to some extent Bacon,
and to a much larger extent Amp&re, although he
also criticised both with characteristic acuteness and
independence. He may be said to have adopted,

214 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

in the main, Ampere's classification, but with
numerous and important modifications which are
mostly decided improvements. He rejected "the
artifice of bifurcation." Instead of commingling
and confounding, as Ampere did, arts and sciences,
he entirely separated them. He attempted to dis-
tinguish carefully between science strictly so called
and history, and founded on the distinction a divi-
sion of the sciences into two great series — namely,
(a) a cosmological and historical series and (6) a
theoretical series. There are thus three parallel
series of the kinds or divisions of knowledge — a
technical series, a cosmological and historical series,
and a theoretical series. Our author did not apply
the distinction between science and philosophy, like
that between science and history, as a principle of
classification. For that his reason was that philos-
ophy cannot be sharply separated from science, while
history can. Philosophy, he held, has no special
object of its own ; is not a science or group or series
of sciences ; but is an indispensable element of all
sciences ; lies at their root, pervades their ramifica-
tions, and reaches to their summits. The series of
theoretical sciences he divided into five groups —
the mathematical, physical, biological, noologicaJ,
and political sciences. Psychology he placed among
the biological, not the noological sciences; on the
other hand, he regarded Natural Theology as a

FROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 215

noological science. Few of his groups seem to com-
prehend just the sciences which they ought to con-
tain ; but the distribution as a whole has very great
merits.

An American author, Prof. W. D. Wilson, pub- wikon.
lished in New York, in 1856, an Elementary
Treatise of Logic, which contains, in its last chapter,
a classification of both Sciences and Arts. They
are divided into three classes — namely, Theoretical
Sciences, Practical Sciences, and Productive Arts;
so that the scheme is essentially a modernised re-
production of the Aristotelian distribution of phil-
osophy. Each of the three classes, we are told,
" naturally divides itself into two departments, dif-
fering in the first class, both in the starting-point
and in the method ; in the second class they differ
in the starting-point only; and in the third class
the two departments differ chiefly in the object in
view — the one producing objects of beauty, and the
other objects of utility." The departments of the
Theoretical Sciences are : 1. Exact Sciences, and, 2.
Pure Sciences. The former includes Meteorology,
Ouranography, Geology, Geography, Chemistry,
Mineralogy, Anatomy, Physiology, Botany, Zoology,
Ethnology, Psychology, and History; the latter
Arithmetic, Geometry, Algebra, Calculus, Trigono-
metry, Analytic Geometry, Analytics, Method, and
Ontology. The departments of the Practical Sciences

216 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

are: 1. Mixed Sciences, and, 2. Ethical Sciences.
The former comprehends Mechanics, Astronomy,
Hydrostatics, Hydraulics, Pneumatics, Acoustics,
and Optics; the latter Ethics, Polity, Natural Re-
ligion, Jurisprudence, Church Polity, and Revealed
Religion. The departments of the Productive Arts
are : 1. Fine Arts, and 2, Useful Arts. The former
contains Gardening, Architecture, Sculpture, Paint-
ing, Music, and Poetry ; and the latter Agriculture,
Metallurgy, Technology, Typography, Engraving,
Commerce, Medicine, Rhetoric, Political Economy,
and War. This scheme is much inferior to that
of Cournot. It is impossible to regard the order in
which the sciences are arranged in it as the order
in which they have been discovered, or that in
which they should be studied, or as a natural order
of any kind. A number of the so-called Exact
Sciences are obviously and necessarily less exact
than the so-called Pure Sciences and Mixed Sciences.
The designation Exact Sciences is an infelicitous
one, as all science is only science on condition of
being exact.

There is nothing on our subject worth mentioning
in the hazy and confused Organismus der Wissen-
schaft which Adolf Helfferich published in 1856.
Science he defines as " the rational or ideal repro-
duction of the real human personality," and, there-
fore, holds that " the organism (Gliedbau) of science

FROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 217

must correspond to the organisation (Gliederung) of
the human being/'

In Sir Wm. Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, Hamilton,
published in 1859, but delivered from 1836-37, there
is a classification (see Lect. VII.) which, although
comprehending only the mental sciences, may be
noticed here, because if good for the mental sciences
it should be equally good for the physical sciences.
On the other hand, if no physical philosopher would
think of arranging the sciences with which he is
conversant as referring to the facts, the laws, and
the results of the material world, or, in other words,
as phsenomenological, nomological, and ontological ;
if, on the contrary, he must recognise that such an
arrangement would contravene every true notion of
what science is, it may be inferred that such an
arrangement of the mental sciences cannot be more
tenable, less unscientific, less destructive of every
true notion of the nature of science. Let us con-
sider, however, Hamilton's classification in itself,

He starts from the common but erroneons notion
that philosophy is equivalent to mental science.
Then he proceeds to divide and distribute philos-
ophy thus understood on the supposition that mind
or consciousness yields us facts, laws, and results.
If we deal merely with the facts or phenomena of
mind, we have a mental science or department of
mental science which may be called the Phranomen-

218 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

ology of Mind, but is generally known as Psy-
chology. Its divisions correspond to the classes of
mental phenomena — cognitions, feelings, conative
powers. If we deal with the laws of mind we have
a Nomology of Mind, Nomological Psychology, which
comprises within itself three different Nomologies —
one of cognition, Logic ; one of feeling, ^Esthetics ;
and one of conation, Practical Philosophy, or Ethics
and Politics. If we deal with the results or infer-
ences which the facts of mind or consciousness
warrant, we have Ontology, Metaphysics Proper,
Inferential Psychology.

Such is the classification of Sir Wm. Hamilton.
None of its divisions, major or minor, seem to me
correctly drawn.

Begin with the first, the Phenomenology of
Mind, erroneously identified with Psychology.
What sort of science can that be which deals
only with facts or phenomena, which deals with
them to the exclusion of laws ? There can be no
science where there are no laws. Science consists
in the knowledge of laws. A mere phsenomen-
ology, either of matter or mind, however exten-
sive, however exhaustive, can have no title to be
deemed science. Psychology is not such a phe-
nomenology of mind, just because it labours to
discover the laws of mind, yea, the most hidden,
the essential, and ultimate laws of mind. The

PROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 219

separation of facts and laws in science — the assign-
ing of facts to one science and of laws to another —
involves not only a false division of the sciences,
but the mutilation and destruction of the very idea
and life of science, since science is essentially the
union of facts and laws, the explanation of facts
by laws.

As to the particular divisions of the Nomology,
not one of them seems accurately drawn. How
can Logic, for example, be called a Nomology of
the cognitive powers ? On no reasonable view of
it, and not even on Sir Wm. Hamilton's own view
of it. Logic he held to be the science of the formal
laws of thought, and by thought he meant only
what is strictly termed discursive thought. In
other words, he regarded and treated it as the
science of some of the laws of one of the processes
of one of the cognitive faculties, yet in his scheme
of classification represented it to be the science of
all the laws of all the processes of all the cognitive
faculties.

^Esthetics and Ethics are both only in part
psychological. The distinctive objects and prin-
ciples of both can no more be evolved out of
any psychological process than out of any physio-
logical or other physical process. And, on the
other hand, the properly psychological province of
^Esthetics is not inclusive of all the laws of feel-

220 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

ing, and yet comprehensive of laws of perception,
imagination, and reason; and the psychological
provinces of Ethics and Politics are neither limited
to nor everywhere as extended as the reign of the
laws of action.

Then the Inferential Psychology of Sir Wm.
Hamilton does not seem to answer to Meta-
physics Proper. Metaphysics is not usually con-
ceived of as a science of results, but as a science
of principles. It is almost universally supposed to
be occupied with the conditions of all science, which
is a very different thing from consisting of the
inferences from a particular science. There is a
science which deals with the results of all other
sciences — a science to which the ultimate conclu-
sions of every science are data from which it draws
its own inferences. That science is Natural Theo-
logy. When the scientific specialist has reached his
highest generalisations, the theologian receives them
from him, and, by showing that they are to be
regarded as expressions of the manifestation of God-
head, surrounds them with a halo of Divine glory.
Metaphysics is quite a different science, being con-
versant not with what thus overlies, but with
what underlies our knowledge of contingent things.
Hence Sir Wm. Hamilton's description of Meta-
physics answers not at all to Metaphysics, but
slightly to Natural Theology. And it will be ob-

FROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 221

served that both the instances which he gives as
specimens of the inferences with which Metaphysics
is concerned are not metaphysical, but theological
truths — the existence of God and the immortality
of the soul. But while Hamilton's Metaphysics
answers slightly to Natural Theology, it is only
slightly and badly, seeing that the truths of Natural
Theology ought to be drawn from the results not of
psychological science alone, but of all science. All
things tell us of God. The mind, indeed, always
draws the inference which relates to Him, but it
does not always draw it from itself. Further, Sir
Wm. Hamilton's Inferential Psychology, as described
by himself, is not a psychological science, is not a
division of Psychology. Its inferences relate to
realities beyond the mind, while explanatory of
mind; its truths are reached through truths of
Psychology, but are not truths of Psychology. Sir
Wm. Hamilton's classification, in fact, is erroneous
from beginning to end — erroneous in its root and in
all its ramifications.

The late M. Charles Renouvier, a vigorous and Renouyiar.
acute thinker who developed and applied the doc-
trine of phenomenalism with a comprehensiveness
and consistency probably unequalled, dealt with the
subject of the rational classification of the sciences
in the second of his Essais de Critique G4nSrcUe 9

222 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

the TraitS de Psychohgie Rationnelle (ch. xviiL),
first published in 1859. 1 He entirely rejected
Comtek hypothesis of a hierarchy of the sciences,
and regarded their classification as purely a question
of logical arrangement. He describes what he calls
General Criticism (La Critique GSnSrate) as "the
common trunk of all the sciences." It has to
analyse the universal conditions of knowledge ; to
study the general nature and laws of experience ;
and to treat specially of the categories of relation,
personality, causality, and finality. From this trunk
spring two great branches of sciences — the logical
and the physical — which differ not only in their
objects, but also in their methods, the logical
sciences following the method of ratiocination, and
the physical sciences the method of observation and
experimentation. The logical sciences comprehend
(a) logical sciences in the narrower sense of the
word, those occupied with the relations of quality
— namely, Logic and General Grammar; and (6)
mathematical sciences, those occupied with the
categories of number, position, succession, and
change — namely, Arithmetic, Algebra, Mathemati-
cal Analysis, Geometry, Rational Mechanics, and
Applied Mathematics. The physical sciences in-
clude a group of Natural History Sciences (Cos-
mology, Geology, Mineralogy, Botany, Zoology,

1 I have seen only the second edition, which is of 1875.

FROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 223

and their subsidiary disciplines), Physics (with
Astronomy appended), Chemistry, and Biology.
The main line of demarcation among the physical
sciences is that which has strictly physical science
and chemical science on the one side, and biological
science on the other, just as the great division of
their objects is into inorganic and organic. There
are, however, according to Renouvier, a number of
other studies which are not yet definitively separated
from philosophical speculation and constituted dis-
tinct sciences. These, therefore, he would not class
as sciences, but regard as belonging to General
Criticism. They include History, Morals, Politics,
and Political Economy, and were they sufficiently
advanced to be accounted sciences might be classed
as Moral Sciences. The tree of science would then
have three, not two, great branches.

The foregoing scheme has, I think, serious defects.
One is the non-recognition of theological science.
It is due, doubtless, to the thoroughness and con-
sistency of M. Renouvier's phenomenalism; but
it also indicates that an exclusive phenomenalism
is not the whole truth. Then, what M. Renouvier
calls General Criticism seems an incoherent and
incongruous combination of philosophy and special
science. It is identified both with the knowledge
which transcends special science because of its
universality, and with that which falls below it

224 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

because of its lack of certainty. That is not a
view to be commended. Philosophy should keep
to the universal, and cannot be too critical; and
it shows itself forgetful of both requirements when
it identifies itself with special studies on the ground
that they are somewhat too conjectural and un-
critical to be deemed sciences. It may, further,
be reasonably objected that the conditions of
thought and their relations ought to be regarded
as the objects, not of La Critique GenSrale, but
of a special science with a perfectly definite sphere
— a science closely akin to, if not inclusive of,
Logic, which treats of the conditions of a kind of
thought, discursive thought; also, that Logic has
to do with reasoning in quantity as well as in
quality, and, indeed, with reasoning in all cate-
gories and under all forms. A glance at the order
in which the physical sciences are arranged will
suggest that Comte's view of "a hierarchy of the
sciences " cannot be so wholly false as M. Renouvier
contends. Were it not on the whole a natural and
true view he would hardly be found conforming
to it so much, even when condemning it. It is,
likewise, certainly a serious defect in the scheme
that so many sciences are left unclassed and un-
arranged. Notwithstanding his great ability, there-
fore, M. Renouvier was not in this instance quite
successful.

FROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 225

In a tractate entitled Nuovo Albero Eneiclo- Pecoenini
pedico, published at Naples in 1863, Melchiore
Peccenini, of Ferrara, has classified the sciences
on the hypothesis that the three chief endowments
of mind are the intellect, the will, and the aesthetic
sentiment, and that the objects which respectively
correspond to them are truth, goodness, and beauty.
Truth, goodness, and beauty are naturally and
closely connected, and equally so are all the sciences
and fine arts, seeing that they originate in these
innate ideas. Common to all the sciences and arts
is being (Vente), which in relation to intellect is
truth, in relation to will goodness, and in relation
to aesthetic sense and imagination beauty. Hence,
under the head of "Truth (Intellect)" are placed
all the sciences which "regard being purely with
reference to intelligence." Thus, abstract being is
said to be the object of Ontology or Protology;
concrete being in God of Natural and Revealed
Theology ; concrete being in the soul of Psychology,
Ideology, Logic, Grammar, and Somatics ; and con-
crete being in matter of General Physics and Par-
ticular Physics, both of which are inclusive of a
large number of sciences. Under " Goodness (Will)"
are arranged the sciences "which relate to being
as fitted to satisfy the wants of the spirit." These
are Eudemonology, Moral Philosophy, and Juris-
prudence, with its various subordinate and sub-

p

226 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

8idiary disciplines. Under "Beauty (^Esthetic
sentiment)" are classed the sciences "which refer
to being as capable of gratifying the spirit and
senses." These are ^Esthetics, which treats of
abstract beauty, and a number of sciences which
deal with concrete beauty as exemplified in forms,
motions, sounds, and words. Such is the classi-
fication of Signor Peccenini. I believe that neither
its metaphysical nor its psychological principle will
stand examination. Placing the physical sciences
after the theological and psychological sciences is
in various respects obviously unnatural. Not one
of the larger groups seems accurately divided and
distributed.

DiGio- In 1863 appeared also the first edition of Prof.

Di Giovanni's Principii di Filosqfia Prima (the
2nd ed. is of 1878), in which (vol. i. Lez. 3) the
sciences are classified as belonging either to Primary
or Secondary Philosophy. The former is repre-
sented as comprehending Logic, Ontology, Theology,
Cosmology, Psychology, Noology, and Ethics; the
latter as containing ^Esthetics, Philosophy of
Systems, Social Philosophy, and Philosophy of
History. The learned author endeavoured to
show that his classification can be connected
with, and conformed to, the ideal formula of
Gioberti.

FROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 227

Herbert Spencer's essay on The Genesis of Herbert
Science, originally published in 1854, was largely
devoted to the refutation of Comte's views re-
garding the rational arrangement of the sciences.
His own views as to their correlation were ex-
pounded in a subsequent essay on The Classifica-
tion of the Sciences, originally published in 1864 ;
and obviously opposition to Comte must have been
a considerable motive and factor in their forma-
tion. He held that "the sciences as arranged
in the succession specified by M. Comte do not
logically conform to the natural and invariable
hierarchy of phenomena " ; that " there is no serial
order whatever in which they can be placed, which
represents either their logical dependence or the
dependence of phenomena " ; and that "the his-
torical development of the sciences has not taken
place in any serial order." At the same time, he
thought that the sciences may be distributed into
classes, and endeavoured to show how that may be
done on what he regarded as the only true principle
of classification — namely, that in each class of colli-
gated facts more numerous and radical character-
istics must be included than any of its facts have
in common with objects excluded from the class.
Now, having regard to this principle, the broadest
natural division of the sciences is, he affirmed, that
between sciences which deal with the abstract rela-

228 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

tions under which phenomena are presented to us,
and those which deal with the phenomena them-
selves — between sciences which deal with the mere
blank forms of existence, and those which deal with
real existences. The former class contains Logic and
Mathematics, and these are pre-eminently the Ab-
stract Sciences. The latter class is composed of two
great groups of sciences, the Abstract Concrete
Sciences and the Concrete Sciences. The Abstract
Concrete Sciences treat of realities in their ele-
ments, or of the real relations implicated in certain
classes of facts. Such are Mechanics, Physics, and
Chemistry. The Concrete Sciences deal with reali-
ties in their totalities, or, in other words, with aggre-
gates of phenomena. They comprehend Astronomy,
Geology, Biology, Psychology, and Sociology.
"From the beginning, the abstract sciences, the
abstract concrete sciences, and the concrete sciences
have progressed together, the first solving problems
which the second and third presented, and growing
only by the solution of the problems; and the
second similarly growing by joining the first in
solving the problems of the third. All along there
has been a continuous action and reaction between
the three great classes of sciences."

The classification of Mr Spencer has been criti-
cised by Bain in his Deductive Logic, by Renouvier
in his Psychologies by Siciliani in his Rinnovamento

FROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 229

della Filosofia positiva in Italia, and others. It
has been adopted with some modifications by Mr
Fiske in his Cosmic Philosophy. It has been de-
fended against the objections of Dr Bain by Mr
Spencer himself in the third edition of his essay
(1871). My own criticism of it must necessarily
be much briefer than I could wish.

Mr Spencer was probably right in holding that
any merely serial arrangement of the sciences must
be an inadequate and erroneons expression of their
relations to one another. But he can hardly have been
correct in supposing that there is no natural series
of the sciences at all — none representative either of
logical dependence or dependence of phenomena.
In fact, he himself recognised a truth which plainly
implied that sciences may be arranged in series
according to their logical dependence. Mark the
following words : —

The three groups of Sciences may be briefly defined as
laws of the forms, laws of the factors, laws of the products.
And when thus defined, it becomes manifest that the groups
are so radically unlike in their natures that there can be no
transitions between them ; and that any Science belonging to
one of the groups must be quite incongruous with the Sciences
belonging to either of the other groups, if transferred.
How fundamental are the differences between them will be
further seen on considering their functions. The first, or
abstract group, is instrumental with respect to both the
others ; and the second, or abstract-concrete group, is instru-

230 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

mental with respect to the third or concrete group. An
endeavour to invert these functions will at once show how
essential is the difference of character. The second and
third groups supply subject-matter to the first, and the
third supplies subject-matter to the second ; but none of the
truths which constitute the third group are of any use as
solvents of the problems presented by the second group ;
and none of the truths which the second group formulates
can act as solvents of problems contained in the first group.

In that passage we are told that the abstract
sciences, Logic and Mathematics, are instrumental
to the abstract - concrete sciences, Mechanics,
Physics, and Chemistry, and that all these sciences
of both classes are instrumental not only to such
concrete sciences as deal only with mathematical,
mechanical, physical, and chemical properties — e.g.,
Astronomy and Geology, but also to those which
are conversant with distinctly new peculiarities —
e.g., Biology and Psychology. But if so, on
what ground could Mr Spencer maintain that the
sciences of Logic, Mathematics, Mechanics, Physics,
Chemistry, Biology, and Psychology do not form
a logically dependent series? Is Logic not as
instrumental to Mathematics as Mathematics to
Mechanics or Physics? Is Physics not as instru-
mental to Chemistry as Chemistry to Biology?
How could Mr Spencer contend that Biology is not
instrumental to Psychology, seeing that he repre-
sented both as sciences of the same class ? Astro-

PROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 231

nomy and Geology, however certain and soundly
constituted sciences they may be, cannot possibly
be ranked among sciences which deal with elements
or properties not resolved, or proved to be resolv-
able, into properties with which more general
sciences are occupied. But these two sciences being
removed from where they have plainly no right to
be, Mr Spencer would seem to have himself con-
structed a series of sciences of the very kind which,
in opposition to Comte, he declared to be impos-
sible. Comte meant no more by calling one science
logically dependent on another than that the one
placed first is instrumental as regards the one
placed last, while the latter is not instrumental
as regards the former. If there be a number of
sciences dealing with fundamentally distinct pheno-
mena, and so related that every antecedent is
instrumental as regards every consequent, and no
consequent is instrumental as regards any ante-
cedent, a series of sciences is constituted which
represents the logical dependence of its members.
Mr Spencer started with denying that there was
any such series, but ended by implicitly showing
that there was one. His own classification, taken
in connection with the passage quoted, was a
decisive refutation of what was extreme in his own
criticism of the Comtist scheme. So far from
having succeeded in overthrowing that scheme, he

232 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

only at the utmost succeeded in slightly modifying
it. There is a logical dependence of the sciences.
And why ? Just because there is a natural depend-
ence of phenomena. The quantitative relations
with which mathematics deals are more general
than the mechanical laws which physics brings to
light; there can be no chemical combinations un-
conditioned by physical properties ; vital functions
never appear apart from chemical processes; and
there must be life before there can be consciousness.
That remarkable hierarchy of phenomena is a fact
which a cloud of abstract language or a covering of
subtle reasoning may to some extent and for a short
while conceal from our view, but which no language
or reasoning can efface or even long obscure. And
there being such a hierarchy of phenomena, it is
scarcely conceivable that there should be no corre-
sponding hierarchy of sciences.

The terminology of the Spencerian classification
has little to recommend it. There is no science
which deals with concrete things to the exclusion of
abstract relations or with abstract relations to the
exclusion of concrete things. All science deals with
relations, and is more or less abstract. The con-
creteness of the objects of the so-called concrete
sciences is a concretion of elements and laws which
are abstract; and the essential function of these
sciences is to discover the abstract factors and

FBOM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 233

operations explanatory of the concrete wholes.
Triangles, squares, and circles are as much concrete
things with respect to space and its relations as the
earth is a concrete thing with respect to matter and
its physical properties and laws. The only distinc-
tion among the sciences as to abstractness is one of
more or less ; the only difference one of degree and
not of kind. It should be obvious, from the very
nature of abstraction, that the word abstract is so
entirely a term of degree and relation that it cannot
be properly employed to denote distinctions deemed
ultimate or specific. But Mr Spencer's use of it
was not merely inappropriate; it was misleading,
inasmuch as it tended to conceal from view that
the chief requirement in a philosophical classifica-
tion of the sciences is to determine which are simple
and fundamental, and which compound and deriva-
tive. Comte clearly saw the importance of that
requirement ; Spencer, unfortunately, did not see it,
and so threw together into his third group sciences
which are really separated by the deepest and
widest of scientific distinctions.

Mr Spencer's reasons for affirming that the so-
called abstract sciences, Logic and Mathematics, are
more widely separated from all others than any
other sciences are from one another, are far from
convincing. One is that these abstract sciences
deal with relations apart from realities, whereas

234 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

other sciences deal with realities, and " relations of
whatever orders are nearer akin to one another than
they are to any objects, and objects of whatever
orders are nearer akin to one another than they are
to any relations." That Mr Spencer supposed to be
self-evident. It is not so. Moral relations are
surely much more akin to moral actions than to
mathematical relations. If not, there should be a
science of moral relations parted by a wide chasm
from a science of moral actions. Were Mr Spencer's
view correct, the division among the sciences into
sciences of relations and sciences of objects should
be drawn through the whole scheme of science,
instead of being merely made use of to separate two
sciences from the rest. In fact, it is quite incorrect,
and no division of the sciences ought to be founded
upon it. There is no science without both objects
and relations. There are no relations without objects.
The conception of relations without objects is not
an abstract, but an absurd conception. What proof
did Mr Spencer produce that the abstract sciences
deal exclusively with relations? None at all; he
merely said that they deal exclusively with space
and time, and that "space is the abstract of all
relations of coexistence, and time the abstract of all
relations of sequence." But how can there be any
relations of coexistence without space, or of rela-
tions of sequence without time ? Every experience

FROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 235

and conception of coexistence presupposes the
intuition of space, and of sequence that of time.
To call the necessary conditions of thought and
experience abstracts from either is a serious abuse
of language. Mr Spencer had, however, another
reason for regarding his first division of the
sciences as the broadest which can be drawn.
The abstract sciences, he said, treat of "the
forms in which phenomena are known to us,"
" the empty forms of things," whereas other
sciences treat of "the phenomena themselves,"
"things themselves"; and "the distinction be-
tween the empty forms of things and the things
themselves is a distinction which cannot be
exceeded in degree." Things, things themselves,
are, then, phenomena, phenomena themselves —
not noumena, or things in themselves. One is
glad to know that, for the word "thing" is by
itself very vague and nebulous; but knowing it,
one must wish to know also what Mr Spencer
can mean by contrasting space and time with
things or phenomena. Are these "forms of
things" not themselves "things"? Are these
" forms of phenomena " not themselves " phe-
nomena " ? Yes or no ? If yes, why oppose
forms and things, forms and phenomena ? If no,
then there are sciences of what are not things,
of what are not phenomena — sciences either of

236 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

nothings or noumena — and, in that case, Mr
Spencer's whole philosophy was a vanity, inas-
much as it was based on the supposition that
science is limited to the phenomenal. Further,
one may reasonably wish to know in what relevant
sense Mr Spencer could call space and time " empty
forms." If they are empty, how do the sciences
which deal with them bring so much out of them ?
Ex nihilo nihil fit. It is manifestly just because
space and time are not empty of quantitative pro-
perties and relations that there are mathematical
sciences ; and manifestly just because they are
thus not empty, but contain so many of the
fundamental attributes of matter, that the sway
of mathematical science is spreading over the
whole physical universe, and that physical
science tends constantly to become more and
more mathematical.

I might proceed to show by a direct considera-
tion of the abstract and abstract-concrete sciences
of Mr Spencer that the distance between them is
by no means so broad as he affirmed, but that
has been already so successfully accomplished by
other critics as to be now unnecessary. The
abstract sciences, according to Mr Spencer, were
Logic and Mathematics; and the former treated
of qualitative, the latter of quantitative relations.
That Logic treats of qualitative relations was,

FROM WHEWELL TO ZELLER. 237

however, a proposition which he not only-
failed to substantiate, but failed to make intelli-
gible. He regarded it as conversant in some
sense, like Mathematics, with time and space.
What, then, are the qualitative, non-quantitative
relations either of time or space? Logic is not
limited in the way Mr Spencer supposed. Were
it unable to deal with quantitative relations there
could be no Mathematics. There is even no
perfectly accurate Logic which is not quanti-
tative. Logic if simply qualitative may be con-
clusive, but cannot be absolutely exact.

Mr Spencer's distribution of the abstract-concrete
sciences into Mechanics, Physics, Chemistry, and
Sciences of Light, Heat, Electricity, and Magnet-
ism seems inferior to Comte's classification of the
fundamental sciences, if Astronomy be excluded.
Biology and Psychology, if not Sociology, ought
to find their places in this group and not among
the merely concrete sciences, as although they
have concrete applications, they are in their own
natures decidedly abstract. There are important
differences between Mechanics and Physics, or
rather between Molar and Molecular Mechanics;
but it is very doubtful if we ought to regard
them as two distinct kinds of Mechanics, or two
fundamentally distinct sciences. To do so appears
an error akin to Comte's separation of Celestial

238 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

from Terrestrial Mechanics. How objectionable
the designation " abstract -concrete" is may be
most readily seen, perhaps, in the case of
Mechanics, which in itself is as abstract as
Geometry, and in its applications is not more
concrete.

The distinction between the so-called abstract-
concrete and concrete sciences implies a real dis-
tinction, but does not coincide with it. The
division which should have been drawn is that
between fundamental or simple and derivative or
complex sciences. If, instead of Biology and
Psychology, Mr Spencer had inserted Botany
and Zoology into his third group, he would have
conformed much better to his own description of
concrete science, and would have ranked along
with Astronomy and Geology sciences which
resemble them much more in scope, method,
and general character.

Like Comte, Mr Spencer failed to recognise
how broad is the division between physical and
psychical science; like Comte also, he assigned
no place in the system of knowledge either to
Metaphysics or Theology. These peculiarities of
opinion followed naturally from his principles,
but must, of course, appear serious defects to
those whose principles are different.

PROM BAIN TO WUNDT. 239

The discourse of Prof. Zeller, Ueb$r die Aufgabe Zeiier.
der Philosophie und ihre Stellung zu den ubrigen
Wissenschaften, held at Heidelberg on 23rd Nov-
ember 1868, 1 touches thoughtfully on our problem
at various points, but does not directly treat of
it. The important work of the late Prof. Harms,
Philosophische Einleitung in die Encyklopaedie
der Physik y which forms the first volume of
Karsten's Allgemeine Encyclopaedia der Physik,
and was published in 1869, does not classify or
distribute the non-physical sciences.

VI. PROM BAIN TO WUNDT.

The late Dr Alex. Bain of Aberdeen in the first Bain,
division of his Logic — the volume devoted to
Deduction, and published in 1870 — has dealt with
the classification of the sciences with characteristic
ability. He started with the affirmation that
Science is the perfect form of knowledge, and
thus indicated its peculiarities : " It employs special
means and appliances to render knowledge true, is
knowledge made as general as possible, embraces
a distinct department of the world, or groups

1 Republished in his Vartriige u. Abhancttungen. Zweite Samm-
lung, 1877.

240 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

together facts and generalities that are of a kindred
sort, and has a certain order or arrangement of
topics, suitable to its ends, in gathering, in verify-
ing, and in communicating knowledge." Then,
accepting as primary and fundamental Comte's
division of the Sciences into Abstract and Concrete,
he described the former as the truly fundamental
sciences, and as bound to precede the latter.
Logic, Mathematics, Mechanics or Mechanical
Physics, Molecular Physics, Chemistry, Biology,
and Psychology, are what he held to be the funda-
mental sciences. " In every one of these," he has
said, " there is a distinct department of phenomena ;
taken together they comprehend all known pheno-
mena; and the order indicated is the order from
simple to complex, and from independent to
dependent, marking the order of study and evolu-
tion ; " and, further, that, taken collectively, " they
contain the laws of every known process in the
world, whether of matter or of mind ; and set
forth these laws in the order suitable for studying
and comprehending them to the greatest possible
advantage. No phenomenon can be strange to any
one thoroughly conversant with these subjects."
In Appendix A he has treated very briefly the
classifications of Bacon, D'Alembert, Neil Arnott,
but very carefully that of Herbert Spencer. The
first five, indeed, are disposed of in a few lines.

FROM BAIN TO WUNDT. 241

The criticism of Spencer's scheme seems to me
to be a quite adequate and very conclusive study.
So far as I am aware, it has not been answered.
Part II. — the vol. on Induction — treats in Book
V. of the 'Logic of the Sciences' (pp. 193-367).
Here Logic seems to be represented as so absorbed
in the other fundamental sciences as not to be itself
a science, or the first of the sciences, or in possession
of a specific method of its own no less than other
sciences. Epistemology, on the other hand, appears
to be left out of account. But how can that be
justified ? Apparently Logic should be preceded by
and included in Epistemology rather than the latter
should be absorbed in the former. Dr Bain has
dwelt instructively on the notions, propositions,
definitions, and axioms of Mathematics. His
divisions of Mathematics are — (1) Arithmetic, (2)
Algebra, (3) Geometry, (4) Algebraic Geometry,
which furnishes rules for the embodiment and
interpretation of formulae, and (5) the Higher
Calculus, which deals with incommensurable quan-
tities. Mathematics is followed by Physics, and
Physics is divided into the Physics of Masses
(Molar Physics) and the Physics of Molecules
(Molecular Physics). Molar Physics is represented
as having Abstract and Concrete Branches. The
Abstract Branches comprise — Mathematics of
Motion (Kinematics) ; Forces in equilibrio (Statics),

Q

242

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES,

and Forces causing motion (Dynamics), The Con-
crete Branches are — Mechanic Powers and Solid
Machinery, Hydrostatics and Hydro - dynamics,
Aerostatics and Piwumat tics and A

\y (pp. 222-233), Molecular Physics assumes
mams of matter to be composed of atoms or
molecules that attract or repel each other in various
modes, and in consequence of which its chief sub-
jects are Attractions (Cohesion, &c), Heat, Light,
and Electricity (pp, 233-243). Chemistry follows
directly on Physics, and ia intimately related to
all the departments of Molecular Physics. It is
divided into Inorganic and Organic (pp. 242-257).
Biology is placed immediately after Chemistry,
defined as the science of living bodies, all such
bodies being constituted from elements common
to them all, Under that head the structure,
functions, various distinctive notions, methods, and
hypotheses of Biology are treated of {pp. 258-275).
Psychology is represented as the last of the Ab-
stract Sciences ; as comprehensive of both animal
and human mind ; and so intimately related alike
to body and mind that they are always concomitant,
and every fact of mind has two sides, a mental and
a physical. The Science of Character is presup-
posed by and conjoined with that of Mind. The
account of Psychology (pp, 275-286) is throughout
remarkably clear and instructive, and so likewise.

FROM BAIN TO WUNDT. 243

although more briefly, what is said of the Science
of Character (pp. 286-290).

Besides the Fundamental or Abstract Sciences
there are also in the scheme of Dr Bain Dependent
and Concrete Sciences. There are further distinc-
tively ' sciences of classification/ which include not
only Mineralogy, Botany, and Zoology (see Part
II., pp. 292-314), but also Meteorology, Geography,
Sociology, and Philology (Part I., p. 28). Dr Bain
seems to have forgotten, when occupied with Part
II., what he had written in Part I. In self-con-
sistency his list of Concrete Sciences should have
included seven sciences, — the four in Part I. as
well as the three in Part II. Of all the Concrete
Sciences he maintained that " no one of them
involves any operation but what is expounded in
the fundamental or departmental sciences."

Finally, Bain has included in his scheme Practical
Sciences. These form not only a large but a most
heterogeneous group, including arts like Building
and Dyeing, disciplines like Jurisprudence and
Political Economy, and sciences which may fairly
be held to be themselves fundamental and depart-
mental, as, for example, Economics, Ethics, and
^Esthetics. That group is no natural class but
an artificial and heterogeneous conglomeration, to
which may be added all sorts of occupations, as,
e.g., Baking, Brewing, and the like. Like Comte

244 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

and Spencer, Dr Bain has acknowledged neither
Metaphysics nor Theology to be sciences of any
kind. For that view I have never found good
reasons given. The opinion has been always rested
mainly on misconceptions as to what Metaphysics
and Theology are, and also as to what should be
understood by the terms knowledge, science, and
philosophy. Leaving out of account Dr Bain's un-
satisfactory conception as to what should be called
i Practical Sciences,' his classification of the sciences
properly so called may well be regarded as an im-
provement on Comte's and much superior to
Spencer's.

Cantoni. Prof. Carlo Cantoni, well known by his remark-
able studies on Vico and Kant, and the most
emhient representative of Neo-Kantian criticists,
also sketched a classification of the sciences in his
Corso elementare di Filosofia, — a work published
in the same year as Bain's, and which has gone
through at least ten editions. He would divide
the sciences, according to the nature of the cogni-
tions which constitute them, into two classes — the
ideal or rational and the experimental. And he
would further divide them according to their matter
or objects into three classes — namely, 1. Those
which treat of the fundamental principle and uni-
versal conditions of existence — Ontology, Natural

FROM BAIN TO WUNDT. 245

Theology, Cosmology ; 2. Those which treat of
material things and conditions — Physics, Chem-
istry, Natural History, Mathematics ; and 3. Those
which treat of the powers, laws, and actions of
spiritual beings, i.e., men — Psychology, Logic, Ethic,
^Esthetic, Philosophy of Law, Philosophy of His-
tory, and Paedagogy. Whatever merits this scheme
may have it may also be held to be defective in
that it does not recognise the necessary conjunc-
tion of the ideal and experimental in cognition, nor
the unnaturalness of placing first the sciences which
are most remote and abstruse, nor the error of
treating fundamental and derivative sciences as of
co-ordinate rank.

The first edition of Prof. Valdarnini's Principio Vaidar-
Intendimento e Storia della Classificazione delle
umane conoscenze secondo Franceso Bacone also
appeared in 1870. The second edition is of 1880.
It contains a skilful exposition and energetic de-
fence of the Baconian classification, and gives a
brief but meritorious account of a number of other
classifications of the sciences.

G. B. Peyretti, who has drawn his philosophy PeyrettL
largely from Rosmini, discourses of the evolution
and distribution of the sciences in his Istituzioni
di Filosqfia teoretica, published at Turin in 1874.
The fundamental division of his classification is
into rational or human sciences, which are con-

246 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

versant with the intelligible; and revealed or
divine sciences, conversant with the superinteU
ligible. Each of these orders is divided into a
scienza prima and scienze seconde. The primary
science supplies to the secondary sciences appro-
priate principles, and may be regarded as the
organising and organic whole of which the second-
ary sciences are the members. The primary rational
science is Philosophy, which is either Theoretical
(inclusive of Ideology and Metaphysics) or Prac-
tical. The secondary rational sciences are Mathe-
matics, Physics, Chemistry, Mineralogy, Botany,
Zoology, Medicine, Jurisprudence, &c. Theology
is said to be the primary revealed science, and
Dogmatic Theology and Moral Theology the
secondary revealed sciences.

The separation of the intelligible and superin-
telligible, of philosophy and theology, of rational
and revealed sciences, as presented in that scheme,
implies a very perplexing dualism which Peyretti
attempts to transcend by the supposition of "a
science of the whole, both intelligible and super-
intelligible — a synthesis of the sciences " — Encyclo-
paedia. But must not such Encyclopaedia be
deemed the only true scienza prima, and Philo-
sophy and Theology only scienze seconde? Be-
sides, how is the synthesis to be effected? Is it
by reason or revelation ? In either case reason

FROM BAIN TO WUNDT. 247

and revelation must stand to each other in another
relation than is implied in the contrast which de-
mands a synthesis. The classification of Peyretti
unfortunately rests on conceptions of the relation
of reason to truth and science, and of nature to
revelation, which must render it unacceptable to
all but a small class of religionists, and are too
likely to lead others to undervalue the really judi-
cious observations which he has made on the forms
of knowledge and the stages of its development.

Baldassare Labanca, Professor of the Science of Labanca.
Eeligions in the University of Eome, has written
many most interesting philosophical works and a
still greater number which deal with religious
questions. Any student of theology would find
it well worth the trouble of acquiring a knowledge
of Italian, were it only that he might be able to
read the works of Labanca. Of course, his classi-
fication of the sciences is all that here concerns
us. He advocates what he calls an inclusive
system of philosophy, in opposition to exclusive
systems, devotes a chapter of his Dialettica (vol
ii. lib. iv. c. L), published in 1875, to a considera-
tion of the proper encyclopaedical arrangement of
the sciences. In his view, a logical distribution of
truth must be the basis of a logical distribution of
the sciences, seeing that truth is the end of all the

248 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

sciences. But that is threefold. All truth comes
from the ideal world, the real world, or the social
world, and is apprehended through reason, sensi-
bility, or testimony. Hence three classes of sciences
— the speculative, experimental, and documental.

To the speculative class belong the metaphysical,
mathematical, ethical, juridical, political, and aesthet-
ical sciences ; to the experimental class, all the
sciences called positive — physics, mechanics, chem-
istry, geology, &c. ; to the documental class, the
historical, linguistic, geographical, statistical, and
economical sciences. All sciences, however, assume
certain principles and primary data, and so presup-
pose and depend on Philosophy. The divisions of
philosophy correspond to those of science ; hence,
a philosophy of spirit, comprehensive of the ideal
or speculative sciences ; a philosophy of nature,
regulative of the positive or experimental sciences ;
and a philosophy of history, which dominates the
documental or social sciences. These three great
branches of philosophy spring from a primary and
universal philosophy, the one root and common
stem of the tree of knowledge.

Is that scheme as true and solid as it is neat
and symmetrical ? No ; and for a reason fully
acknowledged by Signor Labanca himself. He
tells us that he bases his fundamental division
merely on the predominance of the traits men-

FROM BAIN TO WUNDT. 249

tioned, not on the exclusion of others; that the
speculative sciences cannot dispense with experi-
ence and authority, or the positive sciences with
reason and authority, or the social sciences with
reason and experience ; and that all the sciences
are, in fact, mixed, being drawn more or less
from all the worlds of truth through all the
channels of knowledge ; but he contends that the
division, instead of being in consequence discredited,
is only thereby proved to be in conformity with the
inclusive nature of dialectics. Surely it proves
rather that a dialectic thus inclusive is incompetent
to draw specific distinctions. It would, besides, be
difficult, if not impossible, to make out, as regards
the particular sciences, even the predominance or
preponderance asserted. Other objections suggest
themselves, but may be withheld.

The work of Prof. Conti, U Vero nelV Oi'dine ContL
(2 vols., 1876), is very largely occupied with the
doctrine of the sciences. The encyclopaedic problem
is the theme of the eleventh chapter. Science,
history, and art are represented as the departments
of human knowledge. Science is the first in the
order of reflection, but the last in the order
of formation. It is to be divided into Philo-
sophy, Mathematics, Physics, and Positive Theology.
Philosophy is either speculative or practical, in the

250

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

former case including Ontology, Rational Theology,
Cosmology, and Psychology; in the latter Logic,
^Esthetics, and Ethics. Mathematics is either p
or a Physics comprehends Physics in the

special sense of the term, Chemistry, Physiology,
and Pathology, and Physical Anthropology. Posi-
tive Theology is founded upon authority, and
therefore to be entirely separated from the theology
which, being based on reason, is a part of philosophy.
I leave it to the reader to criticise that scheme for
himself.

&Erd- In 1877 an article of Benno Erdmann on the

"Gliederung der Wissenschaften " appeared in the
Vierteljahrschrif't fur uismisehctftliche Phihsoj
Bd. iL, Hft. L It is marked by the clearness and
penetration characteristic of its author, and although
in its general conclusions there may be little that is
remarkable, the observations which it contains on
the nature and limits of various particular sciences
are undoubtedly most worthy of consideration. The
aciences as a whole are conceived of by Erdmann as
a system conversant with a complex of regular series
of elementary data. Each series is represented by
a special discipline, and there are as many groups of
sciences as there are different kinds of series. The
mathematical sciences constitute the first great
group, as their series are resolvable into absolutely

FROM BAIN TO WUNDT. 251

like elements and purely logical relations. The sci-
ences concerned with causal connection and real
evolution are, then, divided into formal — those
which seek general laws — and material or historical
— those which deal with the processes of change
which arise from the interaction of general laws. It
is next argued that in the present state of our know-
ledge we must also distribute them into mechan-
ical and psychical — Naturwissenschaften and
Geisteswisserischaften — but with the admission that
this distinction may eventually be discovered to be
unwarranted. After a few general remarks on the
formal mechanical sciences, the historico- mechan-
ical sciences — Astronomy, Geology, Anorganology,
Organology, Anthropology — are more fully char-
acterised. The sciences held to belong at once to
the formal and the psychical class are Psychology
and the normative sciences of knowing (Logic and
Theory of Cognition), of willing in conduct toward
things (Ethic), and of feeling in the appreciation
of things (^Esthetic). While Psychology treats of
psychical processes as they are, the other psychical
sciences just mentioned discuss their validity. The
historico -psychical sciences are unfortunately not
described and distributed. The sciences even when
combined are, according to Erdmann, incomplete ;
between them and within them there are blanks
or gaps which can only be filled up in a hypo-

252 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

thetical manner; and there is a discipline — not
entitled to be called a science — which has this
function — namely, Metaphysics. Besides may be
appended Psedagogy and Theology, the former an
art based on Psychology and Ethics, and the latter
one which undertakes to satisfy the interest of the
general understanding in the ultimate questions of
knowledge in a way conducive to culture and
progress.

These are the findings of Dr Benno Erdmann.
Some of them are, I think, not in the least made
out. A little reflection on the distinctive nature
of Theology, on the character of its relation to
the sciences, and on the number of disciplines,
some of which are plainly theoretical, which it
embraces, should suffice to show that it cannot
properly be ranked along with Paedagogy, and
regarded as merely a practical appendage to
psychical research and metaphysical conjecture.
The account given of the function of Metaphysics
is more amusing than edifying. If true, she who
was erewhile held to be the queen of the sciences
is, in reality, but a degraded and untrustworthy
handmaiden who mends their tattered garments
by patching them with cobwebs. It is obviously,
however, not true, for the whole representation given
of Metaphysics is but a mutilated and caricatured
reflection of the idea of a doctrine of the sciences —

FROM BAIN TO WUNDT. 253

a doctrine which has for aim to trace the limits,
note the defects, and exhibit the relations of the
sciences, as much without hypothesis or conjecture
as possible. In regard to the so-called normative
psychical sciences due weight is not assigned to the
fact that the validity of the distinctions between
truth and error, right and wrong, beauty and
deformity, can no more be shown to result from
mental than from mechanical processes, and must
be the object of investigations of a kind commonly
called metaphysical.

Prof. Simone Corleo has treated of the doctrine of Corieo.
the sciences, or, as he calls it, Sophology, in his
Sistema delta Filosqfia Universale (Rome, 1880).
He distributes the sciences into physical, meta-
physical, and moral, and gives under each head an
ample enumeration of particular disciplines ; but he
does not show how his classes are related, or group
their constituent members, or arrange these mem-
bers in their natural order of sequence, contiguity,
or dependence. The classification is the conclusion
of his work. It is preceded by a special treatment
of psychology, anthropology, and sociology. The
treatise as a whole is a very acute and ingenious
exposition of a philosophy of identity. The author
has earnestly and skilfully combated atheism, pan-
theism, and other inadequate representations of
the Divine. His name has an honourable place

254 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

among Italian patriots in a great crisis of Italian
history.

Bourdeau. M. L. Bourdeau, in his elaborate Thtorie des
sciences (2 vols., 1882), resumed the work of Comte
in the spirit of Comte, seeking to expound an
"integral" or universal science into which shall
enter no metaphysical or theological conception.
His treatise is one of very great importance, to
which, were the publication of my studies on the
scientia scientiarum continued, I should have
frequently to refer. At present, however, I need
only state that, like Comte, he arranges what he
regards as fundamental sciences in a single linear
series ; and that series runs as follows : 1. Positive
Ontology or Logic, the science of realities, employ-
ing the method of intuition ; 2. Metrology or Mathe-
matics, the science of magnitudes, employing the
method of deduction; 3. Theseology or Dynamics,
the science of positions, employing the method of
observation ; 4. Poiology or Physics, the science of
modalities, employing the method of experimenta-
tion ; 5. Craseology or Chemistry, the science of
combinations, employing the method of integration ;
6. Morphology, the science of forms, employing the
method of comparison; and 7. Praxeology, the
science of functions, employing the method of
connection. The Ontology of M. Bourdeau is

PROM BAIN TO WUNDT. 255

mainly a kind of Psychology, and not entitled, it
seems to me, to the place of priority which he
assigns it. At least one whole department of his
Theseology — that of Kinetics — properly belongs to
Mathematics. The way in which he distinguishes
Morphology and Praxeology, and divides and dis-
tributes both, is the most original and ingenious
part of his scheme, and I regret that I cannot give
it the consideration which it merits. I think it
could be shown that the separation of forms and
functions, necessary and important although it be
within certain limits, is not so radical and far-
reaching as he would make it. The new designa-
tions which he gives to the methods of the sciences
seem as little to be, commended as the new names
which he applies to the sciences themselves. Of
course, the objections which hold good against
positivism in general must hold good against the
positivism of M. Bourdeau.

The Order of the Sciences, an Essay on the Shields.
Philosophical Classification and Organisation of
Human Knowledge, published in 1882 by Prof.
Charles W. Shields, of Princeton, may fairly be
ranked among the best of the smaller treatises which
have appeared on the subject of which it treats.
Its exhibition of the scheme of scientific distribution
adopted is clear and skilful; its criticism of other

256 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

classifications is discriminating and incisive. The
author successively enunciates and applies to his
problem the following principles : "1. A phil-
osophical scheme of the sciences should be based
upon the facts which support them, rather than
upon the ideas which they involve; 2. Such a
scheme should fully reflect all the distinct classes
of facts which have been scientifically ascertained ;
3. It should exhibit all classes of facts in their
actual connections as coexistent in space and
successive in time ; 4. It should embrace both the
empirical and metaphysical divisions of the sciences
in logical correlation ; and 5. It should have its
completion in a general science of all the other
sciences, based upon their historical and logical
evolution."

A strict application of the first of these prin-
ciples, he thinks, " would exclude the abstract
sciences of Logic and Mathematics from a phil-
osophical classification, and retain them as dis-
ciplinal studies, until, by being employed in
empirical investigations, they acquire a content
of positive knowledge, when they simply become
parts and processes of other more real sciences."
As regards the second principle, he holds "that
the progress of science has brought into view six
distinct classes of facts, affording ground for as
many corresponding groups of fundamental sciences

FROM BAIN TO WUNDT. 257

— the Physical, the Chemical, the Organical, the
Psychical, the Social, and the Religious." In con-
nection with his third principle he maintains that,
"although the different classes of facts are distinct
and separate, yet they are found succeeding one
another in a fixed order of mutual dependence
and increasing multiformity, each involving its
predecessor, and becoming a condition precedent
to its successor; and with such actual procession
of phenomena must correspond the normal pro-
cession of the sciences." He also lays down a
series of what he calls Principal Sciences — Astron-
omy, Geology, Anthropology, Psychology, Soci-
ology, and Theology — "each Principal Science
representing, in a concrete form, the parallel group
of Fundamental Sciences to which it corresponds,
and including, as its special domain, all of those
Fundamental Sciences from which it is not excluded
by its immediate predecessor and successor in the
series." All these sciences, he argues, exemplify
the fourth principle by being half empirical and
half metaphysical. And he concludes by treating
of the conditions and nature of that terminal science
which, as the fifth proposition affirms, must organise
and complete all other sciences.

In the following respects these views of Dr
Shields fail to command my assent. The ideas
of a science may be its facts, as, for example, in

R

258 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

Mathematics, which is truly science in its most
perfect form and no merely disciplinal study.
Further, ideas may give to the facts their distinc-
tive character. Only if the idea of God have
validity can religious facts be more than simply
facts of psychology. But for the idea which under-
lies it theology would have to be included in
mental pathology. Again, moral and aesthetic
facts seem as distinct from merely psychical facts
as social and religious facts. Then, I cannot
concur in the acceptance of Comte's doctrine of
a single linear series of sciences. The relationship
of the sciences is not truly represented when it is
reduced to a Bimple order of sequence. The con-
ception of a series of Principal Sciences parallel
to a series of Fundamental Sciences also appears
very questionable. Is it not misleading, for in-
stance, to bring together Astronomy and Theology
as Principal Sciences, seeing that Astronomy is
merely one of a number of sciences of physical
facts, whereas Theology is the science of religious
facts? Further, while holding that the sciences
involve metaphysical ideas or conditions, I do not
deem it correct to maintain that they have each
a metaphysical part. To do so ignores the con-
nection of the categories, and is inconsistent
with the unity and independence of metaphysics.
Finally, while accepting Dr Shields's account of the

FROM BAIN TO WUNDT. 259

function of the doctrine of science as thoroughly
just, I cannot regard the doctrine itself as the
terminal science, but only as the first department
of philosophy.

Mr H. M. Stanley, another American writer Stanley,
favourably known by his contributions to philo-
sophy and mental science, has published a paper,
well worthy of consideration, On the Classification
of the Sciences, in Mind, No. XXXIV., April 1884.
It is necessary to leave unnoticed his remarks on
the historical classification of the sciences, as also
on the distinction between Static and Dynamic
Sciences, and to state only the general result at
which he arrives as to a logical classification. He
places Mathematics alongside of all other sciences,
"not as constitutive, but as concomitant"; and
then gives the following series of the sciences, as
one which is determined by " the principle of aggre-
gation " : 1. Chemistry — the Science of Atom ; 2.
Molecular Physics — Science of Molecule; 3. Molar
Physics — Science of Mass; 4. Biology — Science of
Aggregated Cell-Masses ; 5. Psychology — Science of
Individual Man ; 6. Sociology — Science of Human
Aggregates; and 7. Theology — Science of God.
" The order of aggregation," he says, " plainly is :
Atoms into molecules, molecules into masses, cell-
masses into plants, animals, and men, and these

260 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

into societies. Nature is thus a combination of
wheels within wheels. This classification presents
the general order of the dependence of the sciences.
If we wish, for instance, to study in Sociology the
family, there will be necessarily presupposed a know-
ledge of the human individual as a psychical whole ;
and this presupposes a study of the human animal,
and this of the cell, and this of masses, molecules,
and atoms. Herein is a * hierarchy of the sciences.'
If this be the order of dependence of the sciences,
it must also be the order of their completion, the
higher sciences necessarily waiting on the lower.
Again, it is also the order of increasing complexity,
as has been exemplified throughout. It is also
the order of increasing speciality and concreteness,
in that it is a logical order of increasing intension
and decreasing extension. A number of objects
decrease, and numbers of attributes increase. It
is also the order of recognised rank."

On this simple yet ingenious scheme of Mr
Stanley the following criticisms may be offered :
First, it is not shown that Mathematics only is so
concomitant with the other sciences that it cannot
be simply placed in a series of the sciences. The
same is true of Logic, inasmuch as all other sciences
are built up by logical processes. The same is true
even of Theology, inasmuch as all other sciences
furnish materials for Theology. Secondly, the con-

PROM BAIN TO WUNDT. 261

ception given of the nature and position of Chem-
istry seems untenable. Chemistry is defined as the
Science of the Atom, and as such is regarded as the
first constitutive science. In reality, Chemistry has
not yet proved the existence of the atom. The
atom is still only an assumption, and may turn out
to be a pseudo-metaphysical fiction. And should
its existence be scientifically established, it is most
improbable that it will not be found to have
properties and relations of a mechanical order,
simpler and more general than its chemical charac-
teristics. Chemistry has not to do with atoms more
than with molecules and masses. It has to do with
the analysis of compounds into elements and the
synthesis of elements into compounds. It is, as
M. Bourdeau says, the science of combinations.
Thirdly, the principle of aggregation is insufficient
and unsuited for the classification of the sciences.
It is just because there are distinctions of things
which cannot be explained by aggregation that
there are distinct sciences. If life and mind could
be shown to be simply aggregates, Biology and
Psychology would be at the same time resolved
into Chemistry. Sociology can have no claim to
be more than a department of Psychology unless it
can be shown to be more than "human aggrega-
tion." The idea of God, in which Theology is
rooted, is not that of an aggregate.

262 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

d. o. Mr Daniel Greenleaf Thompson, also an American,

exhibits a tabular scheme of classification of the
Sciences in his System of Psychology (vol. i. p.
76, 7), published in 1884. His main division is into
(a) Sciences relating primarily to the extended —
Non-Ego Sciences; and (b) Sciences relating prim-
arily to the unextended — Ego Sciences. Class A is
subdivided into Physics and Biology, each of which
is represented as including various Abstract and
Concrete Sciences. Class B is subdivided into Theor-
etical and Practical Sciences. The former are sub-
divided into : 1. Sciences of Mind in its relations to
itself, comprehending the Abstract Sciences of Logic,
Mathematics, and ^Esthetics, and the Concrete
Sciences of Psychology and Ethnology; and 2.
Sciences of Mind in its relation to other Minds,
comprehending the Science of Human Communica-
tion and Sociology, with its related group of studies.
The scheme, it may be perceived, is of an external
and artificial kind. It rests on no principle, pro-
ceeds on no consistent method, and is pervaded by no
general philosophical conception. It counts various
sciences twice, first as theoretical and next as prac-
tical, and it is not apparent why all are not so
dealt with, while it seems almost absurd to confine
the distinction of Theoretical and Practical to the
Ego-Sciences. Mathematics and Logic are placed
after all the physical sciences, although both are

PROM BAIN TO WUNDT. 263

plainly presupposed by all these sciences. While
prominence is given to the questionable distinc-
tion of Abstract and Concrete Sciences, the much
more significant one of Fundamental and Deriv-
ative Sciences is ignored. No room is found for
Theology. Several other errors of Bain and Spencer
are reproduced.

It is now necessary to give some account of the De
views of M. E. De Roberty on the subject in hand.
He is a native of Russia but lives in Paris, and is a
most industrious as well as very able French publi-
cist. He is a thorough positivist, but very far from
a mere Comtist or, indeed, a mere disciple of any
teacher. He often rejects Comte's conclusions and
substitutes for them very different views of his own ;
and, in fact, is one of the most independent as well
as one of the most interesting and instructive con-
temporary thinkers of the positivist school. Of all
criticisms of Comte and contributions to positivism
those of Roberty are, perhaps, on the whole, the
most thorough and suggestive.

His views on the classification of the sciences are
to be found chiefly in his La Sociologies 1881.
There he has distributed all that he regards as
sciences into four groups. The reason given for
doing so is that the sciences of each of those groups
rest on different ways of observation. The sciences

264 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

of the first group are held by him to be the mathe-
matical sciences, on the ground that they rest on
simple intuitions or self- evident axioms. Astron-
omy, on the other hand, is made to do duty as
representative of a second kind of science, or perhaps
group of sciences, because based on pure and simple
observation. Physics and Chemistry are adduced
as constitutive of a third class, and one of special
interest inasmuch as dependent not only on observa-
tion but on observation conjoined with experiment-
ation. And, further, there is a fourth class, the
sciences of which are designated by Roberty de-
scriptive sciences, because grounded on what he
calls scientific description, — a process on which he
has dealt at considerable length and to which he
attaches great importance. In that last class he has
included Mechanics, Biology, Psychology, and Soci-
ology. To Sociology he assigns the same place,
and attributes much of the same importance, as
Comte had done. The definitive co-ordination of
the sciences he holds to be the task to which the
Philosophy of the Sciences is bound to devote
itself, — a task which is still in the future but will
not fail to be accomplished. Six years later than
La Sociologie appeared his L'Aneienne et la Nouvelle
Philosophic (1887), which was followed by five
works, the parts of a single system of thought, and
the titles of which are L'Inconnaissable (1889),

FROM BAIN TO WUNDT. 265

La Philosophic du Steele (1891), Agnosticisme
(1892), La Recherche de Funiti (1893), and Auguste
Comte et Herbert Spencer (1894). They are all
meant to be contributions to a true philosophy of
the sciences, a scientia scientiarum, a whole of
positive sciences alone, one on which each positive
science depends for its development on the ante-
cedent sciences, and on which all real philosophy
depends exclusively on all real positive sciences.
They are all meant also to convince their readers
that " the whole of religion and the whole of phil-
osophy so-called " have nothing in them of the real
nature of science; that there is no such thing as
theological or metaphysical science; that even the
so-called criticism of Kant, the positivist agnosti-
cism of Comte, the conditioned or relativist agnos-
ticism of Hamilton and Mansel, and the evolutionist
agnosticism of Spencer are all forms of pseudo-
science or of philosophy falsely so called.

The courage and self-consistency of Roberty in
extruding all theology and metaphysics from what
he considers knowledge or science, and his per-
spicacity in showing that very much of what has
been affirmed by modern Agnostics is as non-
sensical as anything of an analogous kind which
can be laid to the charge of medieval scholastics,
are worthy of recognition, but he has quite failed
to prove all metaphysics and theology to be of

266 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

an agnostic, unscientific, or anti - scientific char-
acter. Rightly understood, both metaphysics and
theology may be sciences. The exclusion of all
theology and metaphysics, of all religion and
philosophy, from the rank and nature of
sciences, is a serious defect in a classification
of the sciences. The views of Roberty and
others to the contrary are somewhat fully dealt
with in my Croall Lectures on Agnosticism for
1887-88. Roberty's first group of sciences are
the mathematical. Some of those sciences, how-
ever, are among the latest, and, alike on historical
and rational grounds, it may be questioned whether
any of them were the earliest. Logic, for example,
may perhaps have preceded any of them both in
India and Greece. It is somewhat difficult to
conceive how mathematics could have arisen until
preceded by a considerable knowledge of know-
ledge, a clear apprehension of the axioms on which
mathematics rest, and of the rules and processes
of reasoning. Scientific knowledge has in almost
all departments so grown out of ordinary know-
ledge that it is difficult to determine where the
latter has ended and the former begun. Further,
Roberty describes astronomy as representative of
a second group of sciences on the ground that
it is a science of 'pure and simple observation.
But is it so ? What would have become of

FROM BAIN TO WUNDT. 267

astronomy were it confined to observation and
left unaided by calculation? Other questions are
suggested by Roberty's classification. My readers
may raise and answer them for themselves. His
scheme is a meagre one compared with many
others that I have already noticed. That does
not, however, much affect the value of his
writings, which I wish were more widely known
in Britain.

The name of Wm. Wundt is much more widely Wundt.
known than that of De Roberty. Although born
in 1832, Wundt is still an indefatigable teacher
and experimentalist. Physiology has doubtless
been the main subject of his studies, seeing that
as privat - docent and professor he has publicly
taught it for the long period of forty -seven
years, but he has also by original investigations
left his mark on many of the chief sciences.
Even on logic, ethics, and psychology he has
written most elaborate and very valuable
treatises. It is only natural, therefore, that he
should have occupied himself earnestly with the
problem of the relations of the sciences to one
another. His range of knowledge must be greatly
wider and more exact than was that of Comte.
If less of a philosopher than was Spencer, he is
much more of a scientist. The works in which

268 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

he has treated of the classification of the sciences
are his Logik, Bd. ii. (1883), his Philosophische
Studien, Bd. v. Th. 1 (1886), and his System
der Philosophie (1889). They show that he has
thoroughly realised the importance of classification
of the sciences, and of the dependence of the
sciences on philosophy.

Perhaps it is in the last of the works men-
tioned that he has most completely expounded
and defended his conception of philosophy as 'a
science of all the positive sciences/ as ' the uni-
versal science which has to do with the cogni-
tions obtained by the particular sciences into a
consistent system/ His Logic is described by
himself as 'an investigation of the principles of
knowledge and of the methods of scientific re-
search/ Hence its first volume is expressly de-
signated an Erhentnislehre and the second a
Methodenlehre, — the former being regarded as the
general theory of logic or of real and formal in-
vestigation and reasoning, and the latter as a study
of the principles, methods, and acquisitions of the
special sciences. In the second edition of 1895
the Methodenlehre was greatly enlarged and elabor-
ated so as to be much superior to any corresponding
chapters in J. S. Mill's Logic. The volume con-
sists of four main sections with subdivisions. It
begins with 'a general doctrine of method* (pp.

FROM BAIN TO WUNDT. 269

1-73), and then expounds the logic of mathematics,
treating first of its method so far as general, and
then in the following order of succession the special
methods of arithmetic, geometry, functions, and
infinitesimals (pp. 74-219). The logic of the natural
sciences is similarly dealt with : an exposition of
the general foundation of natural investigation
being first given, and then in due order an ex-
position of the special logical methods of physics,
chemistry, physiology, and biology. The logic of
the mental sciences is dealt with in the same
manner. The bases common to them all are first
laid bare, and then those of the historical and
social sciences are specially described. The volume
is brought to a close with an elaborate exposition
of the methods of philosophy (pp. 478-620).

As already said, Wundt has also dealt with the
classification of the sciences in his Philosophische
Studien, Bd. v. Th. 1, 1886. There he divides
the general system of the sciences into I. Par-
ticular Sciences, and II. Philosophy, and subdivides
both. I. The Particular Sciences he distributes
into two great groups — Formal Sciences and Real-
istic Sciences. (A) Formal sciences are the mathe-
matical sciences, and of these a detailed enumera-
tion and description are given. (B) Realistic
sciences are subdivided into two sections — viz.,
(a) Physical sciences and (b) Mental sciences. The

270 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

latter are subdivided thus : — (a) Theory of the
phenomena of spirit (i.e., psychology under its
different forms) : (6) Sciences of the products of
spirit (philology and social sciences) ; and (c)
Science of the development of the products of the
spirit (history under its different forms). II. Philo-
sophy itself is thus subdivided: — (a) Theory of
knowledge (both formal and realistic) ; and (6)
Theory of principles, which under its general form
is metaphysics and under its particular forms is
philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit.

A still later attempt of Wundt's at the distribu-
tion of the sciences is to be found in his System
der Philosophie (1889). The view of it given by
Prof. Ladd of Yale in his Introduction to Philo-
sophy (1891) is so brief, exact, and accurate, and
so likely to be better than any I could myself
produce, that I shall venture to avail myself of it.

The most recent important work aiming at a system of
philosophy is by Wundt. As might be expected from its
author, this treatise on synthetic philosophy is everywhere
conceived and executed in a spirit of fidelity to the method
and results of the particular sciences. Wundt regards
philosophy as a universal science, having for its problem
to unite the cognitions of the particular sciences into a
consistent system. On account of the relation in which
it stands to these sciences, its divisions must be based on
the division of the sciences. Two main problems are,
therefore, given to philosophy in its efforts to treat syn-

FROM BAIN TO WUNDT.

271

thetically all the particular sciences. The first of these
problems relates to knowing in a process of becoming;
the second, to knowing already become ( Wissen, Werdende,
and Qevnrdene). Hence the two main divisions of philo-
sophy are (1) Science of Cognition, (2) Science of Prin-
ciples. These two divisions are then developed into a
scheme, which may be tabulated as follows: —

Division of Scientific Philosophy.

I. Science of
knowledge.

II. Science of
Principles.

2. Real.

1. General, or
Metaphy sic,

2. Special.

:f

f 1. Formal (Formal Logic).

A. History of Knowledge.

B. Theory of Knowledge, which in con-
nection with formal logic constitutes
Logic in the wider meaning of the word,
is then further subdivided into—

(a) General Theory of knowledge.
(6) Theory of Special Methods as
applied to scientific investigation.
The systematic exposition of the funda-
mental conceptions, and fundamental
laws of all science.

A. Philosophy of Nature, which is Bub-
divided into —

(a) General Cosmology, and (6) Gen-
eral Biology.

B. Philosophy of Spirit, which has three
subdivisions —

(a) Ethics, (6) ^Esthetics, and (c)
Philosophy of Religion.

On the foundation of the three divisions of the Philosophy
of Spirit, and with the help of a comprehensive survey of
human development, stands the Philosophy of History.
Its aim is to give a picture of the whole external and
internal life of man. 1

Wundt's classification of the sciences merits, I
have no doubt, a fuller exposition of it than has just

Ladd, pp. 167, 168.

272 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

been given. A criticism of it I shall not undertake,
although on several points it seems to be not beyond
criticism. The scheme has, I think, a considerable
number of defects. Its merits seem far from equal
to those of the work done by the author of it on the
methodology of the sciences included in it. It is on
the latter, not on the former, that Prof. Wundt's
labours are of such very exceptional value. Only
experts, and experts of an extraordinary range of
knowledge, can be expected fully to appreciate how
great those merits are. As a general review of
Wundt's conclusions as to the classification, logic,
and system of the sciences I know none better
than Prof. Venn's in Mind, vol. ix. pp. 451-468.
To it I refer my readers.

VH. FROM MASARYK TO KARL PEARSON.

Maaaryk. T. G. Masaryk, professor in the University of
Prague, in 1866 published in the Bohemian language
a book on " the classification and organisation of the
sciences." Fortunately a German translation ap-
peared in the following year. It would well deserve
translation also into other European languages, as
there is scarcely any other work so likely to serve
well as an introduction to as many sciences ; for,
although its author modestly acknowledges that only

FROM MASARYK TO KARL PEARSON. 273

on some sociological and psychological departments
of research can he make any claim to write as an
expert, he has obviously made a thoughtful general
study of most of the principal sciences, and acquired
an adequate acquaintance with the literature regard-
ing them. The authorities on which he relies are of
a good kind. With British philosophical literature
he is exceptionally well acquainted. The English
authors to whom he refers most frequently are
Bacon, Bain, Faraday, Rowan Hamilton, Sir Win.
Hamilton, Hume, Locke, J. S. Mill, Newton,
H. Spencer, and Whewell ; the French, DesCartes,
A. Comte, Pascal, and Roberty; and the German,
Du Bois-Reymond, Dilthey, Fechner, Harms, Kant,
Leibniz, and Wundt. That Italian authors are so
much overlooked is to be regretted.

The German title of Masaryk's treatise is Versuch
einer Concreten Logik, and his introductory remarks
are clear and relevant as to the need of a classifica-
tion and also an organisation of the sciences. With
regard to the character of classification, while affirm-
ing its necessity, he allows that there is something
artificial in every classification, and that neither
evidence, certainty, nor method can be its sufficient
principle. The order and relationships of the
sciences ought to be determined by the nature of
their objects. Theoretical and practical sciences,
however, are to be separated. There is the widest

s

274 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

distance between them. Abstract and concrete
sciences are less so, both classes being theoretical
sciences. All these sciences — abstract and concrete
alike — are occupied with the natures of certain kinds
of objects, the systems of truth that may be elicited
from special spheres of knowledge. What the so-
called practical sciences aim at is the attainment
of desired ends, the accomplishment of purposes
deemed useful. All sciences may be applied to
several uses, and all arts may be more or less related
to some science or sciences. To enclose them in the
same scheme cannot be rightly effected, but merely
made to seem so, by a cross and confusing division.
The study of the sciences is one thing, the applica-
tion of them to ends and identification of them
with arts another. Masaryk's so-called * practical
sciences' seem to have been counted by him as
both seven and twelve. There might, I think,
have been many more. His list of them is as
follows : A. Calculation and Measurement. De-
scriptive Geometry. Theory of industrial and
imitative Arts; B. Technology in widest sense
(Kendering serviceable the forces of nature); C.
Physical and curative education (Phytotechnic,
Zootechnic, Medicine, and Hygiene) ; D. Training
of the character and understanding (Pedagogic and
Didactic), Politics, and Ethics (as science of the

FROM MASARYK TO KARL PEARSON. 275

complete guidance of life) ; E. Practical Grammar
(Mastery of Language) ; F. Practical ^Esthetic ; and
G. Practical Logic. Such is Masaryk's enumeration
of so-called * practical sciences/

Obviously some of them would have been better
placed among arts, while others are as properly
sciences and should have been so designated.
Sciences and arts may be intimately connected,
but to call either arts sciences or sciences arts is
an error, and must lead to confusion as it has
obviously done in Masaryk's scheme. That scheme
owes more to Comte than to any one else, and
indeed so much that the author of it may be
fairly regarded as a Comtist, a very independent
and sagacious one however, who cannot be reason-
ably charged with having taken the views of
Comte, or any one else, without close and careful
consideration. He has rejected even Comte's
linear series of the sciences and substituted for it
a binary classification, although his own classifica-
tion thereby loses the sort of unity which per-
vades Comte's scheme, and to which more than
anything else that scheme has owed its popularity.
But for its simplicity Comte's classification would
never have been preferred to a considerable
number of the more complex schemes that have
been already described in our pages.

276 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

As already stated, Masaryk distributes his
c theoretical sciences ' into ' abstract sciences ' and
'concrete sciences/ There has been much con-
troversy as to what should be meant by the terms
'abstract/ 'concrete/ and also 'abstract- concrete/
Comte, Littre, Spencer, and others have been
engaged in it without arriving at any very definite
or important result. There is no mere abstractness
or mere concreteness in the objects of any of the
sciences. The term abstract-concrete should imply
that and neither more nor less. The division or
classification of sciences into abstract and concrete
cannot be a complete division, a perfect classifica-
tion. It may, however, be none the less but all
the more instructive on that account, as showing
how intimately all sciences are related. Pro!
Masaryk attaches great importance to Comte's
doctrine of a hierarchy of sciences, — a closely
connected series of fundamental sciences. Sub-
stantially he adopts it as a whole, yet obviously
after a close and independent study of it. Hence
he is often accurate where Comte was not, and
brings to light what Comte had left in darkness.
All the sciences of the hierarchy are, of course,
represented by him as abstract sciences, — not
concrete and still less so-called practical sciences.
Hence it is now necessary to indicate what in his
scheme of classification are the abstract sciences and

FROM MASARYK TO KARL PEARSON. 277

especially what are the sciences of the hierarchy.
The following table may suffice : —

The Theoretical Abstract Sciences.

A. The Sciences of the Hierarchy (Fundamental
Sciences). The idea of a hierarchy of the sciences
was first clearly set forth in the Pansophiw
Diatyposis (1645) of Comenius.

I. Mathematics. — To it is assigned by Masaryk
precedence in the hierarchical sciences and con-
sequently of all other sciences. His description
and distribution of the mathematical sciences seem
to be about as accurate as could possibly be given
in fifteen pages (71-86) by one professedly not a
mathematical expert; and show how carefully he
has utilised not only the well-known works of
Comte, Bain, and Wundt so far as they bear on
the subject, but also such works as Baumann's
Lehren von Raum, Zeit und Mathematik in der
neuesten Philosophic, Clifford's Common Sense of
the Exact Sciences, Cantor's Vorlesungen iiber
Geschichte der Mathematik, De Morgan On the
Study and Difficulties of Mathematics, Duhamel's
Des Mithodes dans les sciences de raisonnement,
Kroman's Beitrdge zu einer Theorie der Mathe-
matik und Physik, and Schmitz - Dumont's Die
mathematischen Elemente der Erkenntnisstheorie.
Mathematics is, however, a very comprehensive

278 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

term. It is the name not merely of a science
but of a system of sciences, and these closely
interrelated sciences, each of which rests on a
fundamental idea or ideas, and has a corre-
spondency different method. Space, magnitude,
figure, number, time, motion, direction, rate, limit,
&c, are all foundations of mathematical reasoning,
and all mathematical sciences have so far their
own distinctive methods. Arithmetic and Geo-
metry are very different both as to matter and
method from the Calculus and Kinematics. That
is not sufficiently indicated by Masaryk. He has,
however, clearly stated the advantages which the
mathematical sciences have in important respects
over all other sciences, and also their limitations.
II. Mechanics. — According to Masaryk it is the
second hierarchical science ; one which has very
much in common with, and is to a great extent
dependent on, Mathematics. It has even been
often included among the mathematical sciences.
Mach in a treatise on 'the development of
mechanics * has contested its right to be so placed,
and Masaryk deems his argumentation probably
conclusive. Perhaps he is right in thinking so,
but certainly Mechanics is both abstract and con-
crete, both quantitative and qualitative, and cannot
be denied to be on the borderland between mathe-
matical and physical science, and to lie almost as

FROM MASARYK TO KARL PEARSON. 279

much within the territory of the one as of the
other.

III. Physics. — That third so-called hierarchical
science is comprehensive of a large class of sciences,
namely, all those which deal with inorganic physical
things, or, in other words, with the properties and
changes of matter in their molecular constitution,
and therefore with hardness, elasticity, cohesion,
&c, as also with heat, light, sound, electricity,
magnetism, &c. All the sciences referred to are
occupied with these objects, their properties, and
effects. They are all inductive sciences and de-
pendent on observation and experimentation.
Masaryk declines to arrange the departmental
physical sciences in any serial order. He regards
Comte's attempt to do so as a failure.

IV. Chemistry. — It seems strange that Chemistry
should not have been included among physical
sciences but ranked as an hierarchical science. In
its present condition even it seems closely akin to
and dependent on the physical sciences, and appears
likely to be much more so in the future. What
separates Chemistry from Physics as described by
Masaryk is that while physical processes leave the
material structure of things ordinarily unchanged,
chemical processes leave a profound and lasting
change. In other words, what is distinctive of
Chemistry as compared with Physics is what is

280 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

called * chemical affinity/ a peculiar and as yet
altogether mysterious ability of matter to enter in
its smallest parts into an intimate connection of a
kind confined to Chemistry alone. Its products are
completely new. No other science apparently takes
us so deeply into the nature of matter. A complete
knowledge of the evolution of molecules may go far
to explain the evolution of worlds. The infinitely
little may be a key to acquaintance with the in-
finitely great. Experimentation has a large place
in Chemistry. What measuring is in Geometry,
weighing may not unreasonably be said, as it is by
Masaryk, to be in Chemistry.

V. Biology. — To this fifth hierarchical science in
Masaryk's scheme both Physics and Chemistry are
represented by him as subservient, while holding
great injury to have been done to it by a crude
materialism in unreasonable attempts to explain life
and its operations by inadequate causes. A com-
pletely satisfactory method of studying it is held
to have been as yet far from adequately ascertained.
Mere conjectures and conflicting hypotheses abound in
it. Its province is an extremely wide one, including
not merely a single science but many sciences, as, e.g.,
Anatomy and Physiology, Botany and Zoology, &c.

VI. Psychology. — It is closely connected with and
largely dependent on Biology. Life is presupposed
in every psychological process. That life has origin-

FROM MASARTK TO KARL PEARSON. 281

ated out of mere matter (if there be such a thing),
has not been fully proved, but no one doubts that
where there is no vitality there can be no mental
states. Thought, feeling, and volition in every
form, all phases and stages of consciousness, pre-
suppose life, not death. Of all the mental sciences
Psychology is the fundamental science — the Grund-
wissenschaft. Masaryk's treatment of it (in pp. 116-
138) seems to be very judicious.

VII. Sociology. — Like other positivists, Masaryk
regards Sociology as the crowning hierarchical
science, and naturally deals with it at much more
length than with any preceding science. He adopts
Comte's division of it into Social Statics and Social
Dynamics, and also distributes its contents into
Theoretical and Practical Sociology. Its connec-
tions with, and bearings on, other sciences are like-
wise traced, and the history as well as probable results
of its development and findings are referred to. Biol-
ogy, Psychology, and Sociology are the inseparable
stages in a vast and complex system of evolution.

B. Outside of the hierarchy three other abstract
sciences are recognised by Masaryk — namely, VIII.
Philology (Sprachforschung, including Sprachlehre
und Grammatik) ; IX. ^Esthetics ; and X. Logic
(i.e., Abstract Logic). I do not deem it necessary
to remark on that part of Masaryk's scheme, nor on

282 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

his plan or views of the system of the concrete
sciences. It must suffice that I enumerate them as
given by himself: C. Concrete Sciences. 1.
Geometry; 2. Astronomy (Chronology), Acoustics
(in part), Hydrostatics, Hydrodynamics, Aero-
statics, &c, Cosmography (Astro, Geo, and Oceano-
graphy), Cosmology (Astrogeny, Geology, &c, also
Cosmical Physics, Chemistry, Astro - physics and
Astro- chemistry, Geo -physics and Geo -chemistry,
&c.) ; 3. Botany and Zoology ; 4. Concrete Psy-
chology, Ethnology, Political Sciences, Political
Economy (including Statistics), and History (both
Universal and Special) ; 5. History of Language ;
6. Theory of Arts ; and 7. Concrete Logic. All the
so-called Concrete Sciences are represented as in
one direction or connection closely related to the
Abstract Sciences, and in another to the Practical
Sciences.

Supplementary to the section of Masaryk's
system of the sciences, as above described, are two
sections of reflections exclusively on the concrete
and practical sciences. Book v. of his work is a
statement of his Philosophy understood as equivalent
to Metaphysics. Theology he does not admit to be
a science or group of sciences. But he treats it
respectfully, and acknowledges it to have been a
chief condition of scientific progress. He has
written a valuable treatise, and discussed in it

FROM MASARYK TO KARL PEARSON. 283

with varying degrees of lucidity and thoroughness
a great number of questions and problems as to
the classification and organisation of the sciences.
That he has often failed to arrive at definite or
accurate conclusions, I am not prepared to deny.
To excite thought, however, is often a greater
benefit than to satisfy it.

M. Adrien Naville, a worthy son of the illustri- a N»Tflie.
ous Genevan philosopher, M. Ernest Naville, has
earnestly and repeatedly occupied his mind with
the subject under consideration. In 1888 he pub-
lished a Nouvelle Classification des Sciences; in
1898 he gave an excellent restatement of Le
principe general de la classification des sciences in
the German philosophical periodical Archiv fur
systematische Philosophic, iv Band, Heft 3, 1898 ;
and in 1901 a second edition of the work which
appeared in 1888 is spoken of by the author as
" completely recast " {entibrment refondue). He
describes the purpose of the work so long dealt
with as being to trace the boundaries of the special
sciences, to distinguish the fundamental notions of
each of them, and to mark the relations which
connect them. His mode of distributing them
has, so far as I am aware, the merit of original-
ity, one now becoming rare among the classifiers
of the sciences. It is by grouping the sciences

284 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES,

around three questions which he regards as funda-
mental.

The sciences he maintains are " wholes (des
ensembles) of answers to questions put by the
human mind, and the deepest differences between
the sciences are those which result from the
answers to the questions laid down." But the
fundamental questions referred to are in his opinion
just those three : 1. What is it that is possible ?
2. What is it that is real ? and 3. What is it that
is good? Hence he holds that there are three
great classes of sciences ; and that those sciences
which answer the first question are the sciences
of limits and of the necessary relations of pos-
sibilities, or, in equivalent terms, the sciences of
laws; those which answer the second question,
the sciences of possibilities realised, the sciences
of facts; and, further, those which satisfy the
third question — namely, the sciences of possibil-
ities the realisation of which would be good, or,
in equivalent terms, the sciences of ideal rules
of action. His scheme of classification is entirely
dependent on his principle of classification.

His Tableau of the former is regulated by the
latter, and determines his distribution of the sciences
under the three headings — I. Theorematics ; II.
History; and III. Canonics. As belonging to I.
Theorematics, he mentions the following sciences :

FROM MASAKYK TO KARL PEARSON. 285

(1) Nomology, (2) Arithmology, (3) Geometry, (4)
Kinematics, (5) Physico-Chemistry, (6) Biology, (7)
Psychology, and (8) Sociology. He acknowledges,
however, that there may be many more sciences of
mere laws, and even an indefinite number of them.
What he regards as the science of laws under an
absolutely abstract form is what he calls nomology ;
arithmology (arithmetic and algebra), geometry, and
kinematics are at once mathematical sciences and
sciences of law ; but there are other mathematical
sciences, and, even if there were not, there is a vast
interval between the mathematical and the physical
sciences, and a still vaster between the former and
psychology and sociology. That psychology and
sociology are occupied merely with the possible, not
with the real, is extremely questionable, and indeed
M. fraville himself admits that we do not yet possess
a truly theorematic psychology or sociology; that
they are not universally considered as sciences of
laws, but are, on the contrary, largely composed of
historical generalisations derived from experience.
Herbert Spencer placed them in the same class as
astronomy, geology, mineralogy, &c, which are
certainly more occupied with the real than with
the possible. That the mathematical sciences are
sciences of possibilities and theorems and not of
realities or facts is not likely to be denied, nor
will it be doubted that they are members of a

286 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

very distinct and special group of sciences which,
although not wholly unrelated to psychology and
sociology, are no more related to them than to many
other disciplines which M. Naville himself does not
include among his so-called theorematic sciences.
M. Naville's distinction between laws and facts,
possibilities and realities, seems to me to be a real
and important one, but also one which he somewhat
misapplies and makes too much of.

II. History, the second great section of his scheme
of classification, is defined by him as the science of
realised possibilities or facts. The signification given
to it is very comprehensive, and yet, as we have
seen, sociology is not included in it but in theore-
matics, although it surely has as much right to be
regarded as an historical discipline as most of those
studies which M. Naville has represented as actually
included in history. His reason for regarding
history as he does is that it is the kind of know-
ledge or science in which the question, What is
that which is real ? is solved or in the way of being
solved. The real is part of the possible, the possible
so far as realised, what presupposes no mere con-
ditions, no contingencies, no ifs. It is concerned
only with facts and composed only of categorical
affirmations. Further, according to M. Naville,
history is not, strictly speaking, a class of definite
and separate sciences, but, as he himself says, " a

FROM MASARYK TO KARL PEARSON. 287

single science without rigidly distinct divisions,
because in concrete reality all acts upon all, so
that in place of a series of different sciences there
are only parts of one science." Hence the parts of
history thus understood may be innumerable, and,
as they already are in number and character, may
be held to constitute the chief objects of human
study. Naville's list of them is — (1) Astronomy,
(2) Geology, (3) Mineralogy, (4) Botany, (5)
Zoology, (6) Anthropology, and (7) Human History,
political, moral, judicial, economic, linguistic, liter-
ary, artistic, religious, &c. And they are all
obviously to a large extent of an historical char-
acter. But are they more so than say Sociology
or even the History of Mathematical Sciences?
Geometry, Biology, Psychology, and Sociology
have all histories simply as accounts of them
as evolutionary or progressive studies, and their
objects would also have had histories had there
been no human beings to study them.

III. Canonics is the third and last section of
Naville's classification of the sciences. He holds
it to be a scientific group essentially different
from Theorematics and History. It is meant to
be the answer to the third great scientific question,
which is also the chief practical question, and to
include all sciences of the rules of human activity
which expressly tend to the realisation of the best

288 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

possible. A threefold division of it is given. The
first (a) is Morale, the general theory of aims, the
system or doctrine of rules relative to the choice
of chief ends. Its function, according to Naville,
is to study the different aims possible, so as to
estimate aright their comparative and complete
value; — aims held by him to be of four kinds, —
namely, 1°. satisfaction for self, 2°. satisfaction for
others, 3°. truth (knowledge) for self, and 4°. truth
for others. He leaves it to la morale itself to
determine the value of all special investigations
into the nature of the good, and to show how
their findings may be and should be combined.
There are, however, in his conception of Canonics
two other departments than Morale, a second and
third. The second, (b) Theories of the arts, may
be indefinitely numerous, inasmuch as they are
held to include all theories which endeavour to
formulate rules for selection of the most suitable
means to attain ends of every kind; all arts
associated with the various species of knowledge
or games of chance ; logic and didactic ; industries,
medicine, &c. Finally, as a third division of
Canonics there are said to be (c) Moral Sciences;
— sciences said to be composed of rules for the
choice of the means best adapted to realise in a
harmonious way human ideals. Paedagogy and
the Law of Nature (or Reason) are the examples

FROM MASARYK TO KARL PEARSON. 289

given of them. The former seeks by all attainable
means to develop to the utmost and in the most
harmonious way whatever elements for good are
contained in germ in the natures of children.
The latter seeks to ascertain how the State ought
so to constrain and regulate the power intrusted
to it as to contribute as much as possible to the
physical, intellectual, and moral development of
all classes in a nation.

M. Naville's classification of the sciences has now
been described and as far as possible in his own
words. My readers may criticise it for themselves,
and decide, say, whether the section of Canonics is
satisfactory or the reverse. Before coming, how-
ever, to a definitive conclusion even in regard to
Canonics, the seemingly weakest part of his scheme,
they would do well to take into account that M.
Naville published in the Revue Philosophique (No. 1,
Jan. 1897) a very able essay onJEconomique et Morale,
which may be held as a valuable contribution to
what would otherwise have rather discredited his
whole system, whereas now even Canonics may be
deemed not unworthy of consideration.

In 1893 M. Raoul de la Grasserie published his Deia
De la classification objective et subjective des
sciences, des lettres, et des arts. It is an elaborate
work of more than three hundred pages, and obvi-

T

290 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

ously the result of long and earnest studies. Its
author has attempted, however, an almost impos-
sible task by undertaking to deal with three so dis-
tinct classes of objects as arts, letters, and sciences,
and with two contrary kinds of method, a subjec-
tive and objective. Arts and letters are certainly
not wholly independent of or unrelated to the
sciences, but they are not sciences nor, perhaps,
more dependent on the sciences than the sciences
are on them. The subjective method of De la Gras-
serie is any suitable order of method for a desirable
course of education. His objective method is a quite
different process. It is a tracing of the order of
succession and dependence of the sciences in accord-
ance with their own natures. As I have already so
far criticised the classifications of Bacon, D'Alem-
bert, and Ampere, in which arts, letters, and sciences
are included, it seems to me unnecessary to dwell
on what is akin to them in M. de la Grasserie's
scheme. Of course he has not only studied what
he knew to have been carefully attempted by the
most eminent of his predecessors, but has also
sought to appropriate and utilise what seemed to
him to have true findings. Those from whom he
has derived most are Ampere, Comte, Spencer, and
Wundt.

He has accepted as highly important the distinc-
tion between sciences of matter and of mind, or

FROM MASARYK TO KARL PEARSON. 291

what Ampere called cosmological and noological
sciences. It is a distinction which few thinkers,
if any, have either altogether overlooked or re-
jected. It is not a distinction, however, which
can legitimately carry us very far. In proof I refer
my readers to my criticism of Ampere's method of
bifurcation based on the distinction. See pp. 79-82.
Grasserie also adopts what he calls Spencer's 'lumin-
ous division of the sciences ' into abstract sciences,
abstract-concrete sciences, and concrete sciences, (a)
By Abstract Sciences are meant those sciences which,
like Logic and Mathematics, treat of ideals or un-
occupied forms of relations in which phenomena are
known to us; (6) By Abstract - Concrete Sciences
those which, like Mechanics, Physics, and Chemistry,
treat of real relations or the relations among reali-
ties to which different modes of matter and motion
conform ; and (c) By Concrete Sciences those which,
like Astronomy, Geology, Biology, &c, deal with
distributions and redistributions of matter and
motion, molecules, solids, gases, organic pheno-
mena, &c. As to the character of that classifica-
tion see the criticism on pp. 98-103. Further,
M. de la Grasserie has accepted Wundt's distinc-
tion of general and special sciences but rejected
the distinction of formal and real sciences. The
latter, however, if properly drawn, is just as cer-
tain and accurate as the former; and it is unfor-

292 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

tunate that our author, while recognising how
intimately the mathematical sciences are related
to the physical sciences, should have failed to
recognise that they are related also, although in
a lesser measure, to the psychical sciences. Mathe-
matics has undoubtedly a place and function in
psycho-physics, human and comparative psychology,
economics, ethics (moral statistics), and sociology.
How far it will advance it is for the future to
decide.

Karl Karl Pearson, the Gershom Professor of Mathe-

matics, has given a classification of the sciences
in his well-known work the Grammar of Science.
The work was published in 1892, and has gone
through at least three editions. The classification
is only dealt with in the last chapter. The nine
chapters which precede it treat of a great variety
of subjects bearing on science or sciences, as, e.g.,
the scope, claims, domain, or method of science;
the facts of science; the meanings, progress in
formulation, and universality of scientific law;
cause and effect, as also probability; space and
time ; the geometry of motion ; matter ; laws and
life. All those subjects and others are brought
by Prof. Pearson before his readers in a most
emphatic and vigorous style, and with the utmost
faith in himself and in whatever he affirms. Self-

FROM MASARYK TO KARL PEARSON. 293

criticism, however, is obviously not one of his char-
acteristics, otherwise when writing his Grammar
of Science he could not have failed to discover
that he was really as much of the sort of meta-
physician he despised as of the scientist he adored.
He begins his chapter on the classification of the
sciences with "a summary as to the material of
science," and claims for "the heritage of science
the whole domain to which the word knowledge
can be applied," whereas it is philosophy as scientia
scientiarum which makes that claim. No single
science can reasonably do so, nor even all special
sciences combined, as every single science has a
definite and limited sphere of its own. Then he
reminds his readers again, as he had been doing
all through his work, that " knowledge is essentially
a description and not an explanation," — a quite un-
proved, and probably unprovable, generalisation of
KirchofFs definition, not of all sciences, but merely
of Mechanics. Whoever has looked into the Grammar
of Science must have been struck with the contempt
of its author for "the statements regarding force
and matter current in all the elementary text-books
of science," and his extraordinary faith in such
phrases as "science description but not explana-
tion," "conceptual formulae," " conceptual shorthand,"
and a host of other questionable phrases. Probably
few books will be found less serviceable as an ele-

294 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

mentary text-book of science than Prof. Pearson's
own Grammar of Science if used as such, although
being in various respects a work of ability it may be
very stimulating and useful to those who can separate
metaphysics from physics and rhetoric from logic in
ways which the author himself has not always
succeeded in doing.

As regards the problem of the classification of the
sciences, he approaches it with a clear perception of
its difficulty, and even with an almost excessive
humility. He recognises, to use his own words,
" how incapable any individual scientist must nowa-
days be of truly measuring the importance of each
separate branch of science and of seeing its relation
to the whole of human knowledge. An adequate
classification could only be reached by a group of
scientists having a wide appreciation of each other's
fields, and a thorough knowledge of their own
branches of learning. They must further be en-
dowed with a sympathy and patience enough to
work out a scheme of combination." * And again he
writes : " An individual even with the ability of
Bacon or Spencer must fail for want of specialists'
knowledge to classify the sciences satisfactorily. A
group of scientists might achieve much more, but
even their system would only have temporary value
as the position of a science relative to other changes

1 P. 443.

FROM MASARYK TO KARL PEARSON. 295

with its development." l These are certainly words
of soberness and truth. There can be no satisfactory
classification of the sciences without careful dis-
tribution of them into groups, a comprehensive ex-
hibition of the connections between the groups, and
a patient attempt to trace the relationships of the
members of each group. The history of the classi-
fications of the sciences is of itself ample proof of
that.

Prof. Pearson has taken into consideration only
the schemes of Bacon, Comte, and Spencer, im-
perfect although they be, and expressly tells us
that his own scheme, which is derived from these,
" pretends to no logical exactness " ; 2 and that he " is
content to call it an enumeration if the logician
refuses it the title of classification ; for he readily
admits that he is not likely to be successful where
Bacon, Comte, and Spencer have failed." But
surely any scheme of classification should aim at
logical exactness ; and to aim at surpassing the
schemes even of Bacon, Comte, and Spencer need
imply nothing presumptuous. The latest scientists
have always an advantage over their predecessors.
Further, how can a man be reasonably content to
call a classification an enumeration, what it is not
and cannot be ? A mere enumeration of the sciences
can only be useless or worse than useless. Prof.

* P. 474. * P. 452. • P. 452.

296 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES-

Pearson's scheme is nowhere merely an enumeration,
but everywhere a kind of classification, one mainly
composed of three other classifications generally
recognised to be far from perfect but also of con-
siderable value.

It is a scheme composed of three sections — viz.,
A. Abstract Science. Modes of Discrimination ; B.
Concrete Science. Inorganic Phenomena; and C.
Concrete Science. Organic Phenomena.

In A the general relations of discrimination dealt
with are (a) either qualitative and quantitative, as
also (b) relations peculiar to space and time.

As regards the qualitative relations — Logic, Ortho-
logy (by which is meant " the study of the right use
of language, the clear definition and, if needful, in-
vention of terms), and Grammar. As regards the
quantitative relations there is a division of discrete
quantity and another of change in quantity. Under
the heading * discrete quantity ' Arithmetic, Algebra,
Theory of Measurement, Errors, Probability, Stat-
istics, &c, and under that of 'change in quantity '
Theory of Functions, Calculus of Rates or Func-
tions, Calculus of Sums, &c, are assigned a place.
Connected with the special relations of space are
held to be Descriptive Geometry, Metrical Geometry,
Trigonometry, Mensuration, &c, and with those of
time Theories of Observation and Description (qual-
itative), as also Theory of Strains and Kinematics

FROM MASARYK TO KARL PEARSON. 297

(quantitative). Abstract Science is represented as
inclusive of all that is generally considered Logic
and Pure Mathematics.

B. To this second section belong concrete as
opposed to abstract science and inorganic as distinct
from organic phenomena. The common name for
the sciences included in it are physical sciences, and
by Pearson they are subdivided into what he calls
precise or exact and synoptic or descriptive physical
sciences, — the former being held to be those reduced
and the latter those not yet reduced to ideal motions.
Molar Physics, Molecular Physics, Atomic Physics,
and Physics of the Ether are viewed as so many
groups of Precise Physical Science. "In Molar
Physics," says our author, " we deal with the motion
which conceptualises the changes of position in
bodies at the surface of the earth, Mechanics ; with
the motion which conceptualises the changes in the
planetary system, Planetary Theory ; and with the
motion by which we describe changes in the con-
figuration of a planet and its satellites, Lunar
Theory." 1 To Molecular Physics he attaches
Crystallography, Hydromechanics, Aeromechanics,
Theory of the Tides, &c. ; to Atomic Physics
Theoretic Chemistry, Spectrum Analysis, Solar and
Sidereal Physics, &c. ; to Physics of the Ether
sundry studies apart from and also in association

* P. 461.

298 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

with the Molecule, as e.g., Theory of Radiation,
Light, Heat, Electricity, Magnetism, and Theories
of Dispersion, Absorption, Transmission, Conduction,
&c. The Synoptic Physical Sciences are the Theory
of Inorganic Evolution, Geology, Geography,
Meteorology, Mineralogy, Chemistry, &c.

C. The third and last great field of knowledge
according to Pearson is the division of concrete
science which deals with organic phenomena. It
includes the biological sciences, and he subdivides
them into those which deal more especially with
space or the localisation of life and those which
deal more especially with time or growth. In the
first subdivision he places what he calls Chorology
(geographical distribution of living forms), Ecology
(habits in relation to situation and climate), and
Natural History (in old sense) ; and in the second
History as non-recurring and Biology as recurring
growth. History is further described as compre-
hending the general evolution of species, connected
with which are Phytogeny, Palceontology, Origin of
Species, &c., and the special evolution of man, con-
nected with which are Craniology, Anthropology,
&c, as regarding his physique ; Art, Literature,
Science, and Philosophy as dependent on his mental
faculties ; and States, Laws, Customs, Archaeology,
Folklore, &c., as inseparable from his social in-
stitutions. There follow Morphology, Histology,

FROM MASARYK TO KARL PEARSON. 299

Anatomy, Evolution, Theory of Sex, Theory of
Heredity, Physiology, Special Psychology of Man,
and Sociology, the last branch of psychology, but
also one which subdivides into such branches as the
Science of Morals, the Science of Politics, Political
Economy, and Jurisprudence. The whole scheme
is brought to a close with Applied Mathematics,
which link Abstract Science to the Physical Sciences,
and Bio-Physics, which connects the Physical and
Biological Sciences.

Prof. Pearson has candidly acknowledged that
freedom from errors cannot be claimed for the
foregoing scheme, and certainly the errors of it
are numerous. Logic, Orthology, and Grammar
are the members of his first group. But of the
three only the first is a science. So-called Orth-
ology is merely a portion or function of Logic
which almost all books on Logic deal with in some
measure, but which it is an abuse of language to
designate a science in itself. Further, what is meant
by Grammar? and why is it located in the first
group of sciences? Is it even Grammar in the
ordinary sense of the term? In that case it is
nearly equivalent to what Pearson calls Orthology,
and there would seem to be no good reason for the
invention of the latter term, and still less for count-
ing the same science, if a science at all, twice. Or,
Is Grammar to be understood in the sense which he

300 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

attaches to it in the title and throughout the body
of his own book ? — a book in which he pronounces
judgment on the relation of science to theology and
metaphysics, as well as on the natures and relation-
ships of causes and effects, matter, motion, life, &c.
Epistemology, Logic, and Methodology would, I
think, have formed a much more natural group than
the one he has given us. As regards most of the
other group there is no less room for criticism. The
author of them has trusted too much to Bacon,
Comte, and Spencer alone; and has apparently
not even looked at what, for example, Ampere,
Whewell, and Wundt have done in the matter. In
the edition in my possession he has not even re-
ferred to them. He confidently denies the reality
of either theological or metaphysical science. The
closing words of his Grammar of Science are these :
" We have a duty before us, which, if we have faith
in the scientific method, is simple and obvious. We
must turn a deaf ear to all those who would suggest
that we can enter the stronghold of truth by the
burrow of superstition, or scale its walls by the
ladder of metaphysics. We must accomplish a task
more difficult to many minds than daring to know.
We must dare to be ignorant. Ignoramus, labor-
andum est." l It is strange that a man of the ability
of Prof. Pearson could fancy that by such rash and
. l P. 474.

FROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME. 301

random words rational beings would be induced to
ignore all theological and philosophical studies as
superstition and folly. How daring to be ignorant
can be profitable to any mind or any inducement to
labour he has not told us and probably cannot. All
labour and science presuppose a desire of know-
ledge. That no one should enter into any burrow
of superstition may be readily granted; that all
theology is superstition must be proved instead of
merely asserted. As to scaling the walls of truth
with a ladder of metaphysics a good deal depends
on the ladder, and Prof. Pearson may have been
unfortunate in the choice of one. I cannot suppose
him to be ignorant of the fact that an encyclopaedic
study, a comprehensive and organic study, of the
theological sciences, has had a far longer history
than any other group of sciences. The history of it
has been continuous through so many centuries, and
on the whole so progressive and beneficial, that un-
prejudiced men are most unlikely to deem all the-
ology a mere " burrow of superstition."

VIII. FROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME.

From Karl Pearson I must pass to the late Paul
Monsieur Janet, a man of very differently consti- ane
tuted mind. During the last half of the nine-

302 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

teenth century France had probably no more ad-
mirable representative of philosophy than the latter.
For almost fifty years a professor of philosophy, he
made himself acquainted with all forms, phases, and
departments of it; was, to use his own words,
always ready "to seek its foundations, authority,
limits, and signification, by confronting it with the
data and conditions of modern science, as well as
with the doctrines of the boldest and most recent
metaphysics " ; and could most justly say, as he has
actually done, nihil philosophicum a me alienum
putavi. He has written many philosophical works,
not one of which is other than valuable, and most
of which should long deserve to be studied. His
Causes Finales (translated into English in 1878) is
the best work on the subject. Hardly less im-
portant is his Prineipes de M&aphysique et de
Psyclwlogie, published in 1897, two years before
his death. The first twenty lectures of the first
volume of it all bear more or less on the subject
of the relations of philosophy and the sciences to
one another, and also on the classification of the
sciences. To them I must refer.

The first lecture is an admirable discussion of the
question, Is philosophy a science ? The second is
an equally admirable examination of certain modern
definitions of philosophy. The third and fourth
treat of the criterion of philosophy. And the fifth

FROM PAUL JANET TO PRE8ENT TIME. 303

is an inquiry as to what is or ought to be the
respective and appropriate functions of science and
belief in philosophy. None of the subjects of
those lectures are irrelevant to a study either of
the organisation of science or the classification of
the sciences, for the simple but almost always over-
looked reason that philosophy and science are most
closely connected, and that neither can in any form
be wholly severed from the other without serious
detriment to both. In his sixth lecture Janet
gives an account of just five classifications of the
sciences — namely, those of Aristotle, Bacon, Ampere,
Comte, and Spencer ; and the conclusions arrived at
are that the classification of Aristotle is antiquated,
of Bacon superficial, of Amp&re artificial and com-
plicated, of Comte simple and solid but incomplete
and mutilated, and of Spencer more comprehensive
than that of Comte but also incomplete and likewise
burdened with defects justly ascribed to the scheme
of Ampere.

In his seventh lecture Janet begins his own
attempt at a classification of the sciences, but
distinctly refuses to commit himself to presenting
a systematic and complete plan such as Ampfcre
and Spencer had endeavoured to provide. He first
proceeds to indicate the reasons which had been or
may be advanced in favour of a linear series of
sciences ; and then carefully to show that plausible

304 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

as those reasons may be there is a fact of such a
kind — the fact of consciousness — which when care-
fully considered makes absolutely incredible to sane
reason belief in a merely linear series of sciences.
Hence he falls back on the distribution of the
sciences into cosmological and noological sciences,
or into sciences of nature and sciences of humanity.
The sciences of nature or cosmological sciences are
subdivided into two classes. As regards the first
group, these are the sciences which are concerned
with the most general conditions of matter, and
specially occupied with measurement, numeration,
extension, and motion. Such are arithmetic, geo-
metry, mechanics, and the still more abstract
sciences, algebra, and the differential and integral
calculus. Astronomy, physics, and chemistry, al-
though less abstract and comparatively concrete,
are placed in the same group and treated as
abstract and fundamental sciences. Geology and
mineralogy, however, are viewed as concrete sciences
attached to terrestrial physics. The second group
of cosmological sciences are those which treat of
life and its phenomena. It also includes abstract
and concrete sciences, — those which treat of life
in general and those which 3tudy living beings.
Biology is the science of life in general. As such
it subdivides into three great sciences — Biotamy,
Biotaxy, and Bionomy. Biotamy corresponds to

FROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME. 305

anatomy, and is the science of the structure of
living beings. Biotaxy is the science of the classi-
fication of living beings. Bionomy corresponds
to physiology, both general and comparative.
Botany and zoology are two concrete sciences
connected with those that are abstract. The
sciences of humanity should follow in due order.
They all rest on a fundamental fact, the fact of
consciousness, and are divisible into three orders
of sciences — (1) Historical sciences ; (2) Phil-
ological sciences ; and (3) Sociological sciences.
While distinct from the sciences of nature they
are notwithstanding related to them. History, for
example, is inseparable from geography, and geo-
graphy is connected with geology and astronomy.
Psychology itself is intimately united with physio-
logy. To psychology as the science of the facts
of consciousness lectures eight and nine are devoted.
Comte's criticism of the science is shown to have
greatly misrepresented it from his desire to get
rid of it; and, following his example, some later
writers have fallen into errors as to its nature.
Janet has done justice to metaphysics by raising
in lecture ten such questions as, Is there no other
science or class of sciences than those already men-
tioned? Is there not a science superior to, after,
and above any merely particular science ? Is there
not the science known by the name of Metaphysics

u

306 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

from the time of Aristotle to the present day ? Is
Metaphysics not a legitimate and necessary study
in so far as positive philosophy or logic of the
sciences? Is it not so far likewise as a synthesis
of the universe under the form of philosophy of
evolution or any other form? Or as a critique
of knowledge? Or as knowledge even of the
unknowable so far as in any measure knowable?
Or in so far as a final synthesis or as a synthesis
of the sciences of nature and of humanity ?

The lectures which follow those that have just
been noticed are not directly occupied with classifi-
cation of the sciences, but they have indirect bear-
ings on it of very great importance. The subjects
to which I refer are the relations of theology and
philosophy (lectures 12 and 13), of philosophy and
the sciences (14 and 15), of philosophy and history
(16), of philosophy and geography (17 and 18), of
philosophy and literature (19), and of philosophy
and politics (20). They are all subjects of a kind
to be studied and taken into account by those who
would aim at a thorough organisation of the sciences,
— all of a character indispensable to any one attempt-
ing so great a task. By Janet they have been dealt
with remarkable clearness and comprehensiveness,
and with entire freedom from any kind of prejudice
or exaggeration. Although not direct efforts at
classification, they must indirectly be most helpful

FBOM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME. 307

towards a thorough insight into the natures alike
of philosophy and science in all their relationships.

Monsieur Edmond Goblot published in 1898 an Goblot.
Essai sur la classification des sciences, a work of
296 pages. The spirit of positivism pervades it
from beginning to end, although Comtek views
and conclusions are often criticised and rejected.
M. Goblot endeavours in many instances to be a
more thorough and consistent positivist than
Comte, and assumes that all philosophical ques-
tions and conclusions properly belong entirely to
some positive science or other. The assumption
is one which facts are not yet found to have
verified. No philosophical question properly so
called has been shown to belong exclusively to
any of the so-called positive sciences. Philosophy
always of its very nature transcends more than is
attained or attainable by a single exact science.

The work of M. Goblot consists of two parts.
The first is much shorter than the second, and also
of considerably less importance. The title given to
it is " The Formal Unity of Science " ; and induc-
tion and deduction are represented as merely two
stages in the development of certain sciences, not as
two distinct methods proper to them. All sciences,
even the mathematical, — arithmetic, algebra, and
geometry, — are maintained to have followed the

308 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

same method of procedure, one uniform or homo-
geneous in direction as being alike inductive and
deductive ; not two distinct methods separate from
each other, an inductive which begins with groping,
seeking, and finding, and a deductive, synthetic,
demonstrative process. The accuracy of that view
may not unreasonably be doubted. Possibly such
plausibility as it may appear to have may be due
to failure on M. Goblot's part to distinguish and
separate the two stages of knowledge, ordinary and
scientific. Mathematical demonstration belongs ex-
clusively to the latter and higher stage. According
to the author of the Essai, all true science tends
to become abstract and deductive, the experimental
as well as the mathematical That may or may not
be so. Considering how far mathematics has during
the nineteenth century extended its bounds, what
thoughtful and educated man will venture to say
where will be its limits at the close of the twentieth?
There has probably been nothing more marvellous
in the nineteenth century a.d. than the development
and expansion of mathematical thought.

The title given by M. Goblot to the second
section of his work is " The System of the Sciences,"
and in that section he subjects to a very close
examination the arrangement and classification of
the sciences. As was to be expected, he has main-
tained that of all sciences the mathematical are

FROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME. 309

entitled to have the foremost and dominant place
assigned to them. They are, of course, represented
as composing the first group of sciences. Arith-
metic, algebra, geometry, and mechanics are held
to be its constituent sciences. The first two, in-
asmuch as they are occupied not with measurable
things like space and motion but with pure quan-
tity, measurement in general, are deemed entitled
to be placed before geometry and mechanics. Geo-
metry is placed next in order on the ground that
it starts from the idea of space, the conception
of extension, what is also directly measurable.
Mechanics follows as dependent on the idea of time,
and is viewed as including kinematics, the science
of movements, and dynamics, the science of forces.
According to M. Goblot it is the best example of
a science which has become deductive as soon as
its elementary notions have been elucidated and
its essential definitions formulated. Like all pure
science, he holds it to be entirely abstract, and as
such altogether independent of the reality of its
objects. He denies that the notion of mass is what
differentiates kinematics and dynamics, and affirms
the real distinction between them to be that the
former is concerned only with real motions whereas
the latter takes account also of possible motions.
The sciences of the mathematical group are said
to have no need of resting on experience as they

310 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

are always in conformity with experience. A fact
not in conformity with mathematical laws is an
impossibility.

The physical sciences are next brought before us
under the head of Cosmology. In their present
condition they are, of course, allowed to be experi-
mental and inductive, but they are also affirmed
to be destined to become deductive. The following
is the list given of them (see ch. iv. pp. 128-156 of
M. Goblot's Essai) : —

Physics, described as theoretical and abstract
cosmology and inclusive of various studies — viz.,
(a) the study of the mutual gravitation or attrac-
tion of masses (barology), (b) the study of heat
(thermics), (c) optics, (d) acoustics, and (e) dec-
trology understood as not only the study of elec-
tricity but also of magnetism. The study of molec-
ular actions is also added, but only so far as confined
to physics and consistent with physics and chem-
istry being two quite distinct sciences. Physics is
defined as the science of matter, but matter is said
to have no ontological meaning — i.e., to be not a
reality but an abstract conception; and by the
indefinite possibility of bodies as space is meant
the indefinite possibility of figures. Body is
affirmed to be space occupied in opposition to
space empty, but the physicist is told that it does
not belong to him to say by what it is occupied;

FROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME. 311

that the chemist and mineralogist should be left
to determine that.

Chemistry, with which mineralogy is intimately
connected, is characterised as special or systematic
cosmology. The new conception here is said to be
that of bodies as actual things. The body, the
elementary body, is the atom. And according to
M. Goblot the atom, although indivisible, extended,
and impenetrable, has no sensible properties, neither
temperature nor colour nor even resistance, neither
solidity nor fluidity. He has strangely little to say
of it, and virtually nothing of what others have said
of it, much and disputed as that has been.

Astronomy and physical geography are char-
acterised as forms of descriptive, concrete, and
theoretic cosmology. Cosmogony and geology are
described as historical, concrete, and theoretical
cosmology. The concrete and theoretic are what
they are held to have in common. What is pro-
nounced distinctive of them is that astronomy and
physical geography are 'descriptive sciences' and
that cosmogony and geology are ' historical sciences.'

The last great group of sciences dealt with by M.
Goblot is now reached. He has treated it at far
greater length than either of the two correspondent
groups which preceded it. It is composed of Biology,
Psychology, and Sociology, and designated Bio-
Psycho - Sociologie, a somewhat clumsy but ap-

312 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

propriately comprehensive term, one meant to
indicate three important and distinct yet related
sub-groups of very important sciences — namely,
the biological, psychological, and sociological. The
fundamental idea, however, which one would expect
to connect all biological, psychological, and socio-
logical science, is the very reverse of clearly brought
out. What it is I confess I do not know. Perhaps
it may be the idea of finality, but if so, there is no
definite statement to that effect.

Physiology occupies in our author's scheme
almost the same position towards biology, psycho-
logy, and sociology as physics towards cosmology.
As pure and abstract or general physiology it is
coextensive with all biology, and is the science of
all the laws of life, or more simply the science of
life. It is in close connection with anatomy. They
march side by side. Neither without the other
would have attained to the full rank of science.
The great stages of progress in physiology have
been preceded by discoveries in anatomy, and
anatomy without the researches of physiology
would be unable to elucidate its own observations.
Physiology indeed, as understood by M. Goblot,
can only adequately accomplish its work by combin-
ing and co-operating with such species of knowledge
as histology, embryology, morphology, phylogeny,
pathology, and teratology. Zoology he connects

PROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME. 313

with botany, and describes them as systematic or
special and applied or concrete biological sciences.
Anthropology he includes in zoology. What he
calls biological geography he describes as a biology
which is descriptive, applied, or concrete, and as a
geography which is linguistic, economic, political,
&c. He further includes palaeontology and history
as closely connected in this section of his scheme,
and as both occupied with ' the order of facts in
time/ Apparently he has overlooked that that is
true also of all sociological studies. Hygiene and
therapeutics are appended as ' practical sciences/ on
the ground that they are serviceable to plants,
beasts, and men.

M. Goblot next proceeds to assign to psychology
its appropriate position in the scheme of classifica-
tion of the sciences. He affirms its dependence on
physiology and biology, and indicates the relation-
ship between it and them. Further, he endeavours
to describe what physical phenomena are and to
show their inseparability to some extent from
physico-chemical phenomena. As to what psycho-
logy itself is, however, he has said disappointingly
little, and that little is not of much importance.
The comparative psychology both of human races
and animal species is entirely overlooked, although
it well deserves to be regarded as what it must
probably soon become acknowledged to be — viz.,

314 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

one of the greatest and most instructive of sciences.
There is a like oversight as to mental pathology.

As a positivist of the Comtist type M. Goblot
should bring his classification of the sciences to a
close in sociology. Comte did so, and was in that
respect self-consistent, but it is not evident that his
disciple is so. Comte divided sociology into social
statics and social dynamics, the former being the
theory of the spontaneous order of human society
and the latter the theory of its natural progress, —
the one exhibiting the conditions of the social exist-
ence of the individual, the family, and the species,
and the other the course of human development.
What M. Goblot does seems to be something very
different. He appends to sociology logic and
aesthetics, and thereby implies that logic and
aesthetics are of later origin and rank than soci-
ology. True, he speaks of them as the remotest
branches of sociology, and thereby implies the latest,
but he does not show that they are branches of it at
all. The logic of Aristotle, who died in 322 B.C., was
at least as great an achievement as the sociology of
Comte, although the former preceded the latter by
so many centuries. Further, if logic and aesthetics
can be so located or characterised as M. Goblot
represents them to be, ethics and economics may be
equally so, and in that case more may reasonably
be said for the priority of them all to sociology than

FROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME. 315

for the priority of sociology to any one of them.
It has also to be noted that logic, aesthetics, ethics,
and economics form a distinct group of sciences,
each of which has a definite aim of its own and a
nature akin to but not identical with the others.
Thus logic is occupied with the nature, conditions,
and processes of reasoning as its subject-matter, and
with the attainment of truth and exposure of error
as its appropriate ends. Thus beauty is the dis-
tinctive object, and the realisation and enjoyment
of it the final causes, of aesthetics. So ethics not
only undertakes to study men's moral natures, moral
relations, and moral histories, but also endeavours
to direct and regulate their actions. And similarly,
while the specific matter of economics is public
wealth, its distinctive ends are the production and
distribution of that matter in the most appropriate
and socially beneficial manner.

A favourably known Neo - Kantish philosopher, stadier.
Prof. A. Stadier of Zurich, published in the Archiv
fiir Systematische Philosophic (Bd. ii. 1, N. R,
1896) a contribution to the subject in hand, entitled
Zur Klassification der Wissenschaften. He had
already made an attempt of the kind in 1887. He
prefaced his scheme with remarks on the views of De
la Grasserie and Wundt, which seem to me of little
relevancy and less value. That he should speak of

316 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

such attempts as " relatively rare " seems to me an
astounding statement, which the present volume
should amply refute. He starts by defining science
as 'the most exact description possible of the
totality of the representations given to human
consciousness.' That may pass as a harmless
statement, but Stadler, following the bad example
of some other recent German writers, has talked in
such a confused way about what should be meant by
the terms " Beschreibung," " Vergleichung," "Mit-
theilung," " Benennen," " Mittheilen," " Erklaren,"
&c, as tends to the reverse of elucidation. On
that subject readers may consult Herr Otto
Schneiders review of Stadler's Klassification. (See
A. S. Ph., iii. Bd. i. 1-19.)

The first and most comprehensive section of
sciences in Stadler's scheme of classification is that
in which the sciences are divided into those which
come under the heading either of Erscheinungslehre
or of Ideenslehre— either into sciences which rest
on phenomena or on ideals, on what is or what
ought to be. The sciences which have physical and
psychical phenomena for their objects and forms are
numerous and compose subordinate groups, of which
the first and largest is occupied with external and
physical phenomena, and entitled Korperlehre.
The members of this group are classified by Stadler
as follows : —

FROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME. 317

A. I. Morphology. — It is said to deal with
phenomena and their changes as they are im-
mediately given, and is represented as a generic
science of which those others are specific — namely,

(a) Cosmology, as knowledge of the external pheno-
mena of the universe ; (6) Astronomy, the objects of
which are the celestial bodies ; (c) Erdkunde, such
an acquaintance with the earth as includes Meteor-
ology, Geography, and Geology; (d) Mineralogy;
and (e) Biology, conjoined with which are Botany,
Zoology, and Physical Anthropology, which all deal
with the study of organisms.

IT. Chemistry. — It is represented by Stadler as
dealing with external phenomena that are combina-
tions of elements and as having the following de-
partments belonging to it : (a) Analytic Chemistry ;

(b) Synthetic Chemistry ; (c) Astro-chemistry ; (d)
Geo - chemistry ; (e) Chemistry of Minerals ; and
(/) Biological Chemistry. As regards Synthetic
Chemistry, the syntheses are referred to as either
inorganic or organic.

III. Histology. — Is occupied with organic pheno-
mena as combinations of vegetable and animal
tissues of the smallest and simplest order. It seems
questionable that it should be held to precede either
Anatomy or Physiology as it does in the scheme,
and questionable also that it should be given pre-
cedence to Physics.

318 CLASSIFICATIONS OP THE SCIENCES.

IV. Physics. — Has many sciences assigned to it.
It is described as being no less than synthetic,
analytic, cosmic, astrophysical, mechanical, optical,
acoustic, magnetic, electric, and thermal, which
means ten sciences in one. But there are added to
it four other sciences — Physical Geography, Physics
of Minerals, Special Physiology, and Special Psycho-
physics.

V. History. — The objects of history are pheno-
mena and their changes as given at different times
and in an orderly succession. Belonging to it are
said to be Cosmogony, Astrogeny, History of the
Earth, History of Development, Autobiography,
General and Special Biography, and the General
and Special History of Culture. Certainly not
all of these are entitled to be deemed sciences
strictly so -called, however interesting they may
be as studies.

B. Seelenlehre (Psychology). — Is the science of
mind and self-consciousness, but also intimately con-
nected with the nature and states of a corporeal
organism. Stadler assigns to it the following studies
as sciences — viz., (a) Subjective Psychology and
Autobiography; (6) Objective Psychology, Psycho-
physical Anatomy, General Psychophysics, Special
Psychophysics, and General Life-History of the in-
dividual consciousness (Special Biography) ; also (c)

FROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME. 319

Comparative Psychology, Universal History of Cul-
ture, and Special History of Culture.

C. Seinsollende (Ideenlehre), knowledge of the
obligatory and ideal, subdivides into Teleology,
which has to do with happiness, and Ethics, which is
conversant with morality.

I. Teleology has the following subdivisions : (a)
Pure Teleology; (b) Applied Teleology; (c) Euda-
monistic Psedagogy ; (d) Economics ; and (e)
^Esthetics.

II. Ethics. — It is subdivided into (a) Pure Ethics,
which treats of absolute morality ; and (6) Ethical
Psedagogic, which concerns itself with the relation-
ship of appearances to absolute morality.

D. Mathematics. — Stadler regards the mathe-
matical sciences as occupied with the possible forms
of phenomena. He has contented himself with
enumerating merely three such sciences — namely,
Geometry, Arithmetic, and Kinetics. But are
mathematicians likely to be satisfied with so
few? Or, are they likely to acquiesce in the
three that are mentioned being placed last in
any classification of sciences? Is it not a fact
that they have very generally been accustomed
to see their sciences placed in the first rank of
most classifications of the sciences?

320 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

Stadler's scheme of classification must be credited
with containing not a few good points and some
admirable suggestions. As a whole, however, it
is far from satisfactory, and many earlier schemes
are likely to be preferred to it. I have already
referred to Schneider's criticism of it.

Trirero. Three years later than the appearance of Stadler's
scheme the Classifieazione delle Scienze of Signor
Camillo Trivero was published. It is a work of
nearly three hundred pages, and one of the books
in the Collection of the Manuali Hoepli, so termed
from the well - known publishing firm in Milan.
The book of Signor Trivero has been much in-
fluenced by the treatise of M. Goblot that has
already been under consideration in this volume.
It may suffice to treat it briefly.

Signor Trivero maintains, like M. Goblot, the
necessity of classifying the sciences both from an
objective and a subjective point of view. All classi-
fications regarded only from either standpoint of
observation are held by him to be necessarily very
defective. In his opinion, as in his predecessor's,
the sciences must be distinguished from one another
either by differences of the facts with which they
have to deal or by differences of the points of
view from which the same facts are contemplated
and examined. Differences of method, he holds,
are not to be taken into account in any attempts

PROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME. 321

at classifying the sciences. He even denies that
there are any such methods. In that respect he
has gone farther than M. Goblot, inasmuch as
whereas the latter at least admits that there are
different methods correspondent to the stages or
phases of development in all the sciences, Trivero
denies that, properly understood, there are any
different methods. There is " only one," he affirms,
"only one that is good and scientific, the method
which proceeds from the known to the unknown;
and it is of little consequence whether that method
ascends and is called induction, or descends and is
said to be deduction, or proceeds horizontally and
is termed analogy." These so-called methods he
denies to be distinct methods.

In the opinion of Trivero a system of the sciences
should be presented under the form, as M. Goblot
has said, "d'un tableau k double entree, avec
* divisions horizontals ' et * divisions verticales.' "
In that respect Trivero and Goblot are agreed,
but neither of them has worked out a scheme of
the kind to either order or completeness, and
Trivero least so, as he has presented no justi-
fication whatever of the "horizontal divisions."
Holding all knowledge to be capable of being
studied from three points of view, he should
have shown what the results would be, but that
he cannot be said to have successfully done. The

x

322 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

three points of view are affirmed to be the his-
torical, scientific, and philosophic, and intimately
connected with them are held to be * vertical
divisions' of the sciences. It does not appear,
however, from Trivero's scheme that almost any
sciences of any kind are to be seen from his
* points of view' or arranged in his * divisions.'
The so-called first point of view is * history/ and
in history * geography' is included, but not more
than ' history ' is included in € geography.' Further,
history began its course not as * science' but as
'art,' as • literature,' and still is often that and
no more. Gradually indeed it passed into a
political stage, and even exercised much political
and social influence. Later it ceased to be satis-
fied with merely describing or recording historical
actions and events, and sought for a full com-
prehension and explanation of them. It thus
passed into the stage of theoretical and explana-
tory science, but with only a very slight addition
to the number of sciences. Beyond the scientific
stage there is admitted to be a philosophical stage,
but there is no mention of philosophical sciences,
and could not be expected to be, as for Trivero
all philosophy is merely metaphysics, and all
metaphysics is merely a search for the absolute.
Thus far the sciences exhibited must be admitted
to have been exceedingly few.

FROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME. 323

But a hierarchy of the sciences resting on the nat-
ural objects and natural sequences of those sciences
has still to be recognised, and according to Trivero
there are seven of them. The first is said to be
Astronomy, and to have for its object the sidereal
world; the second to be Geology \ with the earth
for its object ; the third Mineralogy, which treats
of the mineral kingdom; the fourth Botany,
which is occupied with the vegetable world; the
fifth Zoology, to which the animal kingdom
belongs ; the sixth Psychology, in so far as
man is more than a mere animal; and the
seventh Sociology, the science of man's actions
and productions. That may well seem to some
a very clear and simple distribution of the
sciences, or at least of a ' vertical section' of
them, but it is certainly also a very inadequate
scheme of classification of the sciences as a com-
prehensive system in which are many members
at once distinct and related. Could there have
been a science of astronomy worthy of the name
of science had there not been prior to it logic,
mathematics, and so far physics? If geology be
pronounced a science why should geography not?
Can mineralogy be a science if chemistry be
ignored? Is the definition given to sociology
one of which any sociologist would approve?
Certainly not. It would be nearer to a defi-

324 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

nition of anthropology. All sociologists are aware
that to define sociology is a very difficult affair.

In 1898 a J. G. Meyer published at Strassburg
a book or essay bearing the title Das naturliche
System der Wissenschaften. I am, however, quite
ignorant of its character or contents, having been
unable to obtain a copy, notice, or review of it, or
even to find out the name of its publisher.

From 1866 to his death in 1901 Monsieur J. P.
Durand (de Gros) devoted himself to the study of
classification with more zeal, perhaps, than any one
in France or elsewhere, while deploring that even
naturalists and logicians had contributed exceedingly
little towards the development of what seemed to
him might be, and ought to be, made a complete
and well-established science of universal classifica-
tion or orderly arrangement in every direction, — the
science to which he has given the appropriate title
of Taxinomy. The most important of his works,
perhaps, is the one entitled Aperyus de Tamnomie
GSnSrale, published at Paris in 1899 (by F. Alcan,
dditeur, pp. 265). Too modestly he described himself
as merely a pioneer in a region where he had really
laboured for almost a lifetime, and seems to have
found in it much which alike his predecessors and
contemporaries had overlooked. A more earnest
and independent treatment of it there could scarcely
be. A vainer man who had done as much would

PROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME. 325

have not unlikely claimed to be the author of a
Scienza Nuova. Yet few readers, and especially
readers outside of France, would, I fear, be likely
to do justice to such works as those of M. Dur-
and, suggestive and instructive although they be.
It seems desirable, therefore, to state that of the
Aperqus there are two good yet brief notices which
will be no great burdens on their readers. One is
that of Monsieur F. Paulhan in the Revue Phil-
osophique for April 1899 (pp. 419-424). The
other is that of Prof. Bosanquet in Mind for
October 1899 (pp. 531-535).

Both reviewers have naturally dwelt chiefly on
the main subjects of the works reviewed, — those
which Durand himself called the Four Taxinomic
Orders or Problems. The First Order is described
as that of Generality or Resemblance. The classi-
fications of botany and zoology are applications of
it, specially included in it, and familiar to us in the
relationship between genera and species. Induction,
generalisation, and specification are processes im-
plied in it. The entire order is based on the rela-
tionship of genus to species and of species to genus.
Not so the Second Order, — the order of Composition
or Collectivity. It is founded on the relation of
whole to part and part to whole, and has for its
objects concrete objects, not abstract conceptions
like those in the first order. The Third Order is

326 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

the order of Hierarchy or Relationship of Rank.
It is maintained to rest on relationships of sub-
ordination, as, e.g., of superiority, equality, and
inferiority. The Fourth Order is that of Genealogy
and Evolution, and is represented as dependent on
affinities of kinship under the three species of ascent,
collaterally, and descent. Taxinomy was Durand's
great contribution to classification, and it was with
classification as a whole that he felt himself bound
to see it as far as possible fully developed. A classifi-
cation of the sciences was accordingly not overlooked
by him. But he cannot be said to have given it
any special attention. It would appear as if it
were regarded by him as a comparatively small
affair, the settlement of which could only be attained
through a rational evolution of the science of taxi-
nomy itself Study, he seems to have thought,
the variations of all the objects and methods of
the objects and relations of the sciences, and you
will necessarily learn to classify the sciences aright,
although so many have failed to do so. We can
understand, therefore, how, although he dealt to
some extent in the last chapter of the Aperpus with
the classification of the sciences, it was to a very
small extent, and led to no result of consequence.

There is no apparent likelihood of there being
fewer attempts at classifications of the sciences in

FROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME. 327

the present than in the past century. No one
classification of the kind has yet been generally
adopted. The number of sciences to be classified
seem to be on the increase, and some of them are
difficult both to define and locate. New sciences
are generally found to speedily introduce others.
An active philosophy is sure to agitate questions
which call for settlement from sciences that had
previously been dormant or ignored. The great
increase of interest shown by scientists of late in
classification itself is of itself evidence that classifi-
cations of the sciences will not decrease but increase
in number. Both taxinomy and morphology are
obviously working in that direction under the
belief of those who cultivate them that each science
is to be carefully assigned to its appropriate posi-
tion in an appropriate class. It does not follow
that a correct and adequate classification of the
sciences will be either easily or speedily found.
It will certainly not be found in any single linear
series. It is much more complicated than that,
and seems to be always becoming more compli-
cated. The older sciences are at least as fruitful
as they ever were, and the newer sciences are now
seldom regarded with suspicion, but, on the con-
trary, rapidly adopted and warmly welcomed.

Consider for an instant the positions occupied
by those three recent and very interesting and

328 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

flourishing sciences called Anthropology, Ethno-
logy, and Sociology. There are, perhaps, none
which have come more rapidly to the front or
attracted more attention. Nor are there almost
any sciences which have taken possession of vaster
regions or more numerous provinces. But they so
interlap one another at all points, and so over-
spread ground claimed by all of them with almost
or altogether equal rights, that it is difficult to say
what are their external limits or internal contents.
So far as they have hitherto been dealt with, any
one of them would seem to be largely occupied in
attempting to supplant the other two, while profess-
ing to be entirely co-operating with them.

Anthropology is a real and very important
science, the success of which has been great and well-
deserved owing to the labours of its many zealous
students. In the United States of America alone
there are about forty Universities, and in the
majority of them several teachers of the science,
anthropological museums, and various means of
practical anthropological study. Great Britain and
Ireland are not so advanced owing to their want of
encouragement and support, but individuals have
amply shown how much they could do, and how
much more with ampler means might be done.
There is happily one admirable institution in the

FROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME. 329

kingdom devoted to the study of anthropological
science, and which is well known to have an admir-
able organ in the Journal of the Anthropological
Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, — a large
annual volume now in the twenty-fourth year of
its existence.

Its eminent president, Dr A. C. Haddon, delivered
on January 27, 1903, a very interesting address on
Anthropology, Its Position and Needs. But the
very opening sentences of his address are these : —
" A peculiarity of the study of Anthropology is its
lack of demarcations : sooner or later the student
of Anthropology finds himself wandering into fields
that are occupied by other sciences. The practical
difficulty of drawing a dividing-line between the
legitimate scope of Anthropology and that of other
studies is so great that we are often told there is no
science of Anthropology. This lack of definiteness
adds a charm to the subject and is fertile in the
production of new ideas, for it is at the fringe of a
science that originality has its greatest scope. It is,
however, only by a synthesis of the various studies
which are grouped together under the term Anthro-
pology, that one can hope to gain a clear conception
of what man is, and what he has done." 1 And he
adds : " It may be logically consistent to distribute
portions of Anthropology among other sciences, but

1 Vol. xxxiii. p. 11.

330 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

the result would be that the subject would suffer,
and unless a society like our Anthropological Insti-
tute busied itself with the study as a whole, it would
be developed very unequally. Indeed, to be quite
candid, at the present there is very little direction
in the evolution of Anthropology, or in the study of
its branches." 1 He has further drawn out, with the
fully acknowledged co-operation of Professor Patrick
Geddes, a very remarkable scheme of classification
of sciences, or at least of studies, all held to belong
to, and even to be portions of, Anthropology. The
scheme is represented as having three planes. The
lowermost plane may be designated anthropological
and even biological. Adherent to it are held to be
the following sciences, and they are arranged in two
parallel series thus : —

2. Palaeontology.

Taxonomy.

(Ecology.

Rational Phytogeny.

1. Embryology.

Anatomy.

Physiology.

Rational Ontogeny.

The two series are included in the first and
lowermost plane. Series number one is the lowest
of all in the scheme, and on the whole lies beyond
the legitimate bounds of both Anthropology and
Sociology, Taxonomy and Anatomy. Neither Tax-
onomy nor Anatomy belongs exclusively or dis-
tinctively to Man. The same is true of Physiology.

1 Vol. iii. p. 11.

FROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME.

331

(Ecology is an ambiguous term, being employed by
some, Hseckel for example, to denote the science
of Economics as applied to plants and animals,
and by others to nature-folk as distinguished from
culture-folk. The term Ontogeny is employed in
biology and psychology for individual development,
as contrasted with the term Phylogeny, which is
used to denote the process of the descent and
development of species, and to explain the ancestry
and genetic relations of organisms.

The second plane with its two parallel series are
manifestly more entitled to be regarded as of an
anthropographical or anthropological stage than the
first. It is, however, arranged just in the same
way. It is the intermediate stage or plane, and
its two parallel series are the following: —

H.

4. Palaeontology
of Man.

Racial Classifica-
tion of Man.

Anthropographical
(Ecology.

Rational
Phylogeny.

3. Comparative
Human Em-
bryology.

Comparative Hu-
man Anatomy.

Comparative Hu-
man Physio-

logy.

Rational
Ontogeny.

The man who appears at that stage is truly man,
although far from fully man. He is not a mere
animal but a social and rational being which has
occupations and institutions of the kind distinctly
recognisable as human.

On the third plane man is seen to have risen,

332

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

aided by the stepping-stones of the stages I. and
II., or what is equivalent, those of the series 1, 2,
3, and 4. It is the plane or stage on which, as
President Haddon says, "the limitations of the
classification in the animal plane are largely tran-
scended, " " all the enterprises of social man studied,"
and where " Psychology takes us into the inner
sanctuary of man, and while it, too, has its roots in
his animal nature, it flowers, so to speak, in a realm
of its own. In the third stage, the uppermost stage,
Ethnology and Sociology are identified without
proof given. They should be treated as distinct.
The uppermost plane is the last, and composed of
the two following series of sciences, or supposed
sciences, thus : —

m

6. Archaeology.

Social Taxonomy.

Economics and
Politics.

Philosophy
of History.

5. Evolution of
Institutions.

Analysis of In-
stitutions and
Technology.

Functioning of Oc-
cupations and
of Institutions.
Linguistics.

Criticism of
Institu-
tiona.

President Haddon and Professor Geddes have
presented as a whole the planes, sections, and
series of their scheme of classification. That, it
seems to me, may be found rather too difficult for
general comprehension. Therefore I have also dis-
tributed it into parts and sections, without the

FROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME. 333

least addition, however, of my own. But there
should be no difficulty in piecing them together,
starting from the bottom to the top, as indicated by
the planes L, IL, and III., and connecting the mem-
bers of each series by the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
In accordance with the views of the authors of the
classification, Embryology is set down as its first
term and Philosophy of History as its last. That
may imply either that the intervening distance be-
tween the first and the last link is vast or that it is
not. Embryology regarded as a science is of very
recent origin. Von Baer and F. M. Balfour were
among the earliest, as well as the best known, of its
originators. Eegarded as a history, an evolutionary
or developmental process, between the present hour
and the origin of embryonic existences, millions on
millions of years may have intervened. Then as to
the last term, Philosophy of History, why should it
be where it is and Sociology left unnamed ? Socio-
logy claims to be a science, and, if not the very
last, at least almost the last attained, whereas Philo-
sophy of History does not claim to be an exact
science, although it has generally claimed to be as
good or better. History is a very ambiguous term.
Everything has a history, the world and all things
therein, a molecule of matter no less than the
British Empire. Whatever exists, whatever acts,
in the heavens or on the earth is history, and that

334 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES,

which is purely and strictly history. The best
narrative of history is only a verbal history of a
real history, the history of a history. So there may
be a science of history ; but the science of history,
too, is, and must be, another thing than the history.
And as there is a science of history, so there is
a philosophy of history, and it must rest on what is
actual history, not history of history, science of
history, or itself, i.e., philosophy of history. Socio-
logy may, and not without reason, attempt to be a
Science of History. Philosophy of History may not
reasonably do so, but it is bound to aim at being
more than any mere science or any single science
whatever. It cannot be difficult to recognise defects
in the scheme of classification presented. To in-
clude the Philosophy of History in Anthropology
implies the impossible, the enclosure of a larger
system in a smaller. And further, there are other
sciences seemingly as well entitled to a place in the
scheme as those which are there. The general
utility of the scheme, however, may readily be
acknowledged. Acquaintance with most of the
subjects drawn into it cannot fail to be helpful to an
anthropologist. Enough, however, may now have
been said of Anthropology, as it has not yet been
clearly and successfully discriminated from either
Ethnology or Sociology, although it is manifestly a
member of the same group.

FROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME, 335

As Ethnography corresponds, or at least should
correspond, to Anthropography, so should Ethnology
to Anthropology. Ethnography is merely the de-
scriptive study of all ascertainable groups of peoples.
Ethnology is in a stricter sense a science, although
one intimately connected with and greatly aided by
Ethnography. The latter is occupied with the ob-
servation of human groups and organisations, of
hordes, clans, races, peoples, and nations, or, in
other words, with the status, occupations, and insti-
tutions of mankind, whereas the former aims at
carrying out the fullest possible investigation and
explanation of all that Ethnography may have dis-
covered and described. Keane's Ethnology is an
admirable exposition of the science so called. It
deals in a singularly lucid style alike with the funda-
mental ethnical problems and the primary ethnical
groups. The work issued from the Cambridge Uni-
versity Press in 1896. As regards the accumulation
of ethnographical and ethnological facts and theories,
perhaps the Zeitschri/t fur Ethnologie : Organ der
Berliner Gesellschaft fur Anthropologie 3 Ethno-
logie, und Urgeschichte, founded in 1869, has not
been surpassed, owing doubtless to having started
with the support of such indefatigable workers as
A. Bastian, R. Hartmann, and E. Virchow.

Sociology is an advance on Ethnology, as Ethno-
logy is on Anthropology. It has often been referred

336 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

to in this work in connection with the views of it
given by Comte, Spencer, J. S. Masaryk, De Koberty,
and many others. Very opposite views of it are
still given by equally able men. For instance, Prof.
Giddings, a most distinguished American thinker
and economist, published in 1897 his Principles of
Sociology, a work in which the nature of sociology
as a science, of its place among the sciences, of its
appropriate method, its territory, and distribution of
parts, &c, were most skilfully exhibited. In the
same year, however, a very subtle and elaborate
attempt was made by Prof. Hyslop of Columbia
University, in a Supplementary Number of the
American Journal of Sociology, to refute the
views of his predecessor. There he dealt with
Prof. Giddings' classification in detail, and exam-
ined and criticised a number of possible systems
regarding the relations between Sociology and all
its cognate and auxiliary sciences, or sources of
knowledge.

In America, and all the chief countries of Europe,
Sociology has now attracted to itself a wide, vivid,
and growingly increasing interest. Perhaps its im-
portance has been most adequately realised in the
United States, where it has been taught in almost
all their Universities, and in a generally inde-
pendent and practical way. Britain must be
admitted to have lagged behind, but has now

FROM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME. 337

seemingly awakened up to its duty and interests in
the matter. The newly formed Sociological Society
starts on right lines, and promises to be worthy of
what it should be. It is to be hoped that it may
have, as so many other countries already have, an ap-
propriate literary organ for such a science as Socio-
logy is. Of such an organ the AnnSe Sociologique^
founded in 1896, and since then till now directed
by M. Durkheim and an able body of collaborateurs,
seems to be an excellent model. The distribution
of the matter in it appears to be about as appro-
priate as possible. Little that is relevant to what
Sociology is seems to escape the sociological net, or
to fail to find in it something that may be of use.
The classification in the Annie is from its first year
(1896-1897) to its present year (1903-1904) scarcely
at all altered, — a fact which shows that the scheme
had been maturely conceived from the first. An
"Analysis of the Sociological Literature (in Books
and in Periodicals) summarised in the Annie
Sociologique for 1902 " will be found at the close
of a very valuable paper by Mr Victor V. Branford,
" On the Origin and Use of the Word Sociology,
and on the Relation of Sociological to other Studies
and to Practical Problems." The great variety of
classifications of the contents of Sociology to be
found in books and pamphlets at the present time
should not be regarded as in any way disproving or

338 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

discrediting the validity and worth of Sociology.
It shows merely that Sociology as the general social
science is an extremely comprehensive science when
compared or contrasted with the special social sciences
which are occupied with the composition, elements,
and internal organisation of social groups within
comparatively limited spheres. There are many
'approaches/ as Prof. Geddes says, to Sociology.
There are likewise many sections, and also sub-
sections, each of which has its own special charac-
teristics, and depends on distinctive phenomena
(statistical, physical, organic, psychical, anthropo-
logical, ethnological, or theological), yet which none
the less belong to Sociology itself. 1

I must now hasten to a close. My history of the
classifications of the sciences may be said to be
ended, and a few concluding words are all that
seem called for.

I have not meant the book to be more than what
its title means, and I have brought the history con-
tained in it down to the present time. That that
history is needed, no one, I think, for whom it has
been intended, can fail to acknowledge. It is
meant only for a certain class of persons, and

1 The moet comprehensive study of the nature, methods, and aims
of Sociology is the Sittema di Sociologies 1901 (pp. 664), of Enrico
De Marinis, Professor in the University of Naples and Parliament-
ary Deputy.

FEOM PAUL JANET TO PRESENT TIME. 339

whether the class be a large or a small one I do
not profess to know. It is a history brought down
to a given date, or, practically speaking, the present
day. I do not pretend to have succeeded in col-
lecting and dealing with all classifications of the
sciences, but I hope to have come nearer than
any one else to success in that respect. I have
little doubt that of those who take up the book
into their hands there will be a considerable pro-
portion who deem its chief fault to be that so
very many schemes of classification are presented
in it. That criticism or objection will not touch
me at all. A selection of comparatively interest-
ing classifications is not needed, and it can be
of very little worth to any one who wishes to
have an historical view of the process of classifi-
cation of the sciences.

While I am writing these lines there is being
held at St Louis, U.S.A., a Universal Exposition, —
an International Congress of Arts and Sciences, —
the express object of which is " to discuss and set .
forth the unification and mutual relations of the
sciences, and to thus overcome the lack of relation
and harmony in the scattered specialists sciences of
our day." There has never, so far as I am aware,
been known in the history of the world any such
event in the history of classifications of the sciences,
and if that event be a success the latter history, —

340 CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES.

the history of classifications of the sciences, — far
from being ended or drawing near to a close, must
receive an altogether exceptionally powerful pro-
gressive impetus.

Considering the character of the arrangements
and the qualifications of those to whom they are
intrusted, there is every likelihood that the event
will be a great success.

THE END.

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